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This paper provides a short study of Indonesia economic performance before July
1997 and an early diagnosis of the economic crisis in Indonesia which occurred from July
1997 to March 1998. After achieving a remarkable economic development success over
the past several decades, Indonesia unavoidably had to face an economic difficulties.
What are the causes of economic crisis? To answer this question is the purpose of this
paper. The paper finds that the combination of several factors contributed to create the
economic crisis, the factors are: Thailand's economic crisis; contagion/spillover effects;
Indonesia's structural weakness, debt and crisis of confidence; globalization and
integration within the financial/capital market; investors and panic-stricken lenders;
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For the past 20 years, a growing number of countries in
Southeast Asia have consistently recorded some of the
highest rates of economic growth in the world. The high
growth performers in these countries have grown at 6-8
percent per annum. This growth was accompanied by
improvements in a number of social indicators, suggesting
that social welfare was rising throughout the region. We
are accustomed to studying the reasons for the success of
the so-called Asian Tigers in Southeast Asia, and these
economies have been the envy of the rest of the world.
Currencies were stable, stock markets skyrocketed, and
domestic growth was constantly among the highest in the
world. This outstanding performance is well above that
experienced in other developing countries.
Until a few months ago (July 1997)
,
growth almost came
easy. As a region, Southeast Asia grabbed the opportunities
of "globalization" and translated them into levels of
dynamism found almost nowhere else on earth. Large capital
flows stimulated these countries, and they benefited
somewhat from globalization.
But now, the globalization brings serious challenges.
Since July 1997, Southeast Asian exchange rates have been
volatile, stock markets slump, and foreign investors are now
cautious, the region is at a crossroads. The Southeast
Asian economies have been plunged into a crisis far more
severe than anyone predicted. The financial crisis was
sparked by the sharp depreciation of the Thai bath, which in
turn triggered similar downturns in the Philippine peso,
Malaysian ringgit, Indonesian rupiah and even the Singapore
dollar. The crisis happened not only in Southeast Asia but
also spread to other regions, such as Hong Kong and South
Korea. The crisis spread around the region as foreign
investors sold out, and local companies scrambled for hard
currency to cover their debt obligations. The IMF was
forced to bail out Thailand and Indonesia and, most
sensationally of all, South Korea. For Indonesia, this has
been the biggest financial crisis ever, since the new order
took the power in 1965. After a growth rate of 7% per annum
for the past 20 years, the Indonesian government has to face
these financial difficulties. How and why did this happen?
The purpose of this thesis is to answer these questions.
B . OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to answer the following
questions
:
• What happened with the Indonesian financial system
in 1997-1998?
• Why the financial crisis happened in Indonesia?
• What was the Indonesian economic situation before
the crisis?
• What are the causes of the financial crisis?
• How has the Indonesian government faced the crisis?
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATION
1. Scope
This thesis will focus on the financial crisis in
Indonesia and will address the Indonesian economic condition
before the crisis. It will present and review the situation
during the crisis, how the government faced the crisis and
the causes of financial crisis in Indonesia.
2 . Limitation
This thesis will only examine the financial crisis
during a nine-month period, starting in July 1997 to March
1998. What happens after this period is another matter and
may give different results needing further research.
METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE REVIEW
1. Methodology
The information necessary to complete this study was
gathered by reviewing available literature from books,
magazines, newspapers, the Internet and other library
information resources. The first step was to review the
articles concerning the crisis in Indonesia, and Southeast
and East Asia. Secondly, to collect data, and third to
analyze the data.
2 . Literature Review
The majority of the literature reviewed included
information provided by the Naval Postgraduate School
Library, course outlines and the Internet. The list of
references is properly documented and appropriately
footnoted in List of references.
E. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
There are numerous definitions and abbreviations that
are used in the text of this thesis. A consolidated
glossary, including all definitions and abbreviations, is
contained in Appendix A.
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
The remaining three chapters provide the details of the
research conducted. Chapter II begins with Indonesian past
performances. Indonesia's successful performance and recent
development (before July 1997) was derived in this chapter.
Chapter III addresses the financial and currency crisis in
Indonesia from 1997-1998. This chapter provides the
indication and the unfolding of the crisis in Indonesia,
episodes from July 1997 to March 1998. Chapter IV analyzes
the causes of the financial and currency crisis. Finally,
Chapter V contains the summary, conclusions, and
recommendations for further research.
II. PAST PERFORMANCES
A. SUCCESSFUL PERFORMANCE 1
The Republic of Indonesia has achieved remarkable
economic development success over the past several decades
and is considered to be among the best performing East Asian
economies. Designated as one of the 10 "Big Emerging
Markets" by the U.S. Department of Commerce 2
,
this nation
is abundantly endowed with natural resources and a
population of 200 million. Prudent macroeconomic policies,
high investment and saving rates, and continuing structural
reforms to liberalize markets have kept Indonesia on a path
of rapid economic development
.
Since the 1970s, economic growth has averaged 7% per
annum, raising GDP per capita toward the level of middle
income countries, while dramatically lowering the incidence
of poverty. The economic structure has become diversified,
as dependency on the oil sector has declined and an export
-
oriented manufacturing base has emerged, led by a dynamic
private sector and fueled by high domestic savings and large
inflows of foreign direct investment. Meanwhile,
macroeconomic balance has been maintained; the budget has
been balanced; inflation has been contained at relatively
low levels; current account deficits have been kept
moderate; and international reserves have remained at
comfortable levels. 3 According to the World Bank in an
1 See Figure 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and Table 2.1, 2.2.
2 Edward C. Schultz, Dynamic Indonesia Economy leads Asia
Pasific Region, www.solusinet.com/econ02.htm.
3 Business news, Economy in 1998, www.indonesiatoday.com.
Indonesian country brief, Indonesia grew at a rate of 7.1%
between 1985 and 1995, and attained a real Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) growth of 7.8% in 1996. The benefits of this
growth have extended across all of Indonesia's 27 culturally-
diverse provinces.
Between 1970 and 1996, the proportion of the population
living below the official poverty line declined from 60% to
an estimated 11%, reflecting the government's strong
commitment to poverty reduction. All provinces have
increased income, consumption, and employment, although they
have done so at different rates and starting from different
levels. The quality of life for the average Indonesian has
improved significantly. Infant mortality declined from 145
per 1,000 live births in 1970 to 53 per 1,000 in 1995, while
in the same period, life expectancy rose from 46 to 63
years. Indonesia has achieved universal primary education,
reduced the adult illiteracy rate by nearly two-thirds, and
significantly increased the percentage of the labor force
with a secondary or tertiary education from 11.7% in 1980 to
29.3% in 1994. Indonesia has also succeeded in reducing the
wage and educational gaps between males and females. Few
countries in the world can match Indonesia's narrowing of
gender differentials across all levels of education. 4
"Indonesia can be justifiably proud of its development
record. Twenty- five years ago, it was one of the poorest
countries in the world, with a per capita income of only
$50. Since then, it has made great strides, achieving an
average GDP growth of almost 7% per annum, a growth
performance that ranks among the ten fastest in the world
and on part with that of the dynamic East Asian economies,
which rose at a rate of about 4.5% p. a. Over this period,
Indonesia's per capita income reached $650 in 1992 and
$1,130 in 1996, implying a substantial improvement in living
4 The World Bank Group, Indonesia, country brief
standards. Indonesia is still classified as a low income
country, but, provided the momentum of development is
sustained, it is now within striking distance of joining the
ranks of middle income countries." 5
5 The World Bank, Indonesia-Sustaining Development, p. 2,
Washington D.C., January 1994.
Table 2.1 The Indonesian Economic Trends
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998p)
1 . The growth rate ofGDP 7.5 8.1 7.8 4.7
(% p.a.)
- GDP per capita (USS) 920 1,023 1.184 910 330
- GNP per capita (USS) 8S6 978 1,047 875 300
2. Total export (USS bill) 40.0 453 49.8 55.2 595
Total increase (%) 9.2 13.8 r) 9.5 10.8 7.8
Non-oil/gas(USS billion) 31.4 35.2 38.1 423 45.7
Non-oil Increase (%) 75.5 12.1 10.4 11.5 7.5
3. Total import (USS bill) -32.0 -39.8 42.7 -44.6 533
Total increase (%) 13.9 24.4 7.8 4.4 20.0
Non-oil/gas(USS billion -29.6 -36.0 -39.7 403 48.2
Non-oil increase (%) 20.8 21.6 9.2 ZO 19.0
4. Current account (USS bill) -3.0 - 6.8 r) - 7.8r) -6.9 -8.5
5. Foreign exc.res.fUSS bill) 13.2 14.7 19.1 20.5 n.al)
(End of the year)
6. Total money supply (Rp
bill)
.
45.622 52.677 64.089 68.062 n.a
Increase in 12 months(7a) 23.1 15.5 21.7 - n.a
7. Bank credit (Rp billion) 188375 234,611 292,921 402.351 n.a
Increase in 12 months(7c) 27.1 24.4 24.8 • n.a
8. Comm. bank deposit (Rp
bill)
170.406 214,764 281,718 350.738 n.a
Increase in 12 monlhs(%) 19.4 26.0(e) 31.2 - n.a
9. Average interest rate '%
P-a.)
a. 3 months time deposit
-State bank 10.8 15.0 14.6 17.0 n.a
-Private bank 15.4 18.0 17.6 28.7 n.a
b. Short-term credit
-State bank 153 16.9(e) 16.9 21.0 n.a
-Private bank 18.6 203(e) 20.2 31.9 n.a
10. Inflation rate. % p.a 9.24 8.64 6.47 11.05 40(*
Notes : r) Revised figures
e) Estimate by Data Consult
p) Projection figures
n.a. = data not available
1) The government is considering to apply Currency Board System (CBS)
Source: Bank Indonesia, Central Bureau of Statistic and Data Consult
Table 2.2 Indonesia: Social and Demographic Indicators,
1969-97
Fifteen to Most
Unit ofMeasurement Twenty Recent
Years Ago Estimate
Natural resources
Area Thousand sq. km. 1,905 1,905
Agricultural land Percent of land area 21 25
Forests and woodland Thousand sq. km. 1,222 1,095
Access to safe water Percent of population 11 42
Rural Percent of population 4 32
Urban Percent of population 41 65
Human resources
Total population In millions 133 200
Urban population Percent of population 19 34
Population growth Percent per annum 2.4 1.6
Urban population growth Percent per annum 4.8 3.6
Life expectancy at birth Years 51 63
Infant mortality rate Per thousand live births 114 53
Labor force (ages 15-64) Millions 52 88
Health and education
Population per physician Persons 26,988 7,028
Population per hospital bed Persons 1,222 1,503
Primary school enrollment Percent of school-age group 86 114
Secondary school enrollment Percent of school-age group 20 43
Pupil-teacher ratio: Primary Pupils per teacher 29 23
Secondary Pupils per teacher 16 16
Illiteracy rate (age 15 plus) Percent of population 43 16
Income and poverty
GDP per capita U.S. dollars annually 210 1,130
Share of top 20 percent Percent of income 52 41
Share of bottom 20 percent Percent of income 7 9
Population below poverty line Percent of population 29 11
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Figure 2 . 1 Development and Structural Indicators
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Figure 2.3 Changing Shares of Exports
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B. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (BEFORE JUNE 19 97)
The Indonesian economy continued to perform well in
1996 and in the first quarter of 1997, with real GDP growth
of 7.8% in 1996. The rate of inflation fell to 5% in
1996/1997, assisted by improved food supplies and generally
subdued import prices. The Consumer Price Index in June
1997 declined by 0.17%, resulting in a decade low 2.54%
cumulative year-to-date inflation rate, far below the 4.03%
recorded for the first semester last year. A budgetary
surplus of 1% of GDP for 1996/1997 reflected higher-than-
projected oil revenue and firm expenditure control.
The external current account deficit widened to 3.5% of
GDP in 1996/1997, although it remained below that in most
ASEAN countries, it was largely financed by short-term
inflows of portfolio capital. Export growth moderated to 9%
in U.S. dollar terms (7% in volume terms) , despite an above
normal contribution from the oil sector. While Indonesia
was less affected than other Asian countries by the downturn
in the world demand for electronics, the performance of the
labor-intensive footwear, garment, and textile sectors
weakened because of competition from lower-wage economies,
including China and Vietnam.
Capital inflows remained large, but foreign investment
approvals in the first quarter of 1997 fell by 30% year-on-
year. Foreign investment approvals through May dropped by
25.5% to US$13.7 billion from US$18.3 billion due to
election-related concerns, according to the Minister of
Investment, Sanyoto Sastrowardoyo . Official reserves
increased to the equivalent of six months of imports in
1996/1997. The Minister of Information, Harmoko, said in
April that foreign exchange reserves, as of April 1997, had
reached US$20.38 billion. 6 A more flexible exchange rate
6 Indonesian Business: The Year in Review 1997.
13
policy was adopted to help deal with the capital inflows;
the central bank intervention band was widened three times
from 2% to 8% between January and September 1996. While the
authorities continued to depreciate the band against the
U.S. dollar, the nominal effective exchange rate of the
rupiah appreciated because of the strength of the dollar
against other major currencies. 7
1. Real Sector 8
a. Output and Expenditure
The Indonesian economy had grown by 7.8% in 1996,
slightly below the 8.2% increase recorded in 1995. Non-
oil/gas GDP rose by 8.5%, while the oil/gas sector made a
small positive contribution of 0.9%. Private consumption
and investment both expanded rapidly, although net exports
made a negative contribution to GDP. The economy's potential
output was increased by 7-8% a year, reflecting the
relatively high and well-directed investment. Overall, the
economy has continued to operate at close to its
productivity capacity.
(1) Aggregate Demand. Real domestic
demand growth was nearly 9% in 1996, slower than the very
rapid expansion in 1995, but similar to the average rate of
growth for this decade. Total real consumption increased by
8.5% in 1996, with government consumption rising by 4% and
private consumption by 9%. The strong consumption growth
has caused national savings to stabilize in relation to GDP.
7 IMF, Indonesia-Recent Economic Developments, September
1997.
8 See Figure's 2.4, 2.5, 2.6.
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Total real investment increased by 12% in 1996, reaching
almost 33% of GDP. Investment in machinery and equipment
rose by 22%. Investment in buildings and structures,
representing three-quarters of capital formation, increased
by 12%, with property investment growing much faster than
the total. Domestically financed investment approvals rose
by over 40% above the record level of 1995.
Foreign investment approvals reached the highest level
recorded, after adjusting for the extraordinary approvals of
petrol-chemical refineries in 1995. Large investments were
approved in resource-based manufacturing (chemicals, basic
metallic industries, and paper products), hotels, and public
utilities. Actual foreign-financed expenditure increased by
one-fifth, and comprised about 10% of the total gross
investment
.
On a national account basis, the external trade balance
weakened in 1996. Exports of goods and services (in
constant prices) slowed to 6%, compared with 9% in 1995,
partly because of weaker demand in Indonesia's main markets.
Competitiveness factors dampened sales of textiles,
footwear, and wood products. Imports of goods and services
(in constant prices) grew by 10%, also slower than the rise
of 15% in 1995. The slowdown reflected smaller growth of
consumer goods, especially food and raw materials. However,
imports of capital goods continued to grow rapidly. 9
(2) Sectoral Developments. The
diversification of the Indonesian economy has helped sustain
rapid growth and provided resilience against weaknesses in
9 IMF Staff Country Report No. 97/75, Indonesia-Recent
Economic Developments, p . 9-10 , Washington D. C. September
1997.
15
individual commodity markets. The manufacturing sector,
accounting for one-fourth of GDP, provided the largest
sectoral contribution to overall growth. Non-oil/gas
manufacturing output increased by 12%. On a sectoral basis,
GDP growth was slow and the main reason was the agricultural
sector performance, which comprised 16% of GDP. The growth
rates of other sectors were very similar to those recorded
in 1995. The production of agriculture, fishing, and
forestry increased by 2% in 1996, on top of the recovery in
1995. The production of rice increased by 1.5%. Rice
prices increased by 6% in 1996 compared with 15% in 1995 and
21% in 1994. Production of cassava, copra, palm oil and
fisheries all showed increases. Mining and quarrying output
increased by 7% in 1996. The output of gold, coal, and
nickel continued to increase, but growth in copper
production was lower. With oil/gas production essentially
stable, other mining products constituted over one- third of
mining output or 3% of GDP.
b. Development Plan
Substantial progress was made in 1996/97 toward
achieving the government's macroeconomic objectives set out
in the sixth five-year Development Plan (1994/95-1998/99) .
The main targets of that plan are real GDP growth at 7.1%;
annual inflation at 5% or less; GDP for the external current
account deficit at 2%; gross international reserves
equivalent to 6 months of imports; annual growth in non-oil
exports at 17%; an investment share in GDP at 3 0.5%; non-oil
budget revenue reaching 16.9% of GDP, with non-oil taxes
equal to 13.7% of GDP; and public debt declining to 30% of
GDP by the end of the period. 10
10 IMF Staff Country Report No. 97/75, Indonesia-Recent
Economic Developments, p. 10-11. September 1997.
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Real GDP growth in 1996/97 exceeded the target and
its average growth by almost 8% during the first three years
of the plan. Per capita income has risen by around 6% per
year while inflation has declined to the targeted level
during 1996/97. The level of domestic investment has
exceeded the target; foreign financing has also been higher
than the targeted investment. International reserves
strengthened sharply to their target level, and public debt
has fallen below the target
.
In other areas, the achievement of macroeconomic
objectives has been somewhat less successful. Non-oil
export growth fell below the targeted level after being
close in the first two years. Non-oil budget revenue has
leveled off to 11-12% of GDP. The current account deficit
has risen beyond the target range, although the overall
external position remains strong.
(1) Prices and Wages. The inflation rate
was 6.6% for December 1996, but the rate declined to 5.3%
for the year ending March 1997. Food prices increased by
6.1% in 1996, but only 3.8% over the fiscal year, as supply
conditions improved. Non food price inflation remained
around 7%. Public transportation, electricity, and
telephone charges were raised during 1996; fertilizer and
unhusked rice prices were increased in February 1997.
Domestic petroleum prices have remained unchanged since
1993. Wholesale price inflation was 7.7% in 1996, lower
than the previous year. Agricultural prices rose by 11%,
while manufacturing prices increased by only 2%, conforming
to the moderation of domestic cost pressures. Wholesale
import prices rose by 3.4%, while wholesale export prices




(2) Minimum wages increased by about 9%
in April 1996, but the effective increase was much larger
because of the concurrent change to determining monthly-
wages for daily workers on the basis of 30 paid working days
rather than 25 days. In April 1997, the government
announced a further average minimum wage increase of 10.4%.
Minimum wages were considered to be broadly sufficient to
meet basic needs. 11 The Minister of Manpower, Abdul Latief,
said that companies that could not afford to pay the wage
increase could submit appeals to the government. The
government, however, would check on the company's
fundamentals before extending the deadline.
In May 1997, the government raised the Civil
servants' monthly salaries by 34.4% for those on the highest
grade and by 73% for those on the lowest grade. Civil
servants are classified into four grades: I, II, III, and IV
with each grade divided into four strata: a, b, c and d
except grade IV, which has five strata: a, b, c, d and e.
The lowest strata are I -a and the highest IV-e. Indonesia
has around four million civil servants. 12
11 IMF Staff Country Report No. 97/75, p. 12.
12 Indonesian Business: The Year in Review 1997, Chapter 2,
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Figure 2.4 Real Sector Developments, 1990-96
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Figure 2.6 Inflation, 1994-1997
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2. Public Finance 13
a. General Situation
Indonesia's public sector consists of the central
government, 27 provincial governments, 368 municipal and
local governments, and some 170 public enterprises. Central
government transfers account for more than one-half of
regional government revenue. A large share of public
enterprise investment has been funded by loans from the
central government, mainly in the form of foreign borrowing
undertaken for that purpose
.
Consolidated public sector accounts are not
prepared officially and published information does not
enable them to be constructed. Central government budget
data indicate small surpluses in recent years, although
details of spending through off -budget accounts are
incomplete. Provincial government transactions appear to be
in approximate balance. However, the inclusion of quasi-
fiscal activities and operations of public enterprises would
probably indicate an overall public sector deficit.
Central government revenue and grants have
averaged 15-16% of GDP in recent years. Oil/gas revenue has
accounted for about 3-4% of GDP compared with 10% of GDP one
decade ago. Non-oil/gas revenue has stabilized at 11-12% of
GDP. Current expenditure has remained at about 9% of GDP,
while development expenditure and net lending has fallen to
about 6% of GDP, partly reflecting greater private sector
participation in infrastructure. As a consequence of the
improvement in the fiscal balance and continued strong
output growth, external public debt has steadily declined to
less than 30% of GDP. 14
13 See Figure 2.7.
14 IMF Staff Country Report No. 97/75, p. 13-14
22
jb. Central Government Finances
Total revenue (including grants) in 1996/97
amounted to Rp75 . 7 trillion (15% of GDP), exceeding the
original budget estimates by about Rp5 . 5 trillion. Revenue
from the oil/gas sector increased by nearly one-third. Non-
oil/gas tax revenue increased by 19%, in line with budget
estimates. Non-oil/gas income tax collections increased by
24% to Rp25.5 trillion (5% of GDP), well above budget
estimates and equivalent to one-third of total tax revenue.
Value-added tax revenue increased by 11% to Rp20.4 trillion
(4% of GDP) , and accounted for 27% of total tax revenue.
Excise taxes grew at about the same rate as nominal GDP.
Taxes on international trade declined to the equivalent of
less than 4% of total revenue, well below the budget
projection
.
Nontax revenue rose by 17% to Rp7 . 7 trillion (1.5%
of GDP) . Bank Indonesia met its target, despite the cost of
exchange market interventions. Total expenditure and net
lending increased by 19% to Rp78.5 trillion (14% of GDP),
almost equal to budget estimates. Current expenditure
reached Rp49.2 trillion (9% of GDP) with personnel costs
increasing by 17%, in line with the budget. Development
expenditure and net lending increased by 12% to Rp29.3
trillion (under 6% of GDP), somewhat below budgeted levels.
Net foreign financing of the budget was negative for the
third consecutive year (0.5% of GDP) . This reflected the
use of privatization receipts of Rpl . 4 trillion and the
fiscal surplus to prepay relatively expensive external debt
of Rp4 trillion. Domestic financing was also negative (0.5%
of GDP) , as the central government surplus permitted a
further buildup of deposits in the banking system. 15
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3 . Financial Sector 16
a. Banking Sector
The financial system is dominated by the banking
sector. Rapid economic growth, a liberal capital account
regime and regulatory changes over the past decade have all
contributed to fast changes in Indonesia's banking sector.
During the period of 1988-1994, the number of commercial
banks increased from 111 to 240. Since then, the increase
of minimum capital requirements from RplO billion to Rp50
billion has reduced the number of potential entrants,
leaving the number of institutions almost constant over the
past four years. The seven state banks dominated the
sector, with their combined assets accounting for about 45%
of the entire system, although their share of total lending
has declined markedly in recent years. 17 The private
commercial banks have grown faster than the state banks,
which accounted for about 30% of the total banking system
assets in mid-1997. There were also 9,300 rural banks,
which are limited in the geographical area of operations and
in banking activities. The nonbank financial sector,
including savings banks, mutual funds, pension funds,
insurance companies, and leasing companies, has continued to
develop
.
The return on assets of commercial banks averaged
1.2% and the return on equity over 16% in 1996, which
exceeds the rates of profitability in many comparable
countries. Large private sector banks were generally well
16 See Figure 2.8, 2.9, 2.10, 2.11.
17Anne-Marie Guide, Banking Sector Challenges, Indonesia-
Selected Issues, IMF Staff Country Report No. 97/76,
September 1997, p. 54.
25
managed and competitive, but the soundness of the banking
system, especially for the state banks and smaller banks,
has been of concern. Foreign currency borrowings showed
substantial growth between 1988 and 1996, foreign currency
deposits have also grown rapidly, but banks' foreign
currency liabilities were generally higher than their
foreign currency assets. Although Bank Indonesia imposes
limits on net open foreign exchange positions equivalent to
25% of bank capital, a small number of banks did not always
comply with this rule. 18
The average share of nonperforming loans (those
classified as substandard or doubtful) has declined
consistently over the last three years from over 14% in
December 1993 to about 8% in December 1996. For state
banks, the average share of nonperforming loans remains high
at over 15%. The average capital adequacy ratio of the
banking system had reached 12%, but several banks have not
met the 8% minimum ratio. A number of banks continued to
violate legal limits on loan-to-deposit ratios and lending
to connected parties. There had been a rapid expansion in
lending to the property sector, which accounted for 20% of
total outstanding loans in February 1997, compared with 12%
at the end of 1993
.
With signs of easing growth, the Bank Indonesia
cut rates by 0.5% in December 1996, and again by 0.5% in
March 1997, hoping to moderate the inflows of capital, ease
the debt burden on struggling Indonesian firms, and allow an
increase in exports.
18 Anne-Marie Guide, Banking Sector Challenges, Indonesia-
Selected Issues, IMF Staff Country Report No. 97/76,
September 1997, p. 54.
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In the meantime, the Indonesian firms were still
borrowing very heavily in international capital markets. 19
For these circumstances, Bank Indonesia had taken further
steps to strengthen the soundness of the banks. Efforts had
been intensified to improve compliance with prudential
regulations, including ensuring that bank supervisors had
sufficient authority to undertake the comprehensive and
timely evaluation of bank assets. Bank Indonesia had placed
greater emphasis on moral suasion to restrain overall credit
growth, including the increasing use of limits for
individual banks based on their level of capital and the
riskiness of their lending portfolios. 20
In March 1997, Bank Indonesia Director
Hendrobudiyanto said that the central bank would impose
administrative sanctions on banks breaching their credit
growth limit. The statement marks a significant change in
Bank Indonesia's policies, since previous credit growth
limit was enforced merely by moral suasion, not real
sanctions. Bank Indonesia Governor, Sudradjad Djiwandono,
summoned bankers telling them that total credit growth in
1997 would be limited to around 17-18%. For some banks,
this meant that targets were set for 18-20% credit growth
while for some larger banks, those with assets exceeding Rp5
trillion (US$2.12 billion), credit growth would be set at
only 13%. Total outstanding credits in the Indonesian
banking sector rose 24.6% to Rp292,92 trillion (US$121.44
billion) in 1996 after growth of 24.2% in 1995, according to
Bank Indonesia statistics.
Bank Indonesia, the central bank, has secured a
US$500 million standby loan from 40 international financial
19 Giancarlo Corsetti, Paolo Pesent, Nouriel Roubini, What
caused the Asian currency and financial crisis, March 1998,
p. 58.
20 IMF, Staff Country Report No. 97/75, p. 17-18.
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institutions to back up the country's foreign exchange
reserves. The standby facility has a tenure of eight years.
The loan carries an annual interest rate of 0.625% above the
London Inter Bank Offered Rate, should the government draw
down the loan. The facility carries a commitment fee of
0.3125% per year. The lead arrangers included Commerzbank
Ltd., Fuji Bank Ltd., Industrial Bank of Japan Asia Ltd.,
NatWest Markets and JP Morgan Securities Asia Ltd.
Indonesia's foreign exchange reserves currently stand at
US$19 billion.
In April 1997, Bank Indonesia toughened
restrictions on foreign borrowings by on-shore banks. The
measure is designed to maintain prudent debt management to
prevent further stresses on the balance of payments and to
ensure adequate capacity for future debt repayments. The
latest regulation requires banks to allocate at least 80% of
their foreign borrowings of more than two years maturity as
credits to export -oriented industries. The regulation also
requires banks to submit annual foreign borrowing plans to
the central bank (Bank Indonesia) and to report on the
amount of foreign loans they receive. Foreign borrowings by
banks are limited to a maximum 30% of their capital base.
Foreign banks will be required to allocate a minimum of 20%
of their credits to small borrowers, and the central bank,
Bank Indonesia, will fine foreign banks which fail to comply
with this regulation.
Indonesia's bad loans rose in April 1997 to 2.93%
(of total extended debts of Rp349.7 trillion) up from 2.8%
in December 1996, but lower than the 3.29% recorded in
December 1995, stated Bank Indonesia. Total outstanding
loans in April were Rp349.7, compared to Rp331.2 trillion in
December 1996 and Rp267.8 trillion in December 1995.
Property loans, as a percentage of total loans, rose to
19.61% in April 1997, up from 12.2 in December 1992. Bad
debts in the property sector rose 3 9.2% from the end of 1996
28
to US$1.9 billion in the first quarter of 1997. However,
more than 90% of loans to the property sector are still
classified as problem free. The property sector's
cumulative debts, as a proportion of total banking credit,
increased from 18.8% at the end of 1996 to 19.6% in the
first quarter of 1997. Officials and property analysts
noted that most property projects utilize short-term loans
to finance development. 21
b. Monetary-
Recent financial market developments have been
dominated by the buoyancy of foreign capital inflows, both
direct investment and portfolio flows, which have boosted
monetary and credit growth. This limited the ability of the
authorities to reduce inflation and gave rise to upward
pressure on the exchange rate. The authorities have
continued to set targets for monetary and credit growth, in
accordance with the objective of reducing and maintaining
inflation at around 5% per anum, as outlined in the five-
year development plan. However, concern about exchange rate
appreciation and external competitiveness has, in practice,
led to reduce emphasis on monetary targets.
Over the last two years, targeted and actual
growth rates for broad money and private sector credit have
diverged. Broad money increased by nearly 27% in 1996/1997,
slightly lower than 1995/96, but well above the official
target of 17%. The growth of quasi-money was 29%, including
rupiah time and savings deposit, as well as foreign currency
deposits. Reserve money grew to 14% in 1996/97. Private
21 Indonesian Business: The Year In Review 1997, The Castle
Group Business Information, Chapter 1, Capital Markets,
Banking and Finance.
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sector credit growth accelerated to almost 24% in the year
to March 1997 compared with the official target of 16%.
Interest rates remained relatively high in real
terms during 1996/97, as the authorities sought to restrain
monetary growth. The authorities were able to reduce the
rate gradually to just under 11% by March 1997 and still
increase their sales of certificates because of the decline
in domestic price inflation. Three-month deposit rates at
private national banks declined from 17% in the fourth
quarter of 1997 to 16.3% in May 1997. Rates on bank
advances for working capital were in the range of 18-20%,
and rates on investment loans remained broadly unchanged at
16. 5%. 22
c. Exchange Rate
During 1996, in the face of the strength of
private capital inflows, the Indonesian authorities had
increased nominal exchange rate flexibility to enhance the
effectiveness of monetary policy. The authorities had to
widen the exchange rate intervention band on three
occasions; first in January from 2% to 3%, second in June
from 3% to 5%, and third in September from 5% to 8%. On
each occasion, the rupiah moved to the appreciated end of
the band immediately following the change. Bank Indonesia
slowed the pace of depreciation of the nominal rupiah/U.S.
dollar exchange rate to 3.5% in January to March 1997,
whereas in the previous year, the rupiah had depreciated by
5.6%. This was the response to the persistent upward
pressure on the exchange rate stemming from capital inflows.
22 IMF Staff Country Report No, 97/75, Indonesia -Recent
Economic Development, p. 18-19.
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Movements in the real effective exchange rate
(measured by relative consumer price inflation vis-a-vis
trading partner countries) were also influenced by the U.S.
dollar/Japanese yen rate, but most of the appreciation of
7.6% in 1996/97 stemmed from the slower nominal exchange
rate. From a slightly longer-term perspective, the
appreciation of the real effective exchange rate since the
middle of 1995 effectively reversed much of the depreciation
that occurred in 1994-95, as a result of the strength of the
Japanese yen vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar. 23 In June 1997, the
IDR/USD market was remarkably strong, appreciating by 0.2%
for the month, or by 2.2% on an annualized basis, while Bank
Indonesia depreciated the middle rate by 4.4% on an
annualized basis in June 1997.
d. Capital Market
In 1996, market capitalization of the Jakarta
Stock Exchange increased by over 40% to Rp215 trillion (40%
of GDP) . Higher stock prices, the index rose by 24% over
the year, accounted for over one-half of the increase in
capitalization, with the remainder due to new issues and an
expansion in the number of companies listed on the exchange.
The number of listed companies increased from 248 to 267
during 1996. The activity of the domestic bond market
increased markedly, with new issues raising over Rpll
trillion, an increase of over 26%. Mutual funds expanded
their operations rapidly, the number of mutual funds
increased from only one in 1995 to 18 at the end of 1996,
which collectively mobilized Rpl . 9 trillion.
23 IMF Staff Country Report No, 97/75, Indonesia-Recent
Economic Development, p. 19-20.
31
Market sentiment remained strong throughout most
of the year, except during July-August when political
uncertainties contributed to a sharp downturn in share
prices. Share prices continued rising during most of the
first half of 1997 and reached new record levels following
the parliamentary elections in late May 1997, with the index
about one-third higher than at the beginning of 1996. 24
24 IMF Staff Country Report No, 97/75, Indonesia-Recent
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Figure 2.11 Stock Market Developments
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4 . Balance of Payments 25
The external current account deficit rose from $6.8
billion (3.3% of GDP) in 1995/96 to $8 billion (3.5% of GDP)
inl996/97, mainly due to slower growth of non-oil exports.
Total exports grew by 9.4% in 1996/97, substantially below
the increase of 13.5% recorded in 1995/96. The surplus on
the oil/gas account increased to $4.7 billion, but the non-
oil/gas deficit increased to $12.7 billion. Oil/gas exports
expanded by 18% because of higher world prices. Non-oil/gas
exports grew only by 6.7% in value terms, as the weaker
world export demand and competitive pressures from lower-
wage regional economies affected Indonesia.
Imports were $50.8 billion inl996/97. Much of the
import growth was attributable to capital goods, which make
up 25% of total imports, and are closely associated with the
expansion of foreign direct investment. Imports grew by
10.3% because of continued buoyant overall economic
activity, including high investment. Capital inflows were
large throughout the year. The overall balance of payments
was estimated to have registered a surplus of $6.1 billion
in 1996/97, compared with $3.4 billion in 1995/96. This was
reflected in the rise in gross official foreign assets to
$27 billion (6 months of imports)
.
26
25 See Table 2.3 and Figure 2.11.
26 IMF Staff Country Report No, 97/75, Indonesia -Recent
Economic Development, p. 20 -21.
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Table 2.3 Indonesia: Summary Balance of Payments
(In millions of U.S. dollars)
Est








29.714 35.303 36,504 42,083 47,754 52348
6.869 6.363 5312 6311 6329 7375
3.837 4,117 3,822 4.134 4,087 4.954
19.008 24,823 27,170 31,638 37,138 39,619
27.522 30312 32321 37,876 46,071 50,813
3,206 3,645 3.910 3,724 3.999 4,401
250 277 288 290 297 298
24,066 • 26,390 28,123 33.862 41,775 46,114
-2,687 -3.043 -2.602 -2.647 -2.847 -3,096
-3.857 -4,509 -4322
-5,129 -5,823 -6.434
238 270 200 240 220 200
6,086 6,639 4.522 7306 12306 11,435
3,478 3,096 3,407 2315 4.814 5308
1,947 1391 1,436 -251 -544 -1338
6,606 "6,721 6,939 5,826 5,876 5,906
4.659 5330 5.503 6,077 6,420 7,144
1.531 1.705 1,971 2,566 5358 6346
108 142 334 384 371
1301 1.981 774 1,761 1,748
2,500 2300 -1300 3.733 5361 4379
1,062 -1,060 1,967 60 1379 63
-236 1325 -3.485 -5384 -3,403 2356
2,798 4.812 262 -1,447 3,415 6,058
-2,798 -4.812 -262 1,447 -3,415 -6,058
-3.1 -1.6 -1.7 -1.8 -33 -33
10.5 12.0 12.7 133 16.0 195
4.8 5.1 4.5 3.8 4.2 4.6
' 13.6 183 18.6 17.1 20.6 26.6
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(In months of imports) 4/
Gross official foreign assets
(In months of imports) 3/, 4/
Sources; Data provided by the Indonesian authorities", and Fund staff estimates.
1/ Includes prepayments.
II Includes unrecorded private capital flows.
3/ Includes official assets held as a contingency reserve by Bank Indonesia.
4/ In months of the following year's non-oil/gas imports.
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5. External Debt27
The stock of external debt was estimated to have risen
from $107 billion (53% of GDP) at the end of March 1996 to
$113 billion (49% of GDP) at the end of March 1997.
Although a substantial part of capital inflows was in the
form of non-debt-creating investment, private sector debt
increased by $10 billion to $53 billion (23% of GDP) .
Public sector debt declined by $4 billion to $60 billion
(26% of GDP) . Repayment amounted to $1.7 billion, primarily
to the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. Valuation
effects associated with the appreciation of the U.S. dollar
against the Japanese yen were estimated to have reduced
public debt by $3.6 billion.
External debt service amounted to $13.5 million (33.9%
of exports of goods and services) in 1996/97 compared with
$12.4 million (33.2% of exports of good and services) in
1995/96. Public debt service (including prepayments)
declined to 18% of exports, continuing the trend over the
last five years. 28 According to Bank Indonesia, in the
1994/1995 fiscal year, Bank Indonesia statistics note that
the service burden on government debt amounted to 17.7% of
total export earnings, where as those on private-sector
debts only 13.4%. But in the 1995/1996 fiscal year, the
debt-service ratio (against export earnings) for the private
sector had reached 15.1%, compared to 14.1% for the public
sector. Foreign debt has reached US$110 billion US$56
27 See Table 2.4, 2.5, 2.6 and Figure 2.12.
28 imp staff Country Report No, 97/75, Indonesia -Recent
Economic Development, p. 23.
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billion owed by the government and $54 billion by the
private sector as of early this year. 29
29 Indonesian Business : The Year in Review 1997, The Castle
Group Business Information.
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Table 2.4 Indonesia: External Debt -Service Payments
1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96
Est
1996/97













Of which: Public sector debt
(excluding prepayments)
Interest payments/exports 5/ 13.2
(In millions ofU.S. dollars)
9,238 9,779 11,415 12,431
(In percent)
13,473
4,659 5,330 5,503 6,077 6,420 7,144
4,182 4,840 5,132 5,546
.
5,939 6,200
... 782 725 1,650
477 490 371 531 481 944
4,252 3,908 4,276 5,338 6,011 6,329
2,912 3,003 3,117 3,421 3,450 3,381
2,647 2,695 2,843 3,060 3,133 3,006
265 308 274 361 317 •375
1,340 905 1,159 1,917 2,561 2,948
33.7 31.4 32.7 33.7 33.2 33.9
23.4 21.6 21.4 20.2 18.6 18.0
...
...
... 18.6 17.2 15.1
10.1 10.6 11.4 11.3 10.8
Sources: Data provided by the Indonesian authorities
1/ Excludes estimated private sector amortization payments.
2/ Includes prepayments.
3/ Estimated interest based on recorded debt to banks abroad only.
4/ Includes estimated private sector amortization.
5/ As a percentage ofexports ofgoods and nonfactor services.
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Table 2.5 Indonesia: External Debt Outstanding
Est
1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97
(In billions of U.S. dollars)
Total external debt (by debtor) 72.2 83.7 89.3 101.2 106.5 113.6
Public sector 48.3 55.5 60.2 67.6 63.5 60.4
Government 44.5 50.9 55.0 62.6 58.6 55.9
Public enterprises 3.8 4.6 5.2 5.0 4.9 4.5
Of which: LNG expansion 32 4.0 4.5 4.4 .4.3 3.2
Private sector 1/, 11 24.0 2S.2 29.1 33.7 42.9 53.2
Banks 4.1 6.1 8.2 9.0 8.9 9.9
Nonbanks 19.9 22.1 20.9
(In percent)
24.6 34.0 43.3
Total external debt (by creditor)
Public sector 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Suppliers' credits 2.5 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.4
Financial institutions 27.2 25.4 25.8 26.1 26.0 26.6
Bonds 1.4 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.7
Multilateral institutions 28.1 30.0 29.3 28.2 30.3 29.7
Bilateral 34.0 34.7 35.7 37.5 35.1 36.1
Nationalization 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
LNG expansion 6.6 7.3 7.4 6.5 6.8 5.4
Memorandum items: (In percent)
Outstanding debt/GDP 56.4 58.9 55.8 56.2 52.9 49.7
Public sector debt/GDP 37.7 39.1 37.6 37.5 31.6 26.4
Private debt/GDP 18.7 19.8 18.2 18.7 21.3 23.3
Outstanding debt/exports of goods
and nonfactor services 223.5 216.7 221.6 215.7 200.3 193.8
Public debt on concessional terms 3/ 45.6 47.3 47.1 43.9 39.7 35.4
Share ofpublic debt denominated in:
U.S. dollars 42.2 41.4 38.3 36.7 42.0 43.5
Japanese yen 40.0 . 41.2 45.3 45.3 39.8 38.1
Sources: Data provided by the Indonesian authorities, World Bank Debtor Reporting System, and BIS, International
Banking and Financial Market Developments; and staff estimates.
1/ Until 1993/94, based on BIS data. From 1 994/95, new staffestimates for private nonbank debt are based on
improved coverage of private debt by Bank Indonesia.
2/ Based on recorded debt to banks abroad only.




Indonesia Public Sector External Debt
(In millions ofU.S. dollars)
Est
1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97
Government sector
Outstanding debt at beginning ofperiod 44,876 44,484 50,887 55,037 62,569 58,610
Net drawings 1,418 915 1,063 105 -209 -794
Drawings 2/ 5.600 5,755 6,195 5.651 5,730 5,406
Amortization 3/ 4,182 4,840 5,132 5,546 5,939 6,200
Adjustment 4/ -1,810 5,488 3,087 7,427 -3,750 -1,949
Outstanding debt at end of period 44,484 50,887 55,037 62,569 58,610 55,867
Public enterprises
Outstanding debt at beginning ofperiod 3,135 3,771 4,610 5,182 5,009 4,903
Net drawings 529 746 573 -116 -115 -244
Drawings 2/ 1,006 1,236 944 415 366 700
Amortization 477 490 371 531 481 944
Adjustment 4/ 107 94 -1 -57 9 -156
Outstanding debt at end ofperiod 3,771 4,610 5,182 5,009 4,903 4,503
Public sector-total
Outstanding debt at beginning of period 48.011 48,255 55,497 60,219 67,578 63,513
Net drawings 1,947 1,661 1,636 -11 -324 -1,038
Drawings 2/ 6,606 ' 6,991 7,139 6,066 6,096 6.106
Amortization 3/ 4,659 5,330 5,503 6,077 6,420 7,144
Adjustment 4/ -1,703 5,582 3,086 7,370 -3,741 -2,105
Outstanding debt at end of period 48,255 55,497 60,219 67,578 63,513 60,370
Public sector debt service 3/ 7,571 8,333 8,620 9,498 9,870 10,525
Amortization 3/ 4,659 5,330 5.503 6,077 6,420 7,144
Interest 2,912 3,003 3.117 3,421 3,450 3,381
Source: Data provided by the Indonesian authorities.
1/ Excludes loans of maturity up to of one year and transactions with to the IMF.
21 As recorded in debt records ofBank Indonesia. Excludes drawings made in connection with prepayments.
3/ Includes prepayments.
4/ Mainly reflects valuation adjustments owing to changes in exchange rates, and an adjustment for the estimated
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Figure 2.12 External Sector Indicators
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III. INDONESIAN CRISIS IN 1997-1998
A. INDICATION OF THE CRISIS
To predict the crisis in Indonesia before it happened
is quite difficult. In December 1997 the IMF said, "Just
two or three months ago, neither economic forecasts nor the
pricing of assets in financial markets foretold the depth
and breadth of the economic and financial difficulties that
have engulfed several southeast (Indonesia) and east Asian
economies and that affects emerging market economies more
generally. It may well be that such developments are
inherently nonforecastable, as their occurrence and
especially their timing are intimately linked to sudden




Indonesia recently broke into the ranks of the world's
most competitive countries, moving to the top 20 -most
competitive economies. Indonesia was 15th, after ranking
30th in 1996, according to Global Competitive Report 1997
issued by the Geneva-based World Economic Forum. Even when
Indonesia felt the pressure of the crisis in October 1997,
the World Bank's country director for Indonesia, Denis de
Tray, said in Jakarta that "Indonesia's" macroeconomic
foundation remains sound despite recent pressures in the
foreign exchange markets. This strong foundation has
allowed Indonesia to generate remarkably consistent high
growth over the past 3 years, with an increasingly open
30 imf, World Economic Outlook, Interim Assessment, December
1997.
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economy and impressive progress in poverty reduction." 31 But
some articles or comments before the crisis could be
considered as an early indication of the financial crisis in
Indonesia. (See Table 3.1, 3.2)
An article in Asiamoney magazine July/August 1996
mentioned that
between July and August 1995, Indonesia's
simmering economy threatened to overheat. All the
alarm bells were ringing. Wages were on the rise,
rising food prices pushed inflation dangerously
close to double digits and growth in bank loans
peaked, adding liquidity to an already-saturated
monetary system. Then there was the ballooning
current account deficit, with economists
predicting non-oil imports would grow by over 3 0%,
compared with an 18% increase in exports. But by
December 1995, the economy was taken off the boil.
The country's finance minister, Mar'ie Muhammad,
was able to announce a budget surplus of 1% of GDP
and non-oil import growth leveled out at a less
dramatic 27% for the year. Inflation also cooled,
falling back to 8.64%. The government's recovery
was well orchestrated. Some last minute measures
by the government (Indonesia's finance ministry)
saved the economy from overheating, but, the
challenge now is to keep a handle on the current
account deficit and inflation, while averaging an
annual growth in GDP of 7%. 32
31 The World Bank, World Bank Strengthens Support For
Indonesia, News Release No. 98/1503, October 9, 1997
32 Cherrie Marriott, Battling the bulge, Asia money,
July/August 1996.
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Figure 3.1 Indonesia: Variability of Inflation
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The article also explained that many corporations were
going offshore for their financing. Many more were also
turning to the rapidly developing equity market for funds
.
By raising money offshore and bringing in high-tech
machinery from overseas, Indonesia's manufacturers were
adding to the current account deficit. Even though the
government managed to keep import growth below 30% in 1995,
the deficit still topped US$7.2 billion or 3.6% of GDP, more
than double the level in 1994. The economists say it is
worryingly high. The problem is a severe imbalance between
the number of exports leaving the country and the large
influx of imports.
For most of 1995, growth in imports outpaced growth in
exports by 10% -15%. In the short-term, Indonesia will
remain victim to the classic emerging market conundrum of
high investment levels versus a sound balance of payments. 33
High-tech machinery being brought in to equip new factories
will invariably impact on the current account deficit.
"With foreign direct investment increasing you are getting
more imports of raw materials and capital goods and once
these machines start churning out exports, the pain will be
repaid, but a larger percentage of direct investment these
days is directed towards manufacturing for domestic market,"
says Jonathan Haris, an analyst with HG Asia. 34
In 1986, the government devalued the rupiah (Indonesian
money) by 31% against the U.S. dollar and moved from a
floating exchange rate to one managed within a band against
a weighted basket of currencies. Since then, Bank Indonesia
has intervened by buying and selling U.S. dollars with the
aim of depreciating the rupiah against the dollar by about
33 Cherrie Marriott, p 5-6.
34 Cherrie Marriott, p. 6.
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5% a year. The intervention is basically designed to ensure
as little long-term movement as possible, but most
importantly, it maintains the competitiveness of Indonesia's
exports. In early 1996, Bank Indonesia widened its
intervention band for the exchange rates from about 3% to
5%, primarily due to the widening interest rate
differential-foreign interest rates have declined, while
Indonesia's remain high. CS First Boston's report on the
rupiah explains, a conflict has arisen between the
governments monetary and exchange rate policies. To avoid
an overheating economy, the government keeps interest rates
high, but as a result, foreign inflows have increased.
Indonesia has become a favorite with foreign portfolio
investors and great deal of short-term money is now flowing
into the country, adding fuel to the inflation fire. Yet,
the government refuses to allow the rupiah to appreciate. 35
Indonesia' s foreign debt also has long been a concern
for economists. Sovereign debt rose steadily year by year,
increasing from US$79.78 in 1991 to US$109.00 in 1996 and
estimated to US $ 137.42 in 1997. (See Table 3.2, 3.3,
3.4) . Indonesia has borrowed heavily in Yen even though
most of its exports are dollar denominated. (See Table 3.5)
In the first quarter of 1995, the country fell victim to the
sharp swings in the US dollar/yen exchange rate. According
to the World Bank, the depreciation of the U.S. dollar added
about US$6 billion to Indonesia's external public debt and
could have increased to approximately US$750 million.
Indonesia recognizes that it has too much of this
debt because much of their oil sales are dollar
denominated and so are a vast majority of their
35 Cherrie Marriott, p. 7.
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exports, says Denise de Tray in 1996, resident
representative for the World Bank in Jakarta. 36
An article in the Kompas newspaper in April 16, 1996
explained that
Indonesian export was no more the rising star but
had already become the falling star. Since 1993,
the growth of Indonesian export was decreasing and
tends to slowdown. Even more, it became the
lowest among the countries in the region
(Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, China and
India) . This condition occurred because the
export commodities did not have the technical
advantages, they lacked labor skills and there
were weaknesses in industrial structures. If the
conditions did not change, therefore, Indonesia's
economy would be troubled in the future. 37
At the conference on Business Process Re-engineering in
Banking and Finance, organized by the Asia Business Forum,
J.S. Djiwandono, governor of Bank Indonesia said
Due in part to tighter competition, banks have
also become involved in certain high risk
activities. Over the past few years, we noticed
some banks engaged more aggressively in lending to
the property sector. In 1996, bank lending to
that sector grew nearly 40%. Due to this high
growth, the share of bank loans in the property
sector to the total outstanding loans rose to
around 20% in 1996 compared with 13% in 1993. In
recent years, off balance sheet banking activities
have also showed a significant increase. This is
indicated by a particularly rapid growth in off
balance sheet liabilities, consisting of open
forward selling positions and credit commitments.
These activities, particularly those linked to
derivative transactions, also involve high risk
36 Cherrie Marriott, p 7.
37 Kompas, Sangatlah Benar, Laju Pertumbuhan Expor Sudah
Mengkhawatirkan, April 16, 1996.
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for banks. Meanwhile, the employment of such
sophisticated technology does pose considerable
risk as well, both born insufficient planning and
imperfect development, and risk incurred at the
time of operation. 38
38 J.S. Djiwandono, The Banking Industry Facing the 21"
Century, Bank Indonesia.
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Table 3.2 Indonesia: External Debt
Source: Bank Indonesia
INDONESIA: EXTERNAL DEBT
(As of December 31, 1997, updated on February 23, 1998)
fin millions)
Total External Debt | USD 136.088
I. Public Sector | USD 67.773
A. Government | USD 54.110
Of Which IMF Credit USD 3,0 billions
B. State Owned Enterprises | USD 13.663
1. State Banks USD 7.280
;'. Bank Credit USD 5.910
ii. CP/MTN/FRN USD 1.370
2. Non-Bank Enterprises USD 6.383
i. Bank Credit USD 3.995
ii. CP/MTN/FRN USD 2.388
11. Private Sector | USD 68315
1. Private Banks USD 9.409
(". Bank Credit USD 8.454
a. Foreign Banks USD 529
b. Joint Venture Banks USD 3.801
c. Domestically Owned Banks USD 4.124
ii. CP/MTN/FRN USD 955
2. Non-Bank Corporations | USD 58.906
\i. Bank Credit JjJSD 53.593
a. Foreign Investment (PMA) | USD 23.473
b. PMDN dan Non PMDN j USD 30.120
ii. CP/MTN/FRN USD 5.313
Notes:
CP : Commercial Papers
MTN : Medium Term Notes












O W N t rl- CO O CM
t^OOOOt-^OCJO
O v M P) ?
-<t in oq t- cm cmNO do
co <* m in
in t- r- coc CO CJ CD









fflocos rotDrtPoin ,u) f.inT-. mmISS5S
«C) lO N





- Tf CO CO
^ CO CM CM







« m co m rr\ tn r\i l> to PI U .. #^ #^ >/*g^COcMCoScM^gg^^-CDcScS^^
*" T- m CO rn Is"
CM "C >- TO
co 3;
CM "T <o



















NW(D m inw_ingo)NS M om m w<tmto?«t-ro30ouE^inKvNPyrj- en to




' m r~> r~i • * • ** v* *-* k~ wj *.>j
M 'O "l "l to tfl in N m T W }>, y mCM










CO ,„- rrT .« ra ^ g CD S T-- CM CM* Nr?S wni° CM
t^ co co Q 7Z t- cmO *" £j "2 CM CO
7Z - - co cow N r--




o E? 2 x: o-a^a o ° .£ 2 « cox: o-cax: 3 o.SO<D5OO££T^25D.D.a..C0WhF F.-> Ki
54
Table 3.4. International Claims Held By Foreign Banks
































•' Public bank • Short
Outstanding Banks Sector Private Short Term Reserves Term/Reserves
44.5 8.9 6.7 28.8 27.6 14.7 1.9
16.8 4.4 * 2.1 10.1 7.9 23.9 0.3
8.3 2.2 2.7 3.4 4.1 7.8 0.5
62.8 25.8 2.3 34.7 43.6 37 1.2
77.5 50.0 6.2 21.4 54.3 32.7 1.7
209.9 91.3 20.0 98.4 137.5
55.5 • 11.7 6.9 36.8 34.2 19.3 1.8
22.2 6.5 2.0 13.7 11.2 27.1 0.4
13.3 5.2 2.7 5.3 7.7 11.7 0.7
70.2 25.9 2.3 41.9 . 45.7 38.7 1.2
100.0 65.9 5.7 28.3 67.5 34.1 2.0
261.2' 115.2 19.6 126.0 166.3
58.7 12.4 6.5 39.7 34.7 20.3 1.7
28.8 10.5 1.9 16.5 16.3 26.6 0.6
14.1 5.5 1.9 6.8 8.3 9.8 0.8'
69.4 26.1 2.0 41.3 45.6 31.4 1.5
103.4 67.3 4.4 31.7 70.2 34.1 2.1
274.4 121.8 16.7 136.0 175.1
64.6- 16.7 • 24.9 22.8 33.2 6.4 5.2
57.3 11.5 23.5 22.3 26.0 17.1 1.5
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Table 3.5. International Claims Held By Foreign Banks









Total Claims held by banks from:
Outstanding Japan U.S.A. Germany All othe
44.5 21.0 2.8 3.9 16.8
16.8 7.3 1.5 2.2 5.8
8.3 1.0 2.9 0.7 3.7
62.8 36.9 4.1 5.0 16.8



















22.0 5.3 5.5 - 22.7
8.2 2.3 3.9 7.8
1.6 3.9 1.8 6.0
37.5 5.0 6.9 20.8
24.3 9.4 10.0 56.3
113.6
.

















Sub-total 274.4 97.2 23.8 31.7 121.7
Total, all reporting countries
* 404.4 166.3 301.2
• Reporting countries Include G-10 plus Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg. Norway. Spain, plus 15 financial centers
Source: Bank For International Settlements
58.7 23.2 4.6 5.6 25.3
28.8 10.5 2.4 5.7 10.2
14.1 2.1 2.8 2.0 7.2
69.4 37.7 4.0 7.6 20.1
103.4 23.7 10.0 10.8 58.9
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B. THE UNFOLDING OF THE CRISIS: EPISODES
In 1995, Indonesia's real GDP growth reached 8.1%-up
from rates of 7.3% in 1993 and 7.5% in 1994, respectively.
This growth brought along worrying signs of overheating,
such as an inflation rate of 9.4%, a sharp 41% drop in the
country's trade surplus (from US$8.1 billion in 1994 to
US$4.8 billion in 1995) , due to a surge in consumer imports,
and a corresponding increase in the current account deficit
from US $2.8 billion (1.7% of GDP) in 1994 to US$7.9 billion
(3.9% of GDP) in 1995. (See Table 3.6 for more information)
The government's response was a deflationary budget and a
tightening of monetary policy. Throughout 1995, Bank
Indonesia raised interest rates, and in January 1996, raised
reserve requirements for commercial banks from 2% to 3%. In
September 1996, the bank announced that it would increase
the requirements further to 5% in April 1997. The bank also
increased its efforts at moral suasion in an attempt to
moderate the expansion of bank credit. Bank Indonesia also
faced an awkward balancing act, hoping to dampen domestic
demand, but not wanting higher interest rates to fuel
speculative inflows.
In an effort to meet both objectives, Bank Indonesia
widened the rupiah's trading band from 2% to 3% around the
daily midrate hoping that the added trading risk of holding
the rupiah would offset more attractive interest rates.
Again the band widened from 3% to 5% in June 1996 and from
5% to 8% in September 1996. But the broader bands did
little to discourage capital inflows, as the promise of
higher interest rates pushed the rupiah upward on each of
these occasions.
In 1996, signs of overheating did abate, with real GDP
growth slowing to 7.8%, and inflation dropping to 6.6%. The
current account deficit remained at around 3.3% of GDP and
was largely financed by short-term inflows of portfolio
capital. With signs of easing growth, Bank Indonesia cut
rates by 0.5% in December 1996 and by 0.5 in March 1997,
hoping to moderate the inflow of capital, ease the debt
burden on struggling Indonesian firms, and allow increases
in exports. In the meantime, many Indonesian banks and
companies were still borrowing very heavily in international
capital markets. (See Table 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6).
In its annual report on Indonesia, the World Bank has
estimated that Indonesia's 1996-1997 current account deficit
will reach US$8.1 billion, or 3.5% of the country's Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) . The World Bank also said that in
1997-1998 the deficit would reach US$10.1 billion or 4% of
the GDP. However, the Bank praised the country's economic
performance and credited the government ' s fiscal and
monetary policies for helping to solve the structural
problems in the economy, particularly high inflation. The
Bank repeated its call to the government to abolish the
subsidies on fuel and power, increase forestry levies,
maintain the momentum of deregulation, improve the high-risk
banking sector and its exposure toward the property sector
and improve governance to push down business costs and
maintain competitiveness.
1. July 1997
On July 2, 1997, The Bank of Thailand announced a
managed float of the baht and called on the International
Monetary Fund for technical assistance. The announcement
effectively devalued the baht by about 15-20%, and its
trigger for the East Asian crises. The Philippines' central
bank was forced to intervene heavily to defend the peso. On
July 3, the Philippines central bank raised the overnight
lending rate to 24% from 15%. On July 8, Malaysia's central
bank, Bank Negara, had to intervene aggressively to defend
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the ringgit . The intervention worked and the currency hit a
high of 2.5100/10 after a low of 2.5240/50 39 .
In Indonesia, the rupiah started to crumble, and on
July 11, the authorities widened its rupiah-trading band to
12% from 8%, however, this step was unable to stop the
tendency of the weakening rupiah. On July 21, pressures
against the rupiah increased, and Bank Indonesia was forced
to make several interventions by spending the reserved funds
of around US$1.5 billion.
On July 11, the Philippines central bank said in a
statement it would allow the peso to move in a wider range
against the dollar, and if the IMF backed the move, it would
approve the Philippines' request for an extension of its
Extended Fund Facility (EFF) . On July 14, the IMF offered
the Philippines almost $1.1 billion in financial support.
On July 14, the Malaysian central bank abandoned the defense
of the ringgit, and on July 24, Malaysian Prime Minister,
Mahathir Mohamad, launched a bitter attack on "rouge
speculators" after the ringgit hit a 38-month low of 2.6530
to the dollar. Around this time, the Singapore dollar
started a gradual decline and the Singapore authority
allowed the depreciation of the Singapore dollar.
By the end of July 1997, several Asian currencies- the
Thai baht , the Malaysian ringgit, the Philippine peso and
the Indonesian rupiah- all slumped, as confidence in the
region rapidly deteriorated, reflective a perceived
currency meltdown. The baht had fallen by 25% (relative to
the beginning of 1997) while the ringgit fell by 4%, peso by
10% and the rupiah by 9%. After the deflation rate of 0.17%
in June, Indonesia had an inflation rate of 3.20% in July.
It was caused by the increase in the food indices by 1.10%,
housing by 0.21%, clothing by 0.19%, and miscellaneous
indices by 0.70%. The inflation rate from January to July
39 See Table 3.7, 3.8.
60
3.20%. Foreign direct investment approvals declined for the
year to July to reach US$16.2 billion; for the same period
last year, it reached US$21.5 billion. Domestic investment
on the other hand increased in the value to Rp70 . 8 trillion
in 1996.
In the early part of the month, the government had
issued the latest deregulation package, which effectively
cut import tariffs on 1,600 items, slashed the number of
local taxes and fees and allowed imports of used cargo and
fishing vessels. After this latest package, 62.55% of
Indonesia's total tariff codes would be in the range of to
10%. This reform also decreased the Indonesian average
unweighted import tariff from 13% to 11.9%, the second
lowest in Southeast Asia after Singapore. Indonesian donors
pledged US$5.3 billion in fresh aid at the conclusion of a
two day meeting of the Consultative Group on Indonesia. The
amount was slightly higher than the US$5.26 billion secured
by Indonesia from the same group last year.
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Table 3.7. Money and Credit
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 ...-1995
Indonesia
M2 (share of GDP) 43.3 43.7 45.8 43.4 44.9 48.3 52.5
M2 (annual growth rate) 17.5 19.8 20.2 20.0 27.2 27.2
Claims on Private Sector 50.6 50.7 49.5 48.9 51.9 53.7 55.8
(share of GDP)
Claims on Private Sector 16.7 11.4 25.5 23.0 22.6 21.4
(annual growth rate)
34.5 36.2 42.1 45.7 50.4 54.0
17.3 13.6 27.1 24.4 24.2 23.2
17.8 20.6 26.4 29.1 37.5 48.6
Malaysia
M2 (share of GDP) 66.2 69.3 78.9 90.6 88.9 92.7 97.8
M2 (annual growth rate) 16.9 29.2 26.6 12.7 20.0 21.8
Claims on Private Sector 111.4 113.3 115.0 129.6 1446
(share of GDP)
Claims on Private Sector 12.1 16.5 29.7 28.9
(annual growth rate)
Philippines
' M2 (share of GDP) 34.1
M2 (annual growth rate)
Claims on Private Sector 1 9.3
(share of GDP)
Claims on Private Sector 7.3 25.4 39.6 26.5 45.2 48.7
(annual growth rate)
Thailand
M2 (share of GDP) 69.8
M2 (annual growth rate)
Claims on Private Sector 83.1
(share of GDP)
. Claims on Private Sector 22.7 24.8 26.3 31.2 26.0 13.7
(annual growth rate)
Korea
M2 (share of GDP)
M2 (annual growth rate)
Claims on Private Sector
(share of GDP)
Claims on Private Sector 20.9 19.6 21.8 21.6 19.2 17.0
(annual growth rate)
72.7 74.8 78.9 78.5 80.8 79.9
19.8 15.6 18.4 12.9 17.0 12.6
88.6 98.4 110.8 128.1 142.0 141.9
38.3 38.8 40.0 42.0 43.5 43.7 45.7
21.9 14.9 16.6 18.7 15.6 15.8
102.5 103.1 110.7 121.3 128.8 133.5 140.9
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Table 3.8. Net foreign Assets of the Banking System
(share of GDP)
Indonesia
Foreign Assets of the Banking System (net)
Monetary Authorities (net)
.




Foreign Assets of the Banking System (net)
Monetary Authorities (net)
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Monetary Authorities (net)




Foreign Assets of the Banking System (net)
Monetary Authorities (net)




Foreign Assets of the Banking System (net)
Monetary Authorities (net)
Deposit Money Banks (net)
Foreign Assets
Foreign Liabilities
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
5.4 7.6 11.4 8.6 6.4 6.7 9.6






6.0 4.9 5.0 3.4 3.4 3.8 3.9
6.5 5.2 6.2 6.2 6.5 6.0 5.6
22.1 18.7 23.0 34.3 33.2 27.2 23.7





5.8 4.3 3.6 6.5 5.7 4.8 4.4
7.0 9.1 12.7 19.5 9.2 7.4 9.2
-9.1
-1.5 2.6 7.4 7.4 6.2 3.2
-13.0 -5.5
-0.6 3.8 5.4 6.2 10.6
4.0 4.0 3.1 3.5 2.0 -0.0 -7.4
10.2 8.4 8.7 9.0 8.7 8.8 9.8
6.2 4.4 5.6 5.5 6.7 8.8 17.2
14.0 16.4 15.9 14.3 4.1 0.0 -1.7





2.6 2.9 2.7 5.0 4.7 5.8 3.9
5.0 4.9 5.9 11.1 21.6 28.4 26.8
5.7 3.8 5.1 6.6 6.7 6.4 5.2
6.0 4.9 5.7 6.2 6.8 7.2 7.2
-0.3
-1.1 -0.6 0.4 -0.1 -0.8 -2.0
3.8 3.8 4.2 4.9 5.4 6.1 7.3
4.1 4.9 4.8 4.5 5.5 6.9 9.3
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2 . August 19 97
In the first week of August, jittery Indonesian
companies, fearful that the rupiah would continue to lose
value against the U.S. dollar, sold the local currency in
increasing quantities. In turn, international banks writing
options for clients were forced to hedge their own
positions. On August 4, Bank Indonesia increased the
interest rates of SBI (Bank of Indonesia Certificates) for a
six-day period from 6% to 15% and for a period of more than
a week from 7% to 10%. At this time, Bank Indonesia also
froze the commercial papers (SBPU) . On August 11th, in the
face of massive selling pressure, the governor of the
central bank (Bank Indonesia) called in the domestic banks
and asked them to support the rupiah.
On August 13th, the rupiah began to come under severe
pressure. It hit a historic low of Rp2,682 to the dollar
before ending at Rp2,655. The central bank actively
intervened in its defense. Bank Indonesia spent $500
million in an effort to hold the currency within its 12%
trading band. Neither action had any effect. After several
days of decline of the rupiah and realizing that the
intervention band itself attracted speculative attacks, on
August 14, 1997, Indonesia abolished its system of managed
exchange rate and the rupiah was allowed to float. Stanley
Fischer, acting Managing Director of the IMF said,
The management of the IMF welcomes the timely
decisions of the Indonesian authorities. The
floating of the rupiah, in combination with
Indonesia's strong fundamentals, supported by
prudent fiscal and monetary policies, will allow
its economy to continue its impressive economic
performance of the last several years. 40
40 imp Welcomes Indonesia' s Exchange Rate Action, IMF News
Brief No. 97/18, August 14, 1997.
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The landmark decision, which followed renewed attacks
on Southeast Asian currencies, came after a closed door
meeting between Bank Indonesia Governor Soedradjad
Djiwandono, Finance Minister Mar'ie Muhammad, Information
Minister R. Hartono and senior editors of the local media.
Eventually, the monetary authority released the intervention
band and submitted the rupiah exchange value to the market
mechanism. This step was taken to protect the reserved
funds. And in stabilizing the rupiah 1 s value, wherever
necessary, the government would make indirect intervention
through fiscal and monetary policy. A day later, an
increase in rupiah selling caused the rupiah value against
the dollar to drop to Rp3.000 per U.S. dollar.
On August 19th, The monetary authority increased the
SBI from 10.5% to 20% (for one week), 22$ (for two weeks),
and 3 0% (for one month) . This measure was taken to curb
foreign currency speculations. On August 20th, Deposit
funds from government -owned companies and pension funds in
the banks were withdrawn from Bank Indonesia accounts. It
was estimated that Rpl2 trillion was withdrawn from the
total Rp26 trillion owned by government -owned companies.
The measures taken by Bank Indonesia for two days in a row
had caused scarcity in liquidity for many banks. And on
August 29th, the government restricted forward selling
transactions of foreign currency (against rupiah) from the
local banks to nonresident (foreigners) customers, for a
maximum transaction per customer and position per bank of
U.S. $5 million, except swap transactions for investment
purposes in Indonesia and for export - import
.
Bank Indonesia tried mopping up liquidity with high
interest rates . Most market players welcomed the central
banks move, saying that it would stabilize the currency.
Some other analysts, however, question the medium- term
effectiveness of the US$5 million cap, since the ruling was
applied to banks based in Indonesia, whereas in terms of
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volume, the rupiah trading in Singapore was considerably
more significant than in Jakarta. "They just pushed the
panic button, propping up interest rates just killed
economic activity" an investment fund manager said of the
central bank.
The rupiah sank still further, it fell 4.5% on the
day. 41 Now, the rupiah ' s plunge seemed an inevitable
outcome, given the domino- like tumbling of other Southeast
Asian currencies. "Rightly or wrongly, this region is seen
to be integrated; there is a block mentality, " says Michael
McNertney, managing director at Chase Manhattan Bank in
Jakarta. 42 Once the currency of its neighbors dropped, it
was inevitable that for competitive reasons Indonesia would
let its currency go as well. In August the baht had fallen
further down, 34% below its beginning of the year value.
This large effective real depreciation of the baht put firms
in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines at serious risk
and led to rapid currency deprecations of these currencies
in August. By the end of the month, the rupiah had fallen
by 27% (relative to start 1997)
.
The same scenario of competitive devaluation of one
country inducing further devaluation of other ones continued
in September, and by the end of the month the rupiah was 3 7%
below its start 1997 level. The sharp devaluation of the
currencies in the region in July and August 1997 was also
the result of the very loose monetary policies of the
central banks in the region, before and after the currencies
started to fall. The first reaction of the monetary
authority to speculative pressures on the currency was to
41 Financial Times, Timetable : Countdown to crisis, January
13, 1998.
42 Henny Sender, Thorny Hedge, Far Eastern Economic Review,
August 28,1997.
66
try to avoid a monetary contraction and significantly
increased domestic interest rates. When the first pressures
started, the reaction was to perform sterilized
interventions, and once such interventions turned out to be
ineffective given their sterilized nature, several countries
introduced limited (and eventually ineffective) capital
controls to prevent the capital outflows. 43
The basic stance of monetary policy in the region
remained quite loose well into the crisis, and monetary
authorities tried to prevent an increase in domestic
interest rates from occurring. It was only when the fall of
the currencies accelerated in the fall that a serious
monetary tightening implemented. The policy stance of the
central bank in Indonesia was motivated by the concern that
high interest rates would lead to a worsening of the
financial conditions of highly indebted banks, financial
institutions and corporations. However, the serious policy
dilemma faced by the monetaries authorities (i.e., tighten
interest rates, prevent a devaluation, but bankrupt banks
and firms and cause a recession or keep interest rates low
to save shaky banks and corporations but risk a currency
attack) was caused itself by the reckless overborrowing and




Around this time, speculators attacked the Hong Kong
dollar. The IMF unveiled a rescue package for Thailand
including loans totaling $17.2 billion from the IMF and
Asian nations and approved a $3.9 billion credit for
43 Giancarlo Corsetti -Paulo Pesenti-Nouriel Roubini , What
caused the Asian currency and financial crisis?, p. 59,
Nouriel Roubini homepage, March 1998.
44 Giancarlo Corsetti -Paulo Pesenti-Nouriel Roubini, What
caused the Asian currency and financial crisis?, p. 60,
Nouriel Roubini homepage, March 1998.
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Thailand on August 20. Malaysian PM, Mahathir Mohamad,
blamed U.S. financier, George Soros, for leading an attack
on East Asian currencies. The forest fires in some parts of
Indonesia, according to official estimates, had so far swept
through more than 80,000 hectares in Sumatra, Kalimantan,
Sulawesi, and Irian Jaya, with the potential to spread to
300,000 hectares, and its haze affected neighboring
countries
.
The value of the rupiah was Rp3,055 against the U.S.
dollar on Friday August 30, before paring losses back to
Rp2,935 on market closing. The Jakarta Stock Exchange
tumbled by 6.9% to 493.96 index levels, the lowest since
December 1995. The index had fallen 11% in two days and
lost 14% in a week, while benchmark stocks had fallen 32% so
far this year. The inflation rate in August was 0.88%,
caused by the increase in the food indices by 1.05%, housing
by 0.54%, clothing by 0.50%, and miscellaneous indices by
1.07%. The inflation rates from January to August were
4.08%. Some analysts were concerned about two inflationary
factors facing the economy in the near term: the drought
(expected to have its greatest impact on food availability
and prices next January and February) and the coming of the
first day of Ramadhan (the Muslim fasting month) on 31
December 1997. Indonesia's trade surplus rose 64% to $1.45
billion in August 1997 from last year. This was the highest
surplus in the last five years. The total trade surplus
from January to August 1997 reached $6.4 billion, up 91%
from the same period last year.
3. September 1997
On September 3, the rupiah was under pressure and the
stock exchange started to slide. Indonesia announced a
reform package, designed to restore market confidence. Long
a favorite of the International Monetary Fund for its
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conservative monetary policy, Indonesia appeared ready to
please again. It froze a wide range of infrastructure
projects, as part of a broader effort to cut government
expenditure and help bring down the current account deficit
.
It promised far-reaching banking reform, and for the first
time, it would shut down insolvent and undercapitalized
banks. The government said it would raise luxury taxes to
reduce non-essential imports while reducing import tariffs
for raw materials needed by exporting industries, such as
textiles. It lifted a 49% ceiling on foreign share
purchases on Indonesian stocks, leading to a 11% surge in
the Jakarta Stock Exchange Index.
In the short run, the Indonesian governement pledged
gradually to ease liquidity and interest and interest rates.
The government slackened liquidity by decreasing the SBI
interest rate for one month from 39% to 27%, and for three
months it decreased from 28% to 25%. The Minister of
Finance, Mar'ie Muhammad, stressed that the interest rate
would periodically decrease, according to circumstantial
developments. On September 16, Mar'ie Muhammad released
more concrete plans to freeze infrastructure projects,
including power plants and toll roads. Indonesia said it
would postpone projects worth 39 trillion rupiah in an
attempt to slash the budget shortfall. Of all government-
owned companies and private projects related to
government/BUMN, which were funded by commercial credit
amounting to Rpl61,78 trillion, Indonesia would postpone
projects valued at Rp38,92 trillion, and reschedule projects
valued at Rp62,69 trillion.
On September 17, the government, through the Minister
of Finance Decree NO. 477/KMK. 01/1997 , reduced import
tariffs for 153 items; 40 tariff items for textile products,
67 tariff items for wood processing, 31 tariff items for
chemical products, 9 tariff items for leather products, and
three each tariffs for steel, machinery's, and automotive
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and agricultural products. The range of tariff decrease was
5% to 10%. 45 Demonstrating how serious he was about reducing
the current -account deficit, President Suharto issued a
decree on September 22 postponing 81 infrastructure projects
worth more than US$17 billion.
This time around, however, the Jakarta stock Exchange
dipped on the news. Brokers said they were more concerned
with the problem at the heart of the currency crisis-high
interest rates and mounting short-term foreign debt, built
up by private enterprises, much of it unheeded. Poorly
reported, the offshore borrowings surfaced only as a topic
when the depreciation of the Indonesian currency boosted
their value in rupiah terms. Private debt had been
estimated at $55 billion, but many brokerages feared this
figure could be $20 billion to $50 billion higher, with much
of the additional debt in short-term commercial paper.
"Investors were looking for a clear picture in terms of
how they were going to deal with them, " said Paul Shang,
head of investment banking in Asia for Lehman Brothers. The
government never gave this picture, and Mr. Soedradjad
Djiwandono conceded that he simply had no idea. Nothing the
government could do would make these debts disappear. 46
Suddenly, Indonesia was no longer the good boy in the class.
Domestic and foreign investors alike rushed for the exits.
Local companies started lobbying for a more rapid reduction
of interest rates, without much effect. And even if
official lending rates were coming down, few banks were
actually lending. Indonesia saw its first defaults.
45 KK and Andi Zulfikar, Strategy to safe rupiah, Gatra
Number 48/111, October 18,1997.
46 Sander Thoenes , Indonesia: The offshore borrowing trap,
Financial Times, January 12, 1998.
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Around this time, because of drought and clearing lands
by some companies, the massive forest fires were chocking
the archipelago, drought was worsening and President
Suharto's unprecedented apology for the forest fires that
were spewing smoke over neighboring Malaysia and Singapore
had drawn praise as a sign of Indonesia's readiness to
tackle the annual haze. Malaysia sent 1,200 firefighters to
join the assault, Singapore was contributing satellite data,
Japan offered pumping equipment and water- jet shooters, and
Thailand was sending two fire-fighting planes. According to
data obtain from the Ministry of Agriculture, the drought
had hit over 301,000 hectares of rice fields, as of early
September of which 32,600 hectares were completely
destroyed.
The government set up emergency rice stocks across the
country to deal with expected food shortages caused by
drought . The problem was especially severe in Irian Jaya
province, where 251 deaths had been reported due to cholera
and famine, which had affected more than 5,000 villages in
the province . BULOG had said that so far there was no need
to import rice. The Minister of Agriculture, Sjarifudin
Baharsjah, said that there would be no shortage, since the
government had enough rice stocks to cover four to five
months consumption.
Malaysian PM, Mahathir Mohamad, told delegates to the
IMF/World Bank annual conference, on September 20-21 in Hong
Kong, that currency trading was immoral and should be
stopped. And George Soros said "Dr. Mahathir is a menace to
his own country." At the end of the month, the value of the
rupiah was Rp3,289 against the U.S. dollar. Most analysts
believed the weakening was triggered by corporate demands
for the U.S. dollar, as the deadline for certain obligations
were nearing. Some other analysts said the fall in regional
currencies could also have been triggered by yet more
negative remarks made by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir
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Mohamad during his visit to Chile. Mahathir reiterated his
contempt for currency speculators and said trading in the
Malaysian ringgit should be regulated. 47 Foreign Investment
Approvals fell 2.1 in the January to September period to
US$24.09 billion compared with the same period in 1996.
Domestic investment approvals during the same period rose to
Rp91.3 trillion from 546 projects, compared to Rp82 .
5
trillion from 646 projects previously. The inflation rate
in September was 1.29% and was caused by the increase in the
food indices by 1.91%, housing by 0.82, clothing by 0.61,
and miscellaneous indices by 1.29%. Cumulative inflation
rate by the 1997 calendar year (January-September) reached
5.3%.
4. October 1997
On October 3, The Governor of Bank Indonesia, with
Minister of Trade and Industry, announced an award of swap
facilities to exporters and forward buying facilities for
imports related to export activities. These facilities were
offered to attract foreign currencies from exporters and to
provide fixed rates to business communities. Between
October 6-8, Bank Indonesia made three market interventions
for an estimated value of US$650 million. Financial
analysts marveled at how quickly sentiment has shifted
against Indonesia. A stock market index fluttering at the
700 level in early August was now struggling to stay above
500. After the rupiah sunk to a new low of Rp3,845 against
the dollar on October 6, 1997, Indonesia realized it lacked
the means to restore confidence in the rupiah and its
economy
.
47 Indonesian Business : The Year In Review 1997, Chapter 2
Macroeconomic, The Castle Group Business Information.
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On October 8, 1997, Indonesia asked the IMF, World Bank
and Asian Development Bank for advice and financial
assistance in restoring confidence and warding off further
attacks on the currency. The IMF agreed to send a technical
team to Indonesia to begin developing an economic
restructuring program and a financial assistance package.
IMF Managing Director, Michel Camdessus, said that
Indonesia's fundamentals were basically sound, which
indicated that an IMF package would be limited to a stand-by
facility rather than any direct emergency loans. At the
same time, the government had reaffirmed its commitment to a
free foreign exchange system and said that no exchange
controls were planned.
Meanwhile, the Minister of Finance, the Governor of
Bank Indonesia, and the Minister of Industry and Trade had
also been conducting closed door meetings with major
portfolio investors, which included some of the world's
leading fund management companies, such as Quantum,
Templeton and Capital International. Sources close to fund
managers said the mood was still somber, although most were
aware that "Indonesia is not a basket case." The rupiah
seemed to have stabilized between Rp3,450 and Rp3,550 for
the time being, but continued volatility was to be expected.
President Suharto assigned Widjojo Nitisastro, the dean of
New Order financial advisors, to coordinate and take
necessary action in handling the monetary crisis.
In late October, Japan and Singapore pledged $10
billion ($5 million apiece) aid to Indonesia and Malaysia,
despite its own financial problems, pledged $1 billion. The
pledges came as Jakarta pursued difficult negotiations with
the IMF on conditions for aid, and allowed President Suharto
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to declare that he needed only expertise and not money from
the fund. 48 Australia also pledged $1 billion.
On October 31, 1997, Indonesia's IMF package was
unveiled in Jakarta. It provided for as much as $40 billion
in financial assistance, including a front-line defense fund
of $23 billion. Indonesia agreed to close 16 insolvent
banks, reduce import tariffs, deregulate several commodity
products, open its domestic wholesale and retail markets,
postpone several large infrastructure projects, and
implement other economic reform measures. The IMF package
included a commitment from the United States of $3 billion
in the form of second-tier defense loans and bilateral
credits. Confidence was partially restored.
When news of the IMF package for Indonesia broke on
October 28, the rupiah strengthened against the U.S. dollar.
(It was helped by concerted intervention by Japan and
Singapore, which both bought rupiah heavily)
.
49 At the heart
of Indonesia's financial crisis was corporate debt. The
biggest part of the debt problem was the unregulated, very-
short-term commercial paper market-U.S. dollar borrowing on
terms typically between one and three months. Standard &
Poor's had lowered its long-term foreign currency rating on
Indonesia to triple B minus from triple B. Standard & Poor
also lowered its long-term local currency rating on
Indonesia to single A minus from single A plus. In the
meantime, Moody's Investors Service said Indonesian
corporations and banks were likely to experience significant
problems as a result of the country's currency depreciation.
48 Michael Vatikiotis, Pacific Divide, Far Eastern Economic
Review, November 6, 1997.
49 John McBeth, Big is best, Far Eastern Economic Review,
November 13, 1997.
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Around this time, the smog was still sweeping across
Southeast Asia from forest fires in Indonesia. The smoke
choking the region had prompted unusually blunt criticism of
Indonesia from Asian countries that normally treated the
group's largest member with deference. The degree of anger
in Malaysia and Singapore had forced their governments to be
more critical of Jakarta. In response to growing regional
resentment, President Suharto on October 5 issued another
apology to his neighbors, his second in three weeks. He
also ordered the military to step up their efforts to fight
the forest fires. 50
In others countries, on October 17, Taipei abandoned
its defense of the New Taiwan dollar. The South Korean won
slumped rapidly in value against the U.S. dollar and
bankruptcies threatened a debt crisis. In Hong Kong,
several hedge funds decided to see how far they could push
the Hong Kong unit from its tight, 14 -year-old peg of around
7.80 to the U.S. dollar. The Hong Kong stock market
suffered its heaviest drubbing ever. On October 23, the
Hang Seng index was down 23.34% to 10,426.30, and on October
27 the Hang Seng lost another 646.14 points, or 5.80% to
10,498.20. The loss rippled through global markets. Asian
jitters spilled over to the world stock market.
On Wall Street, the Dow Jones industrial average posted
its single-biggest point loss ever, falling 55.26 points or
7.18% to 7,161.15. The Nasdaq plunged 115.43 points and the
S&P index tumbled 64.65 points. The decline was so steep it
prompted stock exchange officials to suspend trading. Stock
markets throughout Latin America suffered record losses as
Asia's market crisis rippled to other vulnerable emerging
markets and investors frantically sold their holdings.
During October in many Asian countries, there was a growing
so Murray Hiebert and John Mcbeth, Trial by Fire, Far
Eastern Economic Review, October 16, 1997.
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feeling that Washington was neglecting the region in its
time of dire need. There was no Mexico-style bailout offer
or other substantial pledges of aid. Washington's muted
response to the currency crisis sweeping Southeast Asia was
sowing suspicion among its allies in the region and fuelling
anti-American sentiment. 51
At the end of the month, the rupiah value was Rp3 , 630
against the U.S. dollar. The deflation rate of 1.99% in
October was caused by the increase in all indices. The food
expenditure index was up by 3.61%, housing index by 1.18%,
clothing index by 2.35%, and the miscellaneous index by
0.65%. Consumer prices in October were up 1.99% from
September and up 8.8% year-on-year . The October increase
was the largest monthly rise in a decade, said Information
Minister R. Hartono.
5. November 1997
In an effort to salvage the country's teetering
financial system, on November 1, 1997, Indonesia closed 16
of it weakest banks . That was enough to prompt panicked
citizens to pull funds out of the system. The move had
frozen the savings of thousands of people and cost 6,000
bank employees their livelihoods. The bank closures ensured
that the package had the desired shock value, because of the
almost deliberate way the government homed in on big-name
owners. "The list is odd because there are so many high-
flyers, surely these are not the worst 16 banks" said Eugene
Galbraith, group head of research for ABN-Amro Hoare Govett
Asia. 52 With as many as 25 or so other problem banks
51 Michael Vatikiotis , Pacific Divide, Far Eastern Economic
Review, November 6, 1997.
52 John McBeth, Big is best, Far Eastern Economic Review,
November 13, 1997.
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believed to be facing the possibility of mergers or
bankruptcy, account holders at even the country's largest
private institution, Bank Central Asia, were pulling out and
heading for the safety of state banks. Most customers at
the closed banks, particularly small savers, would get their
money back
.
Many protesters were gathering with economic rallying
cries, as the pain of the financial crisis started to bite.
Some feared that large numbers of workers would take to the
streets, as the effects of the economic crisis hit home. As
in the last situation, Indonesia had often been described as
a simmering volcano; some feared that the latest tensions
could make the mountain blow its top. 53
Fifteen delayed infrastructure projects had been given
the go-ahead from the government. This decision came only
weeks after all were postponed, along with another 135
infrastructure projects in the wake of the currency crisis.
The 1 November decree said the status of the 15 projects had
been changed, in accordance with the results of a
government study. On November 5, 19 97, the IMF approved a
$10 billion loan for Indonesia, as part of the massive
international package.
On November 18-19, 1997, the Deputy Finance Ministers
meeting in Manila (12 Asian finance ministries, plus the
U.S. and Canada, The IMF, the World Bank, and the Asian
Development Bank) issued a statement that proposed the
formation of a new mechanism to enhance the IMF's role in
identifying possible financial crises in Asia and addressing
them when they happened. The framework for cooperation
would include meetings at least twice a year, but it did not
mention specific participants in the new mechanism. By the
end of the two-day Manila meeting of deputies, no hard
53 The Next Battle, Far Eastern Economic Review, November
20, 1997.
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numbers emerged for the possible size of financing
arrangements that would always be supplements to the
resources put forward by the IMF.
On November 22-24, 1997, President Soeharto discussed
Indonesia's economic restructuring program with President
Clinton at the APEC economic leaders meeting in Vancouver,
Canada. The Asian financial crisis was a lead agenda item
at the APEC meeting, but the leaders reached no policy
decisions. The 18 -member Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
Forum ended an annual summit with a call for greater trade
freedom and common front against the economic turmoil
gripping the region. This year's summit had been
overshadowed by economic crisis in East Asia and fears over
Japan's ability to spearhead a recovery. The APEC leaders
said it was critically important to act quickly against the
Asian turmoil
.
The Singaporean and Indonesian monetary authorities had
clarified confusion caused by Aburizal Bakrie ' s statement on
the nature of Singapore's financial assistance to Indonesia.
After an audience with President Suharto, Bakrie publicly
stated that Indonesia wanted to use US$5 billion in
bilateral loans from Singapore to ease market liquidity. He
said that the funds would be linked to small-scale business,
cooperatives, labor-intensive industries and exports to be
channeled by the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
(Kadin) , which Bakrie chaired. Soon after the Bakrie
intervention, Singaporean and Indonesian officials clarified
the situation. In fact, Singapore's US$10 billion package
consisted of US$5 billion to help stabilize the rupiah and
another US$5 billion for balance of payment support,
according to a Bank Indonesia statement. 54
54 Indonesian Business : The Year In Review 1997, Chapter 2
Macroeconomic , The Castle Group Business Information.
Around this time, a grey-brown haze still blanketed
some part of Indonesia and its neighbors. Millions of
inhabitants had to resort to surgical masks before venturing
into an outside that has been shrouded in an eerie, almost-
perpetual twilight. The haze had been attributed to forest
and bush fires that began from open burning to clear land
and the prolong drought caused by the El Nino effect. In
Thailand, Prime Minister Chavalit resigned on November 6 and
was replaced by Chuan Leekpai on November 9
.
In South Korea, on November 10, the Korean won closed
at 999 to the U.S. dollar, pushing the rate that ordinary
Koreans paid for dollars at banks to more than 1,000 for the
first time ever. South Koreans called it "the four-digit'
era. On November 17, South Korea abandoned its defense of
the battered won, sending the currency smashing through the
psychological 1,000/dollar level. "The plunging won has put
the spotlight on South Korea's economic weaknesses and
raised fears of a Southeast Asia-style meltdown, that would
hurt Japan, Taiwan and more besides. There's a growing fear
that it may become the next domino to fall to the financial
turmoil shaking its Southeast Asian neighbors. If that
happened, the consequences would reverberate not only
through Asia but also around the globe." 55 On November 21,
South Korea, buckling under the pressure of a slumping
currency and crumbling investor's confidence said it would
seek a rescue package from the IMF. Most regional
currencies fell sharply following the fall in the Korean
won. Relative to the U.S. dollar, the Indonesian rupiah
fell 1.0% on November 18 and by 1.86% on November 20.
In Japan, on November 12, the benchmark Nikkei 225-
share index fell to its lowest level in more than two years,
as the yen slid against the U.S. dollar. The Nikkei
55 Charles S. Lee, The Next Domino, Far Eastern Economic
Review, November 20, 1997.
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finished 2.73%, or 433.06 points lower at 15,434.17, amid
rising concerns about the health of the financial system
supporting the world's second- largest economy. The failure
of the Hokkaido Takushoku bank on Monday November 17, the
first of Japan's big banks to collapse under the weight of
bad loans, was the latest strongest sign yet that the
Japanese government was prepared to allow market forces to
reconfigure the domestic financial landscape. On November
24, Japan's fourth-largest brokerage, Yamaichi Securities,
announced it would shut down, casting a spotlight on the
continuing woes of the country's troubled financial sector.
The 100-year-old firm was one of Japan's Big Four
brokerages. Its failure was Japan's largest financial
debacle ever and the third financial institution to close
this month. Yamaichi said that the massive weight of its 3
trillion-yen ($23.6 billion) in debt brought about the
downfall. News of the closure of Yamaichi Securities rocked
financial markets. The events in Japan were gradually being
factored into the regional currencies. The downturn that
killed Yamaichi offers a cautionary tale for the rest of
Asia, where most countries face the bursting of their own




At the end of the month, the value of rupiah was
Rp3,645 against the U.S. dollar. The inflation rate in
November was 1.65% and reflected an increase in the food
indices by 3.66%, housing by 0.54%, clothing by — 0.19%, and
miscellaneous indices by 0.79%. Cumulative inflation rate
by the calendar year (January-November) reached 9.01% and
cumulative inflation rate by the 1997/1998 fiscal year
(April -November) was 7.05%.
56 Peter Landers and Dan Biers, This Will Hurt, Far Eastern
Economic Review, December 4, 1997.
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6. December 1997
On December 5, Indonesia's rupiah hit a record low of
Rp4,020 to the U.S. dollar, as traders shrank from Southeast
Asian currencies. However, the country's central bank came
to the rescue, selling off dollars and stabilizing the
rupiah at Rp3,965. On December 8, workers trapped in a
burning office tower of Indonesia's central bank yelled for
help and waved red cloths, as flames gutted the building's
top three floors, killing 15 people. Faulty electrical
wiring may have caused the fire in the new 25-story Bank
Indonesia building in central Jakarta, a fire official
said. 57 The fire was another crisis for the central bank,
which had been at the center of efforts to prop up
Indonesia's ailing currency. The rupiah promptly slid
further to Rp4,155.
On December 9, rumors that Indonesia's President
Suharto was gravely ill swept Southeast Asian currency
markets, sending the rupiah into a tailspin. Senior
ministers' assurances that the 76 -year-old president was in
good health and merely resting on the advice of his doctors
were unable to prevent the currency from crashing 10%
against the U.S. dollar. By the close of Asian trading, the
rupiah had dropped to an all-time low Rp4,625 to the U.S.
dollar, down from Rp4,141 late Monday, and 47% below its
value just five months ago, before the Asian currency crisis
struck Indonesia.
At present, a regional currency crisis, a severe
drought and a serious loss of confidence among investors
beset Indonesia. Some economists predicted that the number
of people in poverty could soar in 1998. Some agricultural
economists worry that supply may be short, so prices could
57 John McBeth, Flame Out, Far Eastern Economic Review,
December 18, 1997.
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soar next year. Many observers say it comes down to
confidence, and the IMF rescue package agreed to in October
has not boosted confidence as hoped. One major problem,
they asserted, was that Indonesia had sent mixed and
confusing signals about policies. For example, the
government stopped dozens of planned infrastructure
projects, but then allowed 15 of them to proceed. In
another case, businessman Aburizal Bakrie created confusion
when he said last month that the president had told him five
billion U.S. dollars in aid from Singapore could be lent to
private companies but a week later State Secretary Murdiono
said this was not the case. (President Suharto himself
never made any public comment)
.
58
In order to try to boost shattered confidence, on
December 10-12, 1997, Indonesian finance minister, Mar'ie
Muhammad, traveled to Washington and New York to meet with
the U.S. officials, the IMF and business and banking
leaders. On December 12, Indonesia stocks plunged 7.6% and
the nation's currency, the rupiah, sank on Friday, as
concerns resurfaced about the health of President Suharto
when it was reported on the news that he would not attend an
Asian summit next week after all. Assurances earlier in the
week that the president would travel to Kuala Lumpur for the
Southeast Asian Nations Summit had helped to stabilize
Indonesia's markets. But on Friday, official word emerged
that president Suharto would heed the advice of doctors, who
urged him not to make the trip. 59
The reaction in the market was swift. It caused the
rupiah to nosedive to Rp5,800 per U.S. dollar on December
58 Nouriel Roubini, Chronology of the Asian Currency Crisis
and its Global Contagion, 1997,
http: //www, stern .nyu. edu /'-nroubini /'asia/'AsiaChronol ogyl . h tml
59 Imam B. Sarjito, Economic Brief, BNI Securities equity
research, January 1998.
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15, representing a depreciation of around 11% in a single
day. The Jakarta Stock Exchange index lost 30.255, or 7.6%,
to 365.853. Before the Friday announcement, the currency
had already slumped amid fresh rumors about President
Suharto's health. This was supported when the President
canceled a visit to his wife's grave in Solo, Central Java,
which was to be made in accordance with the Indonesian
custom of visiting the graves of relatives before the Muslim
fasting month.
Within minutes of the disclosure, panic selling sent
the currency crashing through the key psychological barrier
of Rp5,000 to the U.S. dollar. Late in the day, the
Indonesian currency was traded at around Rp5,15 to the U.S.
dollar, compared with Rp4,580 to the U.S. dollar late on
Thursday an 11% devaluation. The rupiah was down 22% for
the week and 54% for the year, making it the worst
performing currency in the region so far this year.
The currency freefall had led to predictions by some
economists that Indonesia would experience a recession next
year, as the rupiah' s plunge placed an impossible debt-
servicing burden on Indonesian corporations. That would be
the first contraction in growth since 1965, and raised fears
of social unrest. These worries were starting to dwarf
previous concerns about Indonesia's commitment to the
economic reforms mandated by the IMF, as part of its $40
billion bailout. 60 On December 22, 1997, Moody's Investor
Service, the U.S. credit rating agency, downgraded
Indonesia's credit rating to Bal (to junk bond status)
including South Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia. The IMF
revised down its estimate of 1998 world economic growth from
4.3% (made in October 1997) to 3.5%, recently due to the
prolonged Asian currency turmoil . With respect to
60 Nouriel Roubini , Chronology of the Asian Currency Crisis
and its Global Contagion, 1997.
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Indonesian economy, the IMF revised its 1998 growth estimate
from 6.2% to only 2.0%. This seemed to be related to the
tumbling of the Indonesian rupiah, which broke the 5,000
level against the U.S. dollar representing a rupiah
depreciation of around 55% in less than six months. This
sharp depreciation of the rupiah has increased the cost of
production, pushing up inflation, and driving up domestic
interest rates. In turn, this would likely cause a slow
down in the growth rate of investment and consumption in
1998. 61
On December 24, the rupiah plunged to a new record low,
as domestic demand for dollars again reached panic levels on
reports that the country's short-term debt burden was higher
than previously thought. After falling as far as Rp6,300 to
the U.S. dollar from a Tuesday closing of Rp5,450, the
currency bounced back after reports of late afternoon
intervention by Bank Indonesia, the nation's central bank,
trading late Wednesday in Asia at around Rp5,750 versus the
U.S. dollar. But analysts said the currency may head still
lower in coming days
.
In addition to worries about the short-term debt burden
faced by Indonesian companies, the rupiah was hurt by the
recent downgrades of Indonesian debt by major rating
agencies. The downgrades heightened fears international
banks would be unwilling to roll over their loans to the
corporate sector. What was needed, analysts said, was more
evidence that the government was prepared to take serious
steps to control the crisis such as measures to create more
competition in the financial sector and open up the property
market to foreign investment.
Little new has emerged since Indonesia implemented some
reforms after turning to the IMF in October for a near $4
billion bailout. The market had been hoping for substantial
61 BNI Securities, Daily - Economics , December 22, 1997.
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policy news at a cabinet meeting headed by President
Suharto. But the meeting proved a disappointment for the
markets yielding little more than a request for Indonesians
to refrain from buying imported items. And the threat from
Indonesia's debt obligations was apparently much worse than
initial projections, according to a December report by the
European investment house Indosuez W.I. Carr Securities.
Indosuez estimated that the total Indonesian debt was likely
to be closer to $200 billion, as opposed to the Indonesian
government's official figure of $117 billion. Indosuez
estimated that at least $44 billion in offshore bond
borrowings was not included in the official government
figures, nor were short-term, offshore borrowings.
The fear that international banks would not roll over
their loans after the Moody's downgrade spurred Indonesian
companies to buy dollars, even at exorbitant rates.
According to Bank Indonesia, US$9.6 billion of Indonesia's
private debt would mature by March 1998. In order to pay
their debts, many entrepreneurs had changed their rupiah
holdings into dollars. This action had considerably boosted
demand for dollars in the market, while demand for the
rupiah had continued to shrink. Unfortunately, hardly any
of the private entrepreneurs safeguarded their debts by
hedging. Hedging involves buying dollars when entering
transactions with the overseas party at the prevailing rate
of exchange at that time, so as to safeguard their loans.
Hedging is vitally important, given that, as Sofyan Wanandi
said, most of Indonesia's private sector overseas debt was
taken out when that dollar was still at Rp2,400. Just
imagine the losses incurred by the private sector now that
they have to pay off their debts with the dollar valued at
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Rp5,500 meaning they have to pay off more than twice the
original loan, not including interest. 62
The hopes for new reform would now likely focus on
President Suharto's January 6, 1998, budget speech, analysts
said. The market seems to be still waiting for a clearer
sign from the government regarding further concrete and
necessary steps that will be taken to restore confidence on
the rupiah. The acceleration in implementing Indonesia's
promises of reform and further efforts to improve the lack
of transparency would likely be able to boost confidence.
Nevertheless, political uncertainty was expected to continue
for a few more months in 1998, keeping the rupiah volatile
during that period. 63
In addition, the capital market regulator, Bapepam,
said the government would unveil 15 new regulations Friday
in a bid to bolster the sentiment on the country's sagging
capital market. Market speculation had focused on a
possible liberalization of the nation's financial services
sector and a reduction in barriers to foreign ownership of
property. They were also looking for a government action
plan for dealing with corporate insolvencies. 64 On December
26, the rupiah extended its morning gains on talk of central
bank intervention. It stood at Rp4 , 975/5 , 005 to the U.S.
dollar against Rp6, 125/75 late on Wednesday.
Dealers said Bank Indonesia sold dollars for rupiah
from the 5,650 to boost the rupiah further. But the short-
62 Any TH, Private Debt: Is This Behind the Rupiah Crash,
Tempo Interaktif, Edition 42/02 - December 20,1997.
63 Imam B Sarjito, Economic Brief, BNI Securities Equity
Research, January 1998.
64 Nouriel Roubini , Chronology of the Asian Currency Crisis
and its Global Contagion, 1997,
http: //www. stern. nyu. edu/-nroubini /asia/AsiaChronologyl . h tml
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end swap remained below par due to persistent demand for
dollars in very thin markets, keeping the rupiah vulnerable
to fresh falls through 6,000, dealers said. "Dollar/rupiah
could still test new highs over the reference holiday-
period. It really is a demand and supply situation and the
demand is on the dollar, "a U.S. bank dealer in Singapore
said. Dealers said transactions were hampered after non-
domestic banks reduced credit lines to local banks following
a Moody's Investors Service rating downgrade of Indonesian
debt to non- investment grade on Monday. They said the move
triggered some follow- through by local banks, which slimmed
down lines to other local banks.
Around this time, in South Korea, the government
officials and the IMF Managing Director, Michel Camdessus,
signed a letter of intent on Wednesday, December 3, covering
an international accord to provide South Korea, the world's
ll th-largest economy, with $57 billion to help dig it out of
its financial mess. The agreement brought an end to weeks
of tension that had gripped financial markets. A record
loan package led by the IMF to bailout South Korea helped
calm jitters in most regional markets, but many South
Koreans reacted with humiliation and anger to the deal, even
though it had breathed new life into the country's ailing
economy. The militant Korea Confederation of Trade Unions
promised to wage "all-out strikes" if companies pushed for
layoffs as a result of concessions to the IMF.
South Korea was desperate for assistance because of a
ticking time-bomb in the form of its short-term debt, the
reason it called in the IMF. South Korean media reported
that the central Bank of Korea had been forced to pay $10
billion in short-term foreign debt on behalf of Korean banks
over the last few days. About $66 billion of Korea's
estimated $120 billion in foreign debt was short-term, and
about $20 billion was due at the end of this year, analysts
said. The IMF package for South Korea was its biggest
87
rescue effort to date, exceeding the $50 billion rescue
program for Mexico in early 1995. Similar IMF packages were
provided recently for Thailand and Indonesia. Thailand
received $17.2 billion and Indonesia $40 billion under IMF-
led rescue that also involved offerings from other
countries
.
On December 18, fed up with their economy's f reefall,
voters in South Korea elected longtime dissident Kim Dae
Jung to serve a five-year term as president, leaving some
concerned that the country's financial markets would be
further battered. Ripples from South Korea's economic
crisis spread throughout Asia, Asian stock markets wilted
from the contagion effect. South Korea's escalating
financial crisis sent currencies and stock prices across the
rest of Asia reeling. Traders said equity investors
throughout the Pacific Rim could not afford to ignore the
economic meltdown currently occurring in South Korea. They
also feared that the won's swan dive might spark another
debilitating round of competitive depreciation throughout
Asia
.
In Japan, as the year drew to a close, in a desperate
bid to jump- start the economy, the government announced
deregulation of several sectors and granted foreign
investors better access to the market. The ensuing series
of disclosures of banks' bad debts raised the specter of a
major crisis whose impact could be worldwide.
During this month, the monetary stability in Asia was
short-lived, as most currencies showed renewed volatility on
a variety of regional concerns. Asian currencies were
mostly weaker after Moody's Investors Service downgraded the
sovereign debt of four countries, lowering three of them to
junk bond status. (See Table 3.9) Moody's said it had
downgraded the foreign currency ceiling for bonds and bank
deposits of Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea in view of
Asia's continuing financial woes. It also downgraded
Thailand's foreign currency ceiling for bonds and confirmed
the ceiling for bank deposits. The ratings agency-
attributed the moves to concern about Seoul's near- term
foreign currency financing needs, the ability of Indonesia's
corporate sector to meet overseas foreign debt obligations,
given the rupiah's drop of over 50% and Malaysia's increased
vulnerability to financial instability in the region.
Moody's confirmed the foreign currency ceiling for bonds and
bank deposits of China, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan,
the Philippines and Vietnam.
At the end of the month, the value of the rupiah was
Rp5,287 to the U.S. dollar. The rupiah has depreciated by
33.7% during December, bringing the cumulative July to
December depreciation to 55.8%. The inflation rate in
December was 2.04%, reflecting an increase in food indices
by 3.55%, housing by 0.88%, clothing by 2.10%, and
miscellaneous indices by 1.48%. The cumulative inflation
rate by calendar year (January-December) in 1997 reached
11.05%. The cumulative inflation rate by 1997/1998 fiscal
year (April -December) was 9.09%. The 1997 ' s inflation rate
was significantly higher than that of 1996 (6.47%), and in
fact was the highest yearly inflation during the last 14
years. Despite current instability in the monetary sector,
approved Foreign Direct Investment (FDD in 1997 remained
high, exceeding that of 1996. From January to mid December
1997 total FDI had reached US$33.8 billion, representing an
increase of around 13% from US$29.9 billion approved in
1996 .
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7. January 199 8
In the beginning of the year, Indonesian economic
conditions were very weak. Jakarta stocks were falling and
the rupiah had plunged into an abyss. With each downward
lurch of the currency, Indonesia's foreign-debt burden grew
bigger. A sick President Suharto hadn't been seen in public
for a week, fuelling market jitters. Perhaps half of the
corporate sector would be closed by now, analysts say, if
Indonesia's bankcrupty process were more streamlined. Three
out of four Indonesian companies were deemed unhealthy in
the Castle Group's Altman-Z test measuring the likelihood of
failure. Tight money had reduced working capital to a
minimum, putting bonuses and even salaries at risk.
Unemployment was on the rise. The Ministry of Manpower
Planning estimated that the crucial forestry industry had
lost 23,000 jobs and the banking sector 16,000 since the
summer 19 97. 65
Outside Jakarta, a severe drought was raising the price
of agricultural goods, while reducing consumer demand from
rural areas-a good recipe for recession. El Nino, a warm
Pacific Ocean current that brings dramatic changes to the
world's weather every few years, caused the drought.
Harvest had been delayed or destroyed, with consequences
that rippled through the rural economy. Some economists
predicted that millions of Indonesians would be dragged back
below the poverty line, reversing decades of progress.
Malnutrition and infant mortality were expected to rise,
particularly in eastern Indonesia. In Irian Jaya,
65 Salil Tripathi, Face the Music, Far Eastern Economic
Review, December 25, 1997 and January 1, 1998
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Indonesia's easternmost province, famine and malaria had
killed about 800 people. 66
On January 5, Asian currencies plunged as investors
returned to the foreign-currency markets and heavily bought
the dollar. Selling drove the Malaysian ringgit, the
Indonesian rupiah, the Thailand baht and the Philippines
peso to record lows against the U.S. dollar. At the end of
Asian trading and at the start of European trading, the U.S.
dollar soared to 133.00, its highest level against the
Japanese yen since May 11, 1992. The dollar had traded at
132.4 late Friday in New York. The tumult in the currency
market, in turn, hurt the Asian equities markets. The
currency blight spread to Australia and New Zealand and gold
dipped to a new 18 -year low on worries about weak Asian
economies and deflation. Traders said the slew of factors
behind the currency declines included uncertainty over
Indonesia's budget announcement Tuesday and the health of
President Suharto, falling regional stock prices and worries
about possible speculative attacks on other Asian currencies
like the Chinese yuan and Hong Kong dollar.
On January 6, at 8:30 p.m. Jakarta time, President
Suharto announced the fiscal 1998-1999 Central Government
budget projecting an increase of 32.1% growth in revenue and
expenditure over the current budget and four percent
economic growth rate. But, this budget failed to convince
investors that Indonesia was committed to reforming its
economy. The rupiah plunged, on January 7-12, losing half
its value against the U.S. dollar over a five-day period,
breaking through the Rp.10,000 to the dollar level, before a
slight recovery. The freefall was triggered by perceptions
that the Central Government Budget was not tough enough to
meet the IMF-mandated austerity measures and by market talk
6 6 Margot Cohen, Unlucky Country, Far Eastern Economic
Review, December 25, 1997 and January 1, 1998
92
that Indonesia might declare a debt moratorium. 67 On
January 8, frantic selling shredded Indonesia's financial
markets, highlighting a sweeping lack of confidence in the
country's economic management and contributing to a sell-off
on most other Asian markets.
The meltdown in Indonesia showed no sign of abating and
raised the specter of civil unrest . Indonesian stocks
crashed 18.5% in mid-afternoon, before recovering to be off
11,95%, or 47.13 points, at 347.10 in late trade. The
rupiah skimmed the Rp.10,500 to the U.S. dollar barrier.
The plunge of 26% in a single session left the rupiah down
more than 70% since the Asian crisis began last July.
All eyes were on Indonesia's hemorrhaging markets.
Attention was increasingly focused on the political
situation, fearing tough IMF conditions had heightened the
likelihood of social unrest prior to the March presidential
poll, in which president Suharto was expected to run for a
seventh five-year term. "There are signs of the social
aspect starting to unravel, with people calling for
President Suharto to step down, " said Callum Henderson,
managing analyst at MMS International. There were reports
of panic buying of food in some Indonesian supermarkets
fearing prices would spiral up. As the rupiah went into a
freefall, panicky housewives and office workers stormed
supermarkets and discount stores, convinced price hikes and
street violence were on the way. 68
On January 9, concern over Indonesia hit Asian stocks,
but currencies won some support on hopes of an imminent deal
between U.S. banks and heavily indebted Indonesian
67 Reuters , Chronology of the Asian financial crisis,
February 01,1998.
68 John McBeth, Ground Zero, Far Eastern Economic Review,
January 22, 1998.
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companies. Expectation of some type of Indonesian debt
accord intensified following telephone conversations between
U.S. President Bill Clinton and Asian leaders, and a new
commitment from Indonesian President Suharto to implement
economic reforms. President Suharto pledged his commitment
to implement economic reforms attached to a US$40 billion
financial aid package negotiated last year, a significant
shift after tabling an expansionary 1998/99 budget that
failed to outline the economic austerity required by the
IMF.
The IMF's first Deputy Managing Director, Stanley
Fischer, arrived in Jakarta on January 11 for talks about
the IMF's programs, additional economic reform measures, and
how to move ahead with it. A senior economic adviser vowed
that the nation would continue to make international debt
payments. At the same time, President Suharto moved to halt
or review 15 infrastructure projects. This move helped to
boost confidence that the country would abide by terms of an
IMF bailout package.
On January 13-15, U.S. Defense Secretary, William
Cohen, and Deputy Treasury Secretary, Lawrence Summers,
conferred with Indonesian government leaders in Jakarta.
Cohen reiterated the important role Indonesia plays in
ensuring regional security and stability. Indonesian State
Secretary Murdiono said President Suharto told visiting U.S.
Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers that Indonesia
would implement its economic reform program, as soon as
possible. Mr. Summers left the talks saying that President
Suharto recognized the need to take strong steps on economic
reform to end the currency crisis. Mr. Cohen concluded
"after talking with the Indonesian President, I am convinced
that he is determined to put his country on a sound footing
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and to have a recovery of confidence in the integrity of the
country's financial system." 69
The remarks were the latest in a raft of confidence-
boosting statements from U.S. luminaries trying to shore up
the nation, racked by bad debt and political jitters. They
helped to lift the rupiah to Rp 7,000/7,500 from an opening
low of Rp8,300. Indonesia's Finance Minister said that
there might be an adjustment in some of the economic reform
program, as a result of the latest developments in the
economy. On January 14, The IMF Managing Director, Michel
Camdessus, came to Indonesia where he stressed that
Indonesia must accelerate long overdue economic reforms.
"The immediate priority of my visit is to arrest and turn
around the tremendous loss of confidence, and stabilize the
market through monetary discipline and a dramatic
acceleration of long overdue structural reforms, " Camdessus
said.
On January 15, President Suharto and The IMF Managing
Director, Michel Camdessus, signed an agreement
strengthening Indonesia's economic reform program. The
agreement called for significant new structural reforms,
including lifting subsidies for energy, dismantling domestic
trade restrictions in several industries, establishing
greater independence for the central bank (Bank Indonesia)
,
reducing selected foreign investment barriers and ending
support for Indonesia's national automobile program and
national aircraft program. 70
There were also major revisions of economic forecasts
contained in the recent budget, which shattered
69 Seth Mydans, Indonesia Agrees to Economic Reform Under
Pressure From I.M.F, The New York Times, January 15, 1998
70 Indonesia' s Economic Crisis - A chronology of events,
http-.www. indonesiatoday . com/a3/j 6/yl .html#Top
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international confidence and dragged the region into a
vortex. Inflation was now forecast at 20% rather than 9%,
economic growth was projected at zero rather than 4%, and
the rupiah rate, upon which the budget was based, was cut to
Rp5,000 to the U.S. dollar instead of Rp4,000. Most
important, some analysts said, was the suggestion that a
one-% budget deficit had been allowed under the new
calculations, implying greater latitude by the IMF on
efforts by the government to stimulate real economic growth.
There were several features about the plan that look
promising. Notable among them was the president's apparent
commitment. Reeling after the last week's financial
meltdown, President Suharto showed himself prepared to put
the nation before family and friends. The President backing
the plan could symbolize that this time a determined effort
would be made to transparent economic management. 71 Michel
Camdessus said, "I am confident that if this program is
implemented with the determination and commitment that I
myself have seen, Indonesia should be able soon to begin to
overcome its economic crisis." And World Bank chief, James
D. Wolfensohn said the reform was as broad-based as
possible. "This program contains just about everything the
government can do to get its economy back on track and to
protect the poor from the worst effects of the economic
crisis." 72 On January 16, The Clinton administration and the
IMF announced strong public support for Indonesia's new
economic restructuring program. Camdessus predicted the
Indonesian economy would recover within two years.
71 Peter Montagnon and Sander Thoenes, On the Critical List,
The Financial Times, January 16, 1998.
72 Raju Gopalakrishnan, Focus -Indonesia Announces sweeping
reforms, Reuters, January 15, 1998.
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Instead of the expected jump, the Jakarta stock
exchange slumped by 4%, and the rupiah, slid 14% to settle
at Rp8,650 to the U.S. dollar. Indonesia's new economic
reform package failed to impress Asian markets, with
analysts saying they were still seeking proof the country
would enact tough measures to pull itself out of crisis.
Jakarta stocks dipped and the rupiah sagged after two days
of gains, helping to take the steam out of a two-day rally
that lifted the region from a selling blitz on Monday.
"Things are, as yet, unchanged. People are pulling in their
horns and waiting for proof," said Marshall Mays, chief
strategist with Nikko Securities. Economists and traders
said that the pact didn't address Indonesia's US$133 billion
of debt, much of it short-term to private companies. 73
On January 19, the rupiah tumbled more than 10%. Late
in the Asian trading day, the U.S. dollar was fetching about
Rp9,400, up from Rp8,450 late Friday. The outlook for Asian
markets was becoming harder to predict short-term, investors
said. In terms of scenarios, "everything is so volatile at
the moment, one can almost justify anything," said Hugh
Young, managing director of Aberdeen Asset Management Asia.
A sharp drop by the rupiah or South Korea ' s won would have
been enough to send regional stock markets reeling.
Indonesia had signaled its commitment to much-awaited
bank reform with the biggest-ever merger in the nation's
private sector, creating a bank with some $5.9 billion in
assets. PT Bank International Indonesia and PT Bank Dagang
Nasional Indonesia said they would merge with three smaller
banking units (PT Bank Tiara, PT Bank Sahid Gajah Perkasa
73 Jay Solomon and Kate Linbaugh, Tension Grows in
Indonesian Factory Belt, Wall Street Journal, January 19,
1998.
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and PT Bank Dewaruci) to form an Indonesian mega bank. 74
Banking analysts said it was only the first such move in the
sector and more mergers and consolidation were expected, as
Indonesia hastened to demonstrate commitment to reforms
agreed to with the IMF to rescue its ailing economy and
currency.
Elsewhere, the mood was less confident. Seoul was
suffering with the won falling on dollar demand to settle
import deals. Singapore shares drifted lower, spooked by
uncertainties in regional currencies and eroding confidence
that Asia would soon start pulling out of its economic
crisis. In the mean time, the perception that the IMF
package for Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea had failed
to stop Asia's collapse was running from Wall Street to Hong
Kong. Jeffrey Sachs, director of the Harvard Institute of
International Development, said the early steps of IMF
intervention sometimes created more panic than calm,
particularly the action of closing banks very abruptly.
On January 21, Indonesia's battered rupiah dragged most
Asia markets back into a quagmire. Strength in Tokyo and
New York failed to spill over to the rest of Asia, where
nearly every market reacted badly to an early session plunge
in the rupiah to Rpl2,000 to the U.S. dollar. All Southeast
Asian currencies sank, as did the South Korean won. The
rupiah hurtled lower on reports that Indonesian corporates
were resorting to rupiah payments on the U.S. dollar debt,
the creditors were then dumping the rupiah.
Renewed political jitters added another broadside.
President Suharto confirmed he would seek a seventh five-
year term in office, perhaps with Minister B.J. Habibie as
his vice-president. As the rumor about the vice-president
74 Jay Solomon and Kate Linebaugh, Indonesian Bank Merger
May be First of Many, The Wall Street Journal, January 20,
1998.
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hit the front page on January 21, the rupiah plunged to a
record low of Rpll,800 to the dollar, a quarter of its value
a year earlier. 75 President Suharto formally established the
Economic and Financial Resilience Council to supervise and
monitor Indonesia's economic reforms. The council
immediately approved all of the reform mandates under Phase
I of the IMF agreement. Several presidential and
ministerial decrees were signed into law.
On January 22, the rupiah continued its fall a week
after the Indonesian Government agreed to the new IMF-
mandated reform measures. The IMF package showed no signs
of alleviating Indonesia's debt and confidence crisis. The
rupiah fell to a record low of Rpl7,000 to the U.S. dollar
at one stage, but traders said volume was small. This
enabled Bank Indonesia to intervene by selling the dollar
and drive the currency back to Rpll,800. Dealers said the
market was still overwhelmingly in favor of the dollar due
to a slew of negative developments in Indonesia.
People just don't want to quote this currency
anymore. There's still a lot of dollar buying
interest from U.S. funds, Jakarta centers,
everywhere. And nobody has any dollars to offer.
According to a U.S. bank dealer in Singapore.
The failure of Indonesian authorities to convincingly
address the country's corporate debt, estimated at $65
billion, and growing bank liquidity problems were among the
factors weighing down the rupiah. Central bank governor
Sudradjad D j iwandono said that the government would soon
announce guidelines to resolve liquidity and solvency
problems in the private banking sector. The rupiah also
suffered from uncertainty over the political outlook after
rumors that Research and Technology Minister, B.J. Habibie,
75 John McBeth, Soaring Ambition, Far Eastern Economic
Review, January 29, 1998.
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may be President Suharto's preferred vice-presidential
candidate in the March polls. 76
Most Asian currencies were dragged down by the rupiah's
plunge, but at a much slower pace, as traders were turned
wary of coordinated central bank intervention. The plunge
in the rupiah meant that Indonesia's US$65 billion in
private dollar denominated debt had swelled to exchange
levels that borrowers could not afford to repay, with far
more rupiah required to buy dollars than before. That had
raised the possibility of mass bankruptcies or a possible
moratorium from creditors on Indonesian debt payment, where
some analysts estimated that all but 22 of the nation's 228




On January 23, the Indonesian Government presented a
revised 1998/99 Central Government budget, based on new
figures agreed to between the Government and the IMF. The
new budget expected zero growth in fiscal 1998 and inflation
of 20%. But it also assumed the rupiah would be at a level
of Rp5,000 to the U.S. dollar. It ended the day at
Rpl2,000. Some regional analysts argued that the current
focus on Indonesia would allow other troubled Southeast
Asian economies.
On January 27, at a banking meeting in Singapore, the
top Indonesian officials and advisers met representatives
from 2 big banks for about two hours. Radius Prawiro,
President Suharto's debt adviser, Mr. Kent, and David
Brougham, who is a director of Standard Chartered Bank in
Hong Kong, sketched out their vision for how debt talks
76 Raphael Pura and Richard Borsuk, Suharto' s Likely No. 2
Man Could Stir Storm, The Wall Street Journal, January 21,
1998.
77 Seth Mydans , Indonesia Currency Falls Hard, Clouding
Recovery, The New York Times, January 23, 1998.
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should proceed. Indonesia announced a temporary freeze on
debt servicing until a new framework was worked out between
international lenders and Indonesian borrowers on how to
tackle a crippling private sector overseas debt estimated at
$66 billion, but said this action was not a moratorium.
Companies with the dollars to pay off their creditors must
continue to do so. Indonesia also announced a series of
banking reforms in which the government would guarantee the
security of both depositors and creditors, and commit to
open the doors to foreign ownership. 78 The measures were
designed to restore domestic confidence in the private
banking sector, which had been suffering from a drastic
liquidity crunch, as local depositors withdrew funds.
The Government created the Indonesian Banking
Restructuring Agency (IBRA), which would be responsible for
rehabilitating banks that were not sound or were unable to
restore themselves. Banking analysts welcomed the
elimination of all restrictions on overseas ownership of
Indonesian banks, but some questioned the government's
apparent determination to avoid the liquidation of any banks
in the system.
The Government wants to rescue the banking sector
and they are buying time, "an Indonesian banking
source said. "This is a very different attitude
from November, the Indonesian economy would not be
in the state it is in today." A senior Western
banking analyst said, "I think the very positive
thing is that we are seeing something come out,
whether we like it or not." But, he said, more
details were needed on what was covered under the
government ' s guarantee for creditors of commercial
banks
.
Radius Prawiro, appointed by President Suharto to
oversee the private debt crisis, estimated 228 companies in
78 Darren McDermott and Jay Solomon, Indonesian Debt Plan
Leaves Bankers Skeptical, The Wall Street Journal, January
28, 1998.
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the country faced problems servicing debt . The value of the
rupiah had plunged around 80% against the U.S. dollar since
last July, with frantic buying by corporations to cover
unhedged overseas debt, sending the rupiah further down in a
vicious circle. What began as a financial crisis five
months ago was now having real economic consequences . Many
Indonesian-based exporters, bereft of working capital and
unable to import inputs, suspended production. Foreign
lenders had largely ceased accepting letters of credit from
Indonesian banks, hindering trade. The interbank market,
where banks lend surplus funds to each other, was barely
functioning. 79 The rupiah had strengthened against the
dollar, but analysts said the central bank faced a very
difficult period in supporting the rupiah.
On January 29, markets in the region were mostly closed
for the second day of the Chinese New Year and for the
forthcoming Moslem festival of Eid-al Fitr, which ends the
fasting month of Ramadhan. Blissful quiet appeared to reign
in Indonesia, where some currency quotations were seen but
no deals reported. The rupiah on news of the economic
reform plans. The rupiah was quoted at RplO , 400/10 , 900 to
the dollar late in the day, up from Wednesday's close of
Rp9 , 850/10 , 800 . Calculated on the year-on-year basis,
inflation in January 1998 was 18.06%, compared to 11.6% in
December 1997.
The significant increase of inflation in January was
due to the sharp rise in the price of foods and clothes. In
January, the clothes prices index surged 12.56%, while the
food price index rose by 10.15%, month-on-month. The
housing and service price indices also increased, but at a
lower rate, by 3.64% and 4.16%, respectively. Despite
demand pull factors related to the celebration of Idul
79 Henny Sender, Money Isn't Everything, Far Eastern
Economic Review, February 12,1998.
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Fitri, the sharp increase in inflation in January seemed
also to be triggered by the sharp fall of the rupiah against
the U.S. dollar in that month.
8. February 19 9 8
At the beginning of February, Asian markets roared into
the year of the Tiger with evidence that foreign confidence
in the region was returning. "It's all over, the Asian
crisis. That seems to be the sentiment this morning," said
Callum Henderson, managing analyst at MMS International.
Stock and currency markets firmed and volumes soared as
longer-term, value-oriented funds flooded back into Asia
from Europe. Shorter-term portfolio flows from the United
States followed along. Currencies were also stronger,
firming or consolidating at higher levels, as confidence
seemed to reappear. (See Figure 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5)
"There are some early signs of confidence coming back
or being restored, even though on the fundamentals, nothing
has changed, " said Ambrose Chang, chief investment officer
at Daiwa Capital Management in Hong Kong. A crisis of
confidence over Asian economies had been blamed for the
region's six-month market pounding, but on February 2, that
sense of crisis seemed to ebb a little. The strength was
driven by strong liquidity, and concurred with the region's
traditional tendency to rally on the first day after the
lunar new year. But analysts confirmed evidence to support
the stronger tone. Volatility will continue for the coming
months, as the painful realities of Asia's economic
adjustment unemployment, inflation, and inevitably, social
unrest start to hit sentiment negatively once again.
On February 3-5, World Bank President, James
Wolfensohn, visited Indonesia to discuss the impact of the
economic crisis on Indonesia's low income and poor
populations. On February 3, Singapore Prime Minister, Goh
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Chok Tong, visited with President Suharto and volunteered to
form a multilateral committee of eight countries that would
guarantee L/Cs (Letters of Credit) issued by Indonesian
banks. Since the monetary crisis began, foreign banks no
longer honored L/Cs issued by importers from Indonesia,
fearing they could not meet their commitments. Essential
imports had temporarily stopped coming into Indonesia due to
rejected L/Cs. Goh Chok Tong ' s proposal was expected to
return confidence to L/Cs issued by Indonesian banks. 80
On February 4, the rupiah led gains, scooting past the
10,000 level to trade at 9,200 in early afternoon. U.S.
dollar sales by central bank and hedge funds boosted the
unit, which also won support from the Singapore plan to
guarantee letters of credit to allow Indonesia to continue
to import key goods. Demand for dollars had been somewhat
softened by the fact that under Indonesia's temporary debt
freeze programs, borrowers were able to roll debt forward
and postpone payments, so the bunching of debt and demand
for dollars had come off.
On February 6, Indonesia shined, with the stock market
shooting up more than four percent. Investors bet that many
of the market's indebted companies would be taken over by
their foreign creditors. The composite index closed up
4.27%, or 21.94 points higher, at 535.43 on heavy volume.
The market got a boost from new government moves to tackle
Indonesia's mountain of corporate debt, which stood at
$73,962 billion out of a total $137.4 billion in foreign
debt. Radius Prawiro, the Indonesian government's chief
debt negotiator, said the International Finance Corporation
and other banks would provide $42 billion in credit for 42
domestic companies. Prawiro also said the government would
quickly move to set up a bankruptcy law in line with the
IMF's requirements.
!0 BNI Securities, Daily - Corporate News, February 4, 1998
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The government said it would issue a new regulation
soon to increase the minimum paid up capital for banks from
Rp50 billion to Rp500 billion. The banks were expected to
meet the requirement within one to three years. The banks
also had to meet the 12% capital adequacy ratio within the
same period. The increased paid up capital was expected to
enhance the capital structure of banks and to anticipate the
merger of some banks. 81 Later the Central Bank governor,
Soedradjad Djiwandono, announced that the minimum paid up
capital would be raised to Rpl trillion by the end of 1998.
Only 11 banks currently met this criterion, hence, bank
mergers and foreign infusion of capital were expected to
hasten in 1998. The minimum paid up capital would be Rp2
trillion by the end of 1999 and Rp3 trillion by the end of
2003. This move was a part of Bank Indonesia's continued
effort to strengthen the Indonesian banking sector.
Nevertheless, most of the domestic banks would have to work
hard to comply with this requirement, since most of them had
very little paid up capital. This new regulation was
expected to accelerate mergers among banks, and
significantly reduce the number of domestic banks by the end
of 1998.
On February 10, Southeast Asian currencies skyrocketed
against the U.S. dollar in Asian trading amid indications
that Indonesia might peg the value of its currency to the
dollar. In late Asian trading, the rupiah was propelled to
a high of Rp7,450 to the U.S. dollar, up an astonishing 28%
from its level of Rp9,50 late Monday, as investors
scrambled to buy rupiah with dollars. Rumors that Indonesia
might establish a currency board a system whereby the entire
supply of local currency is 100%-backed by the U.S. dollar
reserves at a fixed exchange rate had circulated for weeks.
The market had largely dismissed the notion as unfeasible.
81 BNI Securities, Daily - Corporate News, February 9, 1998
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However, Indonesia's President Suharto said he intended to
"fix the currency at a certain rate" to drive off
speculators without squandering dollar reserves supporting
the rupiah. 82
"People immediately started accumulating rupiah in the
expectation of being able to sell them back later at Rp5,500
to the U.S. dollar" said Daragh Maher, a regional economist
at ING Barings in Singapore. The Rp5,500 level was being
considered as the peg for the rupiah. Indonesian stocks
skid 2.2%, as the main index in Jakarta fell 11.553 to
517.701. Much of the selling, though, was tied to stocks
that also traded in overseas markets; the surge in the value
of the rupiah made these stocks a better value in foreign
markets
.
Elsewhere, stocks jumped on the currency's gains.
Although the long-term effects of a currency board on the
Indonesian economy were in doubt, leading some pundits to
predict the scheme's inevitable failure should it be
introduced, the rupiah' s rally still sent other regional
currencies sharply higher. The rupiah jumped more than 30%
during one day, as traders got more excited about the
prospect of Indonesia adopting a currency board, or some
other system of fixing the exchange rate. But despite the
move, few in the market seriously believed it was a
possibility or that it would work or last. However, People
were afraid Indonesia might implement a currency board. That
prospect, even if it doesn't last more than a couple of
months, means that if you're long in dollars you want to get
out. The system creates a stable exchange rate because it
ensures that every unit of local currency on issue is backed
by the equivalent in, say, U.S. dollars reserves which
82 Darren McDermott and Jay Solomon, Suharto Considers
Pegging Rupiah to Dollar, The Wall Street Journal, February
10, 1998.
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analysts said Indonesia certainly does not have at the
moment
.
Indonesia's central bank governor, Sudrad j ad
Djiwandono, said after a meeting of top economic policy
makers that a proposal to adopt a currency board system was
being studied, but no decision had yet been taken. The
general view among analysts was that with Indonesia's
massive economic and debt problems, this was no time to try
and fix the currency using any sort of system. Christa
Marti, economist at UBS Securities in Singapore, said if the
peg was established at Rp5,500, traders and investors would
immediately switch to U.S. dollars, at the current rate of
about Rp7, 000. In effect, they would be betting that the
government wouldn't be able to keep the rupiah at what they
saw as an overvalued level (particularly if the currency
comes under attack from traders, as seem likely) . To stem
the flight from rupiah, inter bank rates would have to go
much higher. That in turn would make it even more difficult
for companies to repay debts and would exacerbate the
already critical problem of nonperforming loans at
Indonesian banks. 83
Steven Hanke, a John Hopkins University economist, said
a currency board would work because it would strengthen the
rupiah to a level where most Indonesian companies are
solvent again, increase transparency and limit corruption by
removing the central bank's powers and insuring government
spending was prudent . In working a paper prepared for the
Indonesian government, Mr. Hanke said Indonesia could peg
the rupiah at 5,500 to the dollar. "The currency could
return to stability, inflation would decline, while interest
rates would dramatically collapse, " he wrote, "thus
triggering a virtuous circle of higher growth, lower
83 Salil Tripathi , Hanke Panky? , Far Eastern Economic
Review, February 19, 1998.
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corporate defaults, lower unemployment, abating fears of
social tensions and, ultimately, stability of the nation." 84
On February 11, stocks in Indonesia fell sharply, amid
fears that the country could be hit by a mounting social
backlash against their economic crisis. The Jakarta stock
market demonstrated that despite recent signs of recovery,
Indonesia's crisis was far from over. Traders rushed to
sell on rumors that riots had broken out to protest rising
food prices and as the government warned, that unknown
parties were seeking to undermine the economy. Stocks fell
drastically in the afternoon session, people sold stocks
based on rumors, according to one broker. The composite
index dove 30.09 points to 487.61, a fall of 5.81%. Even
strong performance by the rupiah, boosted by the growing
likelihood that the currency board would replace the current
exchange rate system, failed to reassure the stock market.
Finance Minister, Mar'ie Muhammad, told parliament that the
government was drawing up a framework for such a system, and
it would be submitted to the legislature in the near future.
On February 12, the composite index shed 45.321 points
or 9.29% to end at 442.289 on news of more price riots in a
West Java town and fears that the government ' s move to fix
an exchange rate for the rupiah would mean more pain for the
economy. Foreigners were very concerned over the currency
board system. The beleaguered rupiah remained near the
7,000 per dollar level for most of the day, up from a low of
Rp7,800, after the ruling Golkar party named Parliamentary
Speaker, Harmoko, and Research and Technology Minister, B.J.
Habibie, as vice-presidential candidates in the March
indirect election. Habibie, seen as the front-runner, was
considered by economic analysts as a financial maverick. On
84 Darren McDermott and Jay Solomon, Suharto Considers
Pegging Rupiah to Dollar, The Wall Street Journal, February
10, 1998.
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February 12, the ruling party Golkar nominated B.J. Habibie
for the vice-president. Golkar and PPP endorsed B.J.
Habibie to be President Suharto's preferred running mate in
the presidential elections on March 11. Indonesia's stock
market fell 9.8% after that nomination. 85
On February 13, the IMF and the U.S. officials gave a
cool reaction to Indonesia's plans to set up a currency
board. U.S. economist Steven Hanke, after meeting with the
Indonesian officials, declared that the Indonesian
government remains in favor of a currency board. The IMF
and major economic powers warned Indonesia not to impose a
rigid currency regime now, saying it could shake confidence
in Indonesia. The IMF opposed the currency board and
threatened to pull the plug on its roughly $40 billion
rescue effort. 86 In his most strident comments on the issue,
IMF Managing Director, Michel Camdessus, said Indonesia
should pursue a series of economic reforms before
establishing a currency board to fix the value of the rupiah
currency. Policy makers feared that Indonesia's failure to
stabilize its economy risked spreading Asia's financial
crisis to the world.
Against the advice of the IMF and major lenders, the
government said it would quickly establish a currency board
to fix the value of the rupiah. A currency board is an
inflexible regime with a fixed exchange rate under which a
country issues money only when backed by sufficient
reserves. Research and Technology Minister, B.J. Habibie,
said "President Suharto asked all ministers to find ways to
stabilize the rupiah, and we have implemented the IMF
85 Sander Thoenes, Indonesia stocks fall on Habibie
decision, February 13, 1998.
86 Peter Passell, In Indonesia, Showdown On Risky Bet, The
New York Times, February 19, 1998.
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programs, but still the rupiah has not been stable. Then
the idea of implementing the Currency Board System was
proposed." 87 Camdessus countered that his opposition to the
idea had the unanimous backing of the IMF executive board.
The United States, which until now had refrained from
publicly warning Indonesia, immediately supported his
stance. He said a number of preconditions must be satisfied
before a currency board is implemented. Backers of the
currency board idea said it might be the only alternative
for Indonesia to restore confidence in its currency, and
thereby help local companies cope with huge foreign currency
debts
.
U.S. Deputy Treasury Secretary, Lawrence Summers, said
Indonesia would be wrong to think that it can solve its
economic problems through a currency board without
undertaking serious economic reforms. Testifying in
congress, U.S. Treasury Secretary, Robert Rubin, and Federal
Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan, emphasized the rigid
discipline necessary to successfully implement a currency
board. Mr. Rubin said that Indonesia still needs to think
through a number of issues before proceeding. Camdessus
warned that introducing the currency board could harm the
IMF-led package. On February 14, President Clinton phoned
President Suharto and discussed Indonesia's restructuring
program by telephone. President Clinton urged Indonesia not
to establish a currency Board System. President Suharto
reportedly told President Clinton that the IMF-mandated
program was not stabilizing the rupiah, and additional
actions may be necessary. The plan for currency board would
87 Jay Solomon and Kate Linebaugh, IMF Offers Face -Saving
Proposal to Suharto, The Wall Street Journal February 19,
1998.
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be dropped only if the U.S. and other rich nations came up
with an acceptable alternative. 88
The IMF package, coupled with doubts about the
government ' s commitment to the program of economic and
financial reforms that underpins the rescue deal, had not
only failed to stabilize Indonesia's markets, but has led to
civil unrest. Resident and police in Indonesia reported a
second day of rioting in the West Java town of Jatiwangi,
where a small tile factory and cars were burned, and
outbreaks of violence in the coastal towns of Pamanukan and
Losari . Some protestors burned shops, owned by ethnic
Chinese, attacked churches and set cars ablaze during
protests against rising prices in three West Java towns. On
the news, The composite index tumbled 45.32 to 442.29. 89
The violence erupted for a second straight day in
Jatiwangi, 90 miles (150 km) east of Jakarta, with mobs
burning a small tile factory and setting cars on fire. They
said riots also broke out in the coastal towns of Pamanukan,
60 miles (100 km) east of Jakarta, and Losari, farther east,
over rising prices sparked by the fall in the value of the
rupiah currency and by a drought. In Bandung, 90 miles (150
km) southeast of Jakarta, troops had been deployed and a
number of shops had closed following rumors that students
planned to take to the streets. Violence erupted in
Sumatra, Sulawesi and Lombok. 90 Some said the risk of
widespread social unrest was real in Indonesia, but some
said they didn't feel the kind of tension that could be
88 John McBeth, Double or Nothing, Far Eastern Economic
Review, February 26, 1998.
89 World Stock Markets, Currency peg doubts drive down
Jakarta 9%, The Financial Times, February 13, 1998.
90 Jay Solomon, IMF Digs In Heels on Indonesian Rupiah Plan,
The Wall Street Journal, February 17, 1998.
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expected to surround a major eruption, like in 1964-1965.
"It's a combination of factors that are contributing to the
problem," said the ethnic Chinese president-director of a
bank whose network of rural branches was still performing
well, despite the alleged anti-Chinese sentiment. "But I
don't think you can call it real social unrest." 91
On February 16, Indonesia faced growing international
resistance to its plan to adopt a currency board system.
The rupiah moved to an early low of Rpl0,800 to the dollar
following persistent dollar sales by U.S. investment banks
around the Rpl0,500 level. The IMF threatened to withdraw
assistance to Indonesia if it adopted a currency board. A
senior cabinet minister said the government was seriously
studying the currency board proposal and would discuss it
with the IMF. Indonesia said it was moving towards a fixed
exchange rate system, calling on the IMF to come up with an
alternative for strengthening the rupiah currency, if it
objected to the plan. The government wanted to strengthen
the rupiah to a reasonable level as quickly as possible.
The collapse of the rupiah since last July had plunged
Indonesia into its worst economic crisis in decades, forcing
up prices and unemployment among 200 million people spread
across the country's 17,500 islands. The rupiah was trading
around Rp9,800 against the dollar. It was around Rp2,400
last July before the collapse, and analysts expected a fixed
rate of about Rp5,500.
On February 17, President Suharto appointed Sjahril
Sabirin as the new Governor of Bank Indonesia, replacing
Sudradjad Djiwandono. The state secretariat released a
presidential decree signed February 11 replacing the central
bank governor, Soedradjad Djiwandono, with Sjahril Sabirin.
The decree said the change in governors was "necessary" and
91 John McBeth and Salil Tripathi, Playing With Ire, Far
Eastern Economic Review, March 5, 1998.
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that Mr. Soedradjad was "terminated with respect." 92 Sjahril
Sabirin served as a Bank Indonesia director from 1987 to
1992 and then worked with the World Bank in Washington
before returning to the Indonesian bank in December 1997.
The rupiah closed at around Rp9, 400.
On February 20, Indonesia moved to restore fading
confidence among Indonesians in their government by
guaranteeing a payout on all legal deposits in 16 banks
liquidated last year. The government previously had said it
would cover up to 20 million rupiah in each account of the
16 banks, which amounted to 1.7 trillion rupiah. Japan
announced a series of new loans, totaling 300 billion-yen
($2.36 billion), to support Indonesia's recovery. The
United States, Japan and Australia announced a plan to grant
export credits to Indonesia to help the country import badly
needed commodities and raw materials.
On February 21 to 22, Indonesia suspended its plan to
implement a controversial currency-board system that would
have pegged the rupiah to the U.S. dollar. The Indonesian
monetary official noted that some of the risks involved in
the currency board had been taken seriously, and the plan
was not going to be implemented. A representative of the
IMF in Jakarta welcomed the news, as the removal of an
irritating distraction that had been blocking efforts to
move forward with serious banking-sector reform, and plans
for dealing with the nation's $74 billion in the private
sector debt. U.S. Treasury Secretary, Robert Rubin,
expressed satisfaction with Indonesia's reported decision.
He said it would be challenging for Indonesia to stick to
the conditions of the IMF's reform program, but that it
would be necessary if foreign investors were to regain
92 Richard Borsuk and Jay Solomon, Indonesia Dismisses
Central -Bank Governor, The Wall Street Journal, February 18,
1998.
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confidence in the nation. Leaders of the world's seven
richest nations pledged at the G-7 meeting to help Indonesia
deal with shortages in trade finance and basic necessities
particularly medicine and food. Before a G-7 meeting in
London, Indonesia sent a letter to the G-7 members, asking
for help in stabilizing the rupiah and in handling the
country's foreign debt. The Indonesian Finance Minister
stated that Indonesia is still committed to the IMF reform
package; he hoped the G-7 nations had a way to stabilize the
rupiah, which was not disruptive to the IMF reform package.
On February 26, representatives of foreign bankers and
their Indonesian corporate borrowers offered little evidence
of progress following their first meeting. Officials on
both sides expressed optimism about the ability of the group
to deal with Indonesia's $73 billion in private offshore
borrowings. The main objectives of the initial meeting,
according to Radius Prawiro, President Suharto's special
adviser on private external debt, were to stress to foreign
bankers that those Indonesian companies that can pay will do
so a message that Mr. Prawiro had repeated since he
announced in January a pause on debt repayments. The
meeting also produced yet another agreement to compile a
complete inventory of Indonesia's debt, something
international bankers had been demanding for weeks.
9. March 1998
The Indonesian economy was on the brink of
hyperinflation, with prices soaring at rates not seen since
the mid-1960s when President Suharto first came to power,
according to figures released by the government on March 2.
Month-to-month inflation jumped to 12.76% in February after
a 6.88% rise in January; the year-to-year rate, as
calculated by Reuters, was around 31.74%. February
inflation was the highest monthly inflation in the entire
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new order era. As a rule of thumb, hyperinflation was
defined as price increases between 40 and 50%, analysts
said. According to the official figures, food price rose
16.07% in February, housing 10.03%, textiles 15.62%, and
services 9.31%.
But food prices were rising at a much faster rate than
official figures showed, and had been the main cause of
civil unrest. Anecdotal evidence suggested that in recent
weeks, on a month-to-month basis, cooking oil had risen in
price by around 130%, rice 34%, flour 33%, eggs 88%, and
chicken 34%. Bank Indonesia director, Miranda Goeltom,
announced that current foreign reserves stood at US$16.3
billion at the end of February, losing around 14% from the
end of January. 93
President Suharto's March 1 st speech in front of the
country's People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) boosted
positive sentiment in the stock market after little good
news over the previous few weeks. The speech, according to
some local market players, was perceived as a clear
direction of how the government would deal with current
economic turmoil: limited active trading despite growing
support for regional markets and a strengthening rupiah
against U.S. dollar. Some investors commented that the
speech discontenting corruption and bureaucratic issues
surrounding recent political situations in Indonesia. 94
On March 2, Indonesian stocks rallied, aided by the
regional gains and positive responses to the speech by
President Suharto to the People's Consultative Assembly
(MPR) . President Suharto pledged to follow the IMF reform,
and also said he was still considering implementing the
currency board idea eventually. He called for an "IMF-Plus"
93 BNI Securities, Daily-Corporate News, March 3, 1998
94 BNI Securities, Daily-Corporate News, March 3, 1998
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program. 95 In late trading, the main stock index was 2.52%
or 12.18 points higher at 494.56. They continued to go up
by 4.42% or 21.96 points to 518.67 on the next day. On
March 4, the U.S. and Indonesia appear headed for
disagreement over the Indonesian government plan to
implement a currency board. The U.S. Envoy to Indonesia,
Walter Mondale, told reporters after meeting with President
Suharto that the U.S. felt Indonesia must deal with the
underlying problems and not look to any quick fixes,
referring to the currency board. He also said it is very
much in doubt whether Indonesia would comply with IMF
requirements. Speaking at a conference in Dallas, Mr.
Mondale said President Suharto and his aides "were very open
and very candid. I was able to make our case. But what
their decision will be I do not know." 96
On March 5, President Suharto reaffirmed his commitment
to IMF reforms, but currency traders and a growing
parliamentary opposition indicated their dissatisfaction
with the lack of progress on pulling Indonesia out of its
current economic crisis. The rupiah fell to the 10,000
level against the dollar for the first time since mid-
February, sliding to 9,975/10.325 after trading at
9,500/9,700. Investors worried whether the IMF would go on
with the next US$3.0 billion in assistance scheduled for
approval on March 15. The British Junior Foreign Minister,
Derek Fatchett, told reporters after meetings with President
Suharto and Finance Minister, Mar'ie Muhammad, that the
government was committed to the program. Economic analysts
said the foreign exchange market was reacting to confused
signals over the fate of the currency board and the
95 The Economist, The doctors at the door, March 7, 1998.
96 Bob Davis, IMF Signals Assent To Jakarta Currency Board,
The Wall Street Journal, March 11, 1998.
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possibility of a delay in the next $3 billion disbursement
of IMF assistance to Indonesia. Senior banking sources have
said that an IMF review of progress in reforms, due to be
completed by March 15, was being delayed by the current
political preoccupation with the MPR session. The
government had banned mass gatherings and demonstrations
during the MPR session, and so far the country had been
generally quiet following riots in a number of towns by
people angered by rising prices. The most recent
demonstrations had been largely confined to university
campuses, with students condemning price increases and
calling for political and economic reforms. 97
On March 6, financially battered Indonesia said that it
would subsidize imports of food and other essentials to keep
prices under control, but warned that any delay by the IMF
in disbursing funds from a bailout package would hurt
regional currencies. Financial Minister, Mar'ie Muhammad,
said Indonesia is confident the IMF will disburse the second
$3 billion installment of the fund's $10 billion share of
the rupiah bailout. He said any delay would affect the
return of investor confidence in Indonesia and "have a
negative impact on efforts to strengthen and to stabilize
currencies in Southeast Asia. Senior banking sources said
the IMF review had been delayed two to three weeks by
Indonesia's preoccupation with politics, as it prepared to
re-elect President Suharto for a seventh five-year term and
the need to re-assess some economic assumptions.
On March 8, President Suharto was quoted as saying the
IMF's economic reform package is actually not in agreement
with the constitution because it supports a "liberal" rather
than a "family-oriented" (kekeluargaan) type of economic
97 The Economist, Suharto's Family Value, March 14, 1998.
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system. Meanwhile, the rupiah has plunged again to the
Rpll,500/US$l level. 98
On March 10, Indonesia re-elected President Suharto for
a seventh five-year term. At his inauguration ceremony on
March 11, President Suharto called on Indonesians to pull
together in this time of hardship and told the nation he was
willing to heed loud and blunt criticism during his seventh
term. There was little change in stocks after the election
result were released, but they declined in afternoon
trading, leaving the key index 1.08% lower, or 5.34 points,
at 490.48. The rupiah also changed little and was trading
around Rpl0,500 to the dollar in late trade.
The deputy head of the IMF said the fund was ready to
be flexible on its reform program with Indonesia. The IMF's
First Deputy Managing Director, Stanley Fischer, said the
IMF was paying special attention to the humanitarian aspects
of the debate about whether to release another installment
of its $10 billion loan to Indonesia.
We would want to allow imports of food at cheap
prices and other things that would take care of
social problems, " Fischer said in an appearance on
CNN's "Moneyline with Lou Dobbs on March 10. ' He
said the IMF recognizes that it must adjust its
programs as reality changes. Fischer said that
includes careful monitoring of Indonesia's
economy. "We would have to renegotiate the
monetary and fiscal program because Indonesia's
economy has changed. Also, the exchange rate is
way off from where we expected.
Fischer said that the IMF always looks at changing
circumstances in deciding whether its programs need to be
modified, and would probably do so in Indonesia. But Mr.
Fischer gave no indication that the fund was prepared to
98 BNI Securities, Daily-Corporate News, March 9, 1998
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change its basic approach." IMF officials have said they
would not be in a position to decide whether to make
additional money available to Indonesia before April because
a government was not yet in place and a string of structural
measures needed to be introduced. Bank Indonesia announced
new banking rules such as setting the maximum interest rate
for third party deposit banks at 25% above Certificate of
Bank Indonesia, allowing banks to have prize draws, with the
maximum value of 1% above interest expense, etc.
On March 13, Indonesian shares were higher in quiet
trading, ahead of the impending announcement of a new
cabinet. Also topping Indonesia's upcoming agenda was a
gathering of top regional and international political and
financial leaders, all of whom were bent on getting
President Suharto to adhere to the terms of the IMF accord.
The Jakarta Stock Exchange Index was up 1.72%, or 8.55
points, at 506.73. The line-up heading for Jakarta included
Japanese Prime Minister, Ryutaro Hashimoto, and senior
financial ministry official, Eisuke Sakakibara, a senior IMF
team and U. S. Treasury Under- secretary of International
Affairs, David Lipton. The possibility Indonesia would
introduce a currency board remained the biggest guessing
game in international financial circles. In Washington, IMF
Managing Director, Michael Camdessus, said the IMF was still
opposed to the idea of a currency board because of
Indonesia's low level of reserves, its troubled banking
system and large corporate debt .
By March 15, President Suharto had appointed a new
cabinet. In the reshuffle, President Suharto gave the new
vice-president, B.J. Habibie, unprecedented influence in
foreign affairs. He was put in charge of relations with
multilateral organizations, such as the Association of South
99 Seth Mydans, At Pivotal Time, Suharto Gets a 7 th Term, The
Wall Street Journal, March 11, 1998.
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East Asiar Nations and Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation.
Unlike the previous vice-president, Habibie would be
responsible for "management of national interests in the era
of globalization"- code for dealing with the current
economic crisis, and restructuring industry to improve links
between large business groups and smaller companies.
Another of the vice-president's many jobs will be to
"maintain national unity and integrity." This was described
by one official as a very wide function crossing cultural,
political and economic lines, and one that provided an
opportunity for a far-reaching process of decentralization
and reformation. 100
Japanese Prime Minister, Ryutaro Hashimoto, urged
Indonesian President to take "courageous decisions" to
reform his country's crisis-hit economy. Mr. Hashimoto
emerged from more than two hours of candid talks with the
Indonesian President, expressing deep concern about the
economic difficulties facing the country and calling on
President Suharto to stand by his agreements, including his
deal with the IMF. 101 Officials from the IMF arrived in
Jakarta over the weekend for continuing talks on
implementing the reform program, (which was agreed to in
exchange for a $40 billion financial rescue package.) But
the drastic shake-up of the cabinet was likely undermining
the IMF's efforts to implement the reform package
established in January.
The fund needed to decide whether to release a second
$3 billion installment and open the way for further help
from the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and donor
100 John McBeth, Suharto' s Way, Far Eastern Economic Review,
March 26, 1998.
101 Sander Thoenes , Suharto' s cabinet choices ignores pleas
for reform, The Financial Times, March 16, 1998.
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nations. Early this month, the IMF suspended the initial
US$3 billion disbursement of a US$43 billion bailout package
to Indonesia, citing dissatisfaction with the pace of the
economic reform to which Indonesia had agreed as a IMF-led
bailout. Indonesia responded to the suspension with a flush
of nationalistic statements, implying that Indonesia was
ready to suffer the consequences of a possible IMF pullout
rather than accede to the IMF's economic-liberalization
agenda
.
March 17, Coordinating Minister for Economy, Finance
and Industry, Ginandjar Kartasasmita, speaking to reporters
after the new government's first cabinet meeting, said
Indonesia wouldn't implement a currency board "for now"
because the country lacked adequate foreign reserves to make
a dollar peg stick. At the same time, an IMF official in
Jakarta conceded the IMF would probably have to relax
certain fiscal and other requirement for Indonesia, in light
of the country's social needs arising from the battered
rupiah and a punishing drought. The IMF probably will be
more flexible in allowing Indonesia to allocate a larger
portion of its budget than planned to subsidize food and
medicine, this official said. 102
By March 21, The IMF and the Indonesian government made
"considerable progress" toward a new deal to counter the
country's grave economic crisis, according to the IMF's top
official for Asia. Hubert Neiss had came to Indonesia amid
fears that Indonesia was backsliding on commitments to
implement tough and sweeping reforms under the $43 billion
IMF-sponsored bailout. Neiss met Indonesian cabinet
ministers to discuss revising its terms. The head of
Indonesia's national logistic body, which controls the
102 Jay Salomon and Richard Borsuk, Indonesia, IMF appear to
move closer to accord, The Wall Street Journal, March 18,
1998.
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marketing of basic food items, said the IMF team had agreed
to an Indonesian request to maintain state subsidies for
nine essential food categories, as well as basic medicines.
Finance Minister, Fuad Bawazier, said he hoped a new
agreement could be struck with the IMF by the next week.
On March 26, the Indonesian government said it was
closed to a comprehensive package of measures to lift the
country out of its worst economic crisis in three decades.
Finance Minister, Fuad Bawazier, told reporters that the
package of measures was being finalized in talks with the
International Monetary Fund. "Let us wait to conclude the
talks. It's a very comprehensive package, very wide,
touching on macro and micro economic issues, we will
announce it once we reach an agreement," said Bawazier.
The World Bank said it was coordinating humanitarian
relief for Indonesia and hoped to supply imports of food and
other essentials worth $1.5 billion in 1998-99 (April-
March) . The successful conclusion of the talks with the
IMF, which included a review of reforms Indonesia to which
had agreed in exchange for a $40 billion bailout, would
bring much-needed funds into the country. The IMF would
release the second $3.0 billion from the bailout package and
some $2.5 billion in funds from the World Bank and the Asian
Development Bank would also become available. Japanese
banking sources in Jakarta said Tokyo planed to negotiate
and sign a $1.0 billion trade financing loan in yen
equivalent, once the IMF review was completed.
Diplomatic and political analysts said relations
between Indonesia and the IMF had warmed appreciably in
recent days after a period of strain. Indonesia appeared to
be back on an orthodox IMF-approved track of reform, while
Indonesia also won some concessions from the IMF, including
approval to continue subsidies on essential commodities.
The central bank, Bank Indonesia, raised key interest rates
an average of 12.7% in a move that quickly won IMF praise.
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The government also scrapped a proposed 5% tax on
foreign currency purchases after consultations with the IMF.
The new minister for state-owned companies, Tanri Abeng,
said the government was actively working to deal with some
$74 billion in private foreign debt, which has led to a
massive loss of investor confidence. "Because the IMF has
agreed that the government takes the initiative in solving
private debt, we are going to make it compulsory for
corporations to report their debts," he said. But he also
stressed there was no government bailout involved and the
government was taking no credit risk.
"What we want to achieve first is to reduce
pressure on the rupiah to allow the currency to
recover, secondly, we want to give our private
companies the chance to resume their business
operations, so that economic life can return.
Everything is at standstill now, " Abeng said,
adding that the crucial issue is how to reschedule
the debt
.
The collapse of the rupiah from around Rp2,400 to the
dollar last July sparked sporadic protest over rising prices
and unemployment. It threw most companies into technical
bankruptcy and brought trade to a virtual standstill. A
steering committee of banks that have lent money to
Indonesian companies met in Singapore, but no details were
immediately available. Sources said the talks "were more
substantial" than they were previously. An initial total of
54 domestic banks will be addressed by an agency the
Indonesian government established to rehabilitate insolvent
banks
.
The bankers in Jakarta, knowledgeable about
developments at what's called the Indonesian Bank
Restructuring Agency (IBRA) , said that specific plans for
dealing with the banks would be unveiled after Indonesia and
the IMF revised the terms of an IMF rescue program for the
economy. Fifty- four banks already placed under IBRA
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included thirty-nine privately owned commercial banks, four
state banks, and eleven state-run provincial development
banks . Some bankers speculated that after the new
Indonesia- IMF deal was announced, many of the banks
currently under IBRA would be effectively forced to merge,
sharply reducing the total number of Indonesian banks from
about 200 at present. The bankers also believed that dozens
of other banks not yet under IBRA would soon be shifted to
the agency's responsibility.
At the end of the month, Indonesia and the IMF had been
working for about two weeks to solve the nation's private
debt problem, a key step in lifting the nation out of its
worst economic crisis in decades. Concerned about the debt
formula, Hurbert Neiss, the leader of the IMF, said it was
based on Mexico's Fiarco program. "The IMF, the Indonesian
government, the World Bank and other observers think the
Mexican model has merit, it has some merit because it
provides some attractiveness to the creditors, and at the
same time it limits the financial involvement of the
government and that is very important." Indonesia said it
would prepare a draft bankruptcy law by next April in order
to revive investor confidence in the economy.
Singapore Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, announced a
trade financing scheme aimed at helping hundreds of
Indonesian firms buy vital imports. The scheme would be
financed by at least $2 billion originally pledged by
Singapore for the IMF's $43 billion rescue package for
Indonesia. Indonesia approached the IMF after the rupiah
currency plunged last year. The currency has fallen some
70% against the dollar since July 1997, causing 30-year
highs in inflation, doubling unemployment to about nine
million people, bringing trade to a standstill and
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Figure 3.5. Asian Stock Markets
128
Table 3.10. The middle exchange rate of the U.S. dollar at
Bank Indonesia, 1992 - 198
End of Year/ Exchange rate Increase
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Table 3.11. Composite Index at the Stock Market



























































































































IV. THE CAUSES OF FINANCIAL CRISIS
The causes of the financial crisis in Indonesia can be
explained by several factors. It started from the Thailand
Crisis and spread through the Contagion/Spillover Effect. It
then continued through structural weaknesses, debt, a crisis
of confidence, globalization and integration of the
financial/capital market, investor and panic stricken
lenders, speculators, socio political effects and foreign
exchange rate adjustments.
A. START FROM THAILAND
The problems began in Thailand, where there were
numerous signs of impending crises. Macroeconomic
indicators pointed to substantial imbalances; the real
exchange rate had appreciated substantially, export growth
had slowed markedly, the current account deficit was
consistently large and was increasingly financed by short-
term inflows, and external debt was rising quickly. The
external debt statistics released by OECD showed that since
1990, Thailand's debt was increasing significantly. In
1992, Thailand ranked seventh of the ten countries whose
debt had increased the most. In 1993, Thailand was ranked
second and became the country with the largest debt increase
in 1994 and 1995. The bulk of the increase was in the most
volatile type of debt, short-term bank loans, although long-
term ODA loans, bank lending and trade credits also
expanded. 103
These problems, in turn, exposed other weaknesses in
the Thai economy, including substantial unhedged foreign
103 External Debt Statistics, 1996 edition, OECD
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borrowing by the private sector, an inflated property
market, and a weak and over-exposed banking system. Markets
also warned of insustainability in Thailand's policies, as
seen in lower equity prices and mounting exchange rate
pressure. 104 The crisis erupted in Thailand in the summer of
1997. Starting in 1996, a confluence of domestic and
external shocks revealed weaknesses in the Thai economy that
until then had been masked by the rapid pace of economic
growth and the weakness of the US dollar to which the Thai
currency, the baht , was pegged.
To an extent, Thailand's difficulties resulted from its
earlier economic success. Strong growth, averaging almost
10% per year from 1987-1995, and generally prudent
macroeconomic management, as seen in continuous public
sector fiscal surpluses over the same period, had attracted
large capital inflows, much of them short-term, and many of
them attracted by the establishment of the Bangkok
International Banking Facility in 1993. While these inflows
had permitted faster growth, they had also allowed domestic
banks to expand lending rapidly, fueling imprudent
investments and unrealistic increases in asset prices.
Past success may also have contributed to a sense of
denial among the Thai authorities about the severity of
Thailand's problems and the need for policy action. Neither
the IMF in its continuous dialogue with the Thais during the
eighteen months prior to the floating of the bath last July
2, 1997, nor increasing exchange market pressure, could
overcome. Finally, in the absence of convincing policy
104 Michel Camdessus, The Asian Crisis and The International
Response, Address at The Institute of Advanced Business
Studies (IESE) of the University of Navara, Spain, November
1997, IMF.
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action, and after a desperate defense of the currency by the
central bank, the crisis broke. 105
B. CONTAGION OR SPILLOVER EFFECT
Once the crisis hit Thailand, the contagion to other
economies in the region appeared relentless. Some of the
contagion reflected rational market behavior. The
depreciation of the bath could be expected to erode the
competitiveness of Thailand's trade competitors, and this
put downward pressure on their currencies. The strongest
pressure emerged initially in the Philippines, where the
authorities had also been maintaining a de facto exchange
rate peg to the U.S. dollar. After seeking briefly to
defend the peg through interest rate hikes and intervention,
the authorities allowed the peso to float on July 11, 1997.
They subsequently imposed restrictions on the sale of
nondeliverable forward contracts to nonresidents in an
attempt to limit speculation against the peso.
Spillover/contagion effect spread quickly to Malaysia,
where the authorities opted to allow the ringgit to
depreciate rather than raise interest rates, and also to
Indonesia, where on July 21, 1997, the rupiah fell sharply
within the official intervention band. The intervention
band for the Indonesian rupiah was widened from 8 to 12
percent in July 1997 in a preemptive move designed to deter
speculation. The rupiah had depreciated by 8% by July 21,
1997; as it fell toward the bottom of the band, some
speculative pressures built up to test the floor. In
response, Bank Indonesia raised interest rates from 12% to
105 Stanley Fischer, The Asian Crisis: A View from the IMF,
Addressee at the Midwinter Conference of the Bankers'
Association for Foreign Trade, Washington, D.C., January 22,
1998, IMF
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13% on July 23, 1997, and reportedly intervened heavily in
support of the currency. 106 Subsequent measures to tighten
liquidity conditions in Indonesia failed to stem the growing
exchange market pressures, and the authorities allowed the
rupiah to float on August 14, 1997. 107
After their experience in the Thailand Market,
investors began to take a closer look at the problems in
other neighboring countries (Indonesia), and the market saw
that some of the problem were the same as in Thailand,
particularly in the financial sector. Added to this, the
debt service costs of the domestic private sector increased
as currencies continued to slide. Fearful about how far
this process might go, domestic residents rushed to hedge
their internal liabilities, thereby intensifying exchange
rate pressures. 108
The situation worsened markedly over the next two
months, reflecting concerns about the effects of currency
depreciation and higher domestic interest rates on highly
leveraged corporate and financial sector balance sheets and
the commitment of the authorities to implement policies
needed to restore rate stability. The actual or threatened
imposition of controls on capital outflows during the crisis
may also have served to further undermine investor
confidence
.
As the Southeast Asian crisis deepened,
spillover/contagion effects began to spread to other
countries in Asia, mainly reflecting concerns about the
adverse effects on growth and export competitiveness of
106 IMF staff Team, International Capital Markets, IMF,
Washington, DC, 1997.
107 p^or2d Economic Outlook, Interim Assessment, IMF, December 1997
108 Stanley Fischer, The IMF and the Asian Crisis, March 20, 1998.
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developments in the ASEAN-4 countries, and also concerns
about the soundness of financial systems. The Singapore
dollar and New Taiwan dollar weakened moderately in July,
and the Hong Kong dollar came under temporary attack in
early August . Equity prices in Hong Kong SAR and the Taiwan
province of China peaked in August 1997 before turning down,
as interest rates were raised to counter exchange rates
pressures, and equity prices in China also weakened sharply.
The crisis spread quickly to other countries in Asia,
including South Korea. By the second half of October, the
unrest became global, and markets in North America, Latin
America, Europe, the Baltic States, and Russia all joined
in. This is one of the first instances when a crisis in an
emerging market has had world-wide financial implications on
a significant scale. 109
C. STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES, DEBT, AND CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE
In his address at the Midwinter Conference of the
Bankers 'Association for Foreign Trade in January 1998, Mr.
Stanley Fischer, First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF,
explained the origins of the crisis in Asia.
The key domestic factors that led to the present
difficulties appear to have been: first, the
failure to dampen overheating pressures that had
become increasingly evident in Thailand and many
other countries in the region (including
Indonesia) and were manifested in large external
deficits and property and stock market bubbles;
second, the maintenance of pegged exchange rate
regimes for too long, which encouraged external
borrowing and led to excessive exposure to foreign
exchange risk in both the financial and corporate
sectors; and third, lax prudential rules and
financial oversight, which led to a sharp
deterioration in the quality of banks' loan
109 Shigemitsu Sugisaki, The Global Financial System: Status
Report, IMF, November 18, 1997
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portfolios. As the crisis unfolded, political
uncertainties and doubts about the authorities'
commitment and ability to implement the necessary
adjustment and reforms exacerbated pressures on
currencies and stock markets. Reluctance to
tighten monetary conditions and to close insolvent
financial institutions has clearly added to the
turbulence in financial markets. 110
Indonesia, despite strong economic performance over the
past several decades, which has ranked among the best in the
developing world, also has a number of underlying structural
weaknesses which made Indonesia vulnerable to adverse
external developments. According to the IMF in press
release No. 97/50, "Long-standing rigidities in the form of
domestic trade regulations, and some import monopolies,
impeded economic efficiency and competitiveness." At the
same time, less transparency in decisions affecting the
business environment and data deficiencies increased
uncertainty and adversely affected investor confidence. In
addition, large capital inflows, intermediated through a
weak banking system, exposed Indonesia to a shift in
financial market sentiment. Thus, Indonesia's banking
sector was not prepared to withstand the financial turmoil
that swept Southeast Asia starting in July 1997.
Similarly, the corporate sector was vulnerable to
adverse external developments. Prompted by large interest
rate differentials between domestic and foreign rates,
private companies had increasingly borrowed abroad to
finance domestic operations, which in the context of a
relatively stable exchange rate were largely unhedged. With
the abrupt shift in market sentiment that had occurred since
the middle of July 1997, Indonesia had to contend with a
110 Stanley Fischer, The Asian Crisis: A View from the IMF,
Address at the Midwinter Conference of the Bankers 'Association
for Foreign Trade, Washington, D.C., January 22,1998.
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major crisis of confidence. The rupiah depreciation and the
fall in equity prices had been among the largest in the
area. The downward pressure on the rupiah persisted,
despite policy measures that were timely and broadly
appropriate, including the floating of the exchange rate,




The Indonesia Memorandum of Economic and Financial
Policies article mentioned that despite the strong
macroeconomic performance, a number of underlying weaknesses
had made the country vulnerable to adverse external shocks.
Structural rigidities arising from regulations in domestic
trade and import monopolies have impeded economic efficiency
and competitiveness. At the same time, the relative
stability of the rupiah during most of the 1990s, together
with high rates of return on domestic investment, both
encouraged and facilitated high levels of overseas
borrowing, a significant portion of which has been private
short-term debt that has been unhedged. By the end of
December 1997, Indonesia's external debt stood at $140
billion (about two-thirds of GDP) , of which $20 billion was
short-term, while its debt service had remained close to
one-third of exports of goods and services. The rapid
expansion of the financial system since the late 1980s also
left a number of banks with significant amounts of
nonperforming loans, straining their liquidity, and, in a
number of cases, undermining their financial viability.
The banking system in Indonesia also created the
problem. Since deregulation began in 1988, banks more than
doubled in number to reach a total of more than 240, but
without proper supervision. Companies over borrowed from
in imf, IMF Approves Stand-By Credit for Indonesia, Press Release
No. 97/50, November 5, 1997
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local banks. In addition, the Indonesian private sector
borrowed heavily from foreign banks without hedging the
foreign exchange risk in case the rupiah fell sharply, as
happened after Thailand was forced by a shortage of foreign
exchange in July 1997 to let the bath float.
Financial governance in the public and private sectors
in Indonesia was weak; the influence of business on
political connections was excessive. With the fall of the
rupiah, firms were unable to repay their foreign debts.
Such structural problems take time to resolve, and involve
high social costs. 112 As Shigemitsu Sugisaki addressed the
1998 Harvard Asia Business Conference on January 30,
1998 , "Structural factors were at the heart of the economic
problems. First and foremost, the crisis was a financial
sector crisis.
There were several weaknesses
:
• The financial sectors in Indonesia, Korea, and
Thailand lack proper standards and supervision.
For instance, financial institutions had been
allowed to borrow from abroad because of
inadequate controls on their foreign exchange
exposure
.
• The sizeable capital inflows had given rise to
investment in equity and property and the risks
associated with price bubbles.
• The authorities had, in some instances, come to
the rescue of insolvent financial institutions and
prevented them from being liquidated.
Other structural problems included:
112 Paul M. Dickie, For Asia, Confidence Means Structural Reform,
International Herald Tribune, February 17, 1998
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• Trade restrictions, such as the maintenance of
trade monopolies, quantitative restrictions on
trade, and other trades barriers.
• Capital controls, including restrictions on
foreigners ' access to the equity and corporate
bond markets; restrictions on foreign borrowing by
corporations (thus, foreign banks could not
evaluate the underlying commercial risk associated
with their lending)
.
• Close links between the government, banks, and
corporations, created a problem in all three
countries (Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand), as
economic decisions and financial relations lacked
transparency and accountability, and inappropriate
investment decisions undermined the health of the
financial sector.
• Governance issues concerned the implementation of
policies, including lack of transparency.
Financial institutions and corporations also
suffered from poor governance. 113
D. GLOBALIZATION AND INTEGRATION FINANCIAL/CAPITAL
MARKET.
During the last decade, the integration of financial
markets had progressed significantly and had helped promote
a better distribution of world savings. From the 1970 ' s
113 Shigemitsu Sugisaki, Economic Crises in Asia, Addressed at the
1998 Harvard Asia Business Conference, Harvard Business School,
January 30, 1998, IMF
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through the early 1990s, advanced countries (industrial
countries and newly industrial countries in Asia, Taiwan,
Hong Kong, South Korea and Singapore) went through a
dismantled exchange and capital controls. This occurred
simultaneously with the deregulation of domestic financial
markets and financial innovations. The improvement of
communications significantly decreased transaction costs.
International capital movements increased and initially
concentrated in offshore markets and banks; then from the
mid-1980s in reformed domestic markets and security markets.
Cross-border transactions in bonds and equities in the major
advanced countries, which were less than 10% of GDP in 1980,
had generally risen to over 100% of GDP in 1995. The daily
turnover in the foreign exchange market expanded from about
$200 billion in the mid-1980s to around $1.2 trillion in




In developing countries, private capital flows picked
up substantially following the lifting of controls on cross-
border flows, especially on inflows. This followed progress
in convertibility of current account transactions.
Reflecting the liberalization of the economies and in the
high growth performance and relative macroeconomic
stability, capital flows have expanded quickly. In the
period from 1990 to 1996, for example, net private capital
inflows to developing countries nearly doubled, from about
$131.3 billion in 1991 to $207.4 billion in 1996, benefiting
particularly equity and portfolio investments in emerging
market economies. Asia's share of capital flows rose
particularly fast, from one third of total private flows in
1990 to as much as half of those flows in 1996. 115
114 iMF,World Economic Outlook, May 1997.
lis xmf, World Economic Outlook, October 1997,
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In the 1980' s and 1990 's, as globalization and changes
in policy orientation resulted in closer international trade
and financial linkages, the economic performance and growth
prospects of many developing countries had been greatly
enhanced. The adoption of outward-oriented policy
strategies and the accompanying liberalization of
international trade and payments have been critical
ingredients of successful economic development. 116
Certainly, there is a very broad recognition of the
benefits of global financial markets: they give countries
new opportunities to quicken the pace of investment, job
creation, and growth. They give investors a wider range of
investment opportunities and higher returns on savings; they
promote a more efficient allocation of resources worldwide
and thus, stronger world growth. Global financial markets
also provide countries with additional incentives to pursue
sound macroeconomic policies and overcome structural
weaknesses that impede investment and growth. Yet, there is
also apprehension about the very serious risk associated
with globalization. Indeed, countries today are more
vulnerable to shifts in market sentiment regarding their
economic situation or policies. Changes in market
perceptions can trigger massive shifts in capital that can,
in turn, precipitate banking sector crises and have serious
spillover effects in other economies. Moreover, some
countries are not well equipped to take advantage of
expanding world trade and capital flows. Therefore, risks
become marginalized from the world economy. Present




116 Anne O. Krueger , Trade Policy and Economic Development: How
We Learn, American Economic Review, Vol. 81 March 1997.
117 Michel Camdessus , The Asian Financial Crisis and the
Opportunities of Globalization, Address at the Second Committee
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Developments in the advanced economies and global
financial markets also contributed significantly to the
build up of the imbalances that eventually led to the
crisis. Specifically, with Japan and Europe experiencing
weak growth since the beginning of the 1990 's, attractive
domestic investment opportunities have fallen short of
available savings; meanwhile, monetary policy has remained
appropriately accommodative, and interest rates have been
low. Large capital flows to emerging markets were driven to
an important degree by this phenomena, and by an imprudent
search for high yields from international investors, without
due regard to potential risks. Also contributing to the
build up to the crisis were the wide swings of the yen /
dollar exchange rate over the past three years and the
associated risks. 118
Mr. Summer likened the capital markets to a jet plane.
We can go where we want much more quickly, we can
get there more comfortably, more cheaply and most
of the time more safely but the crashes when they
occur are that much more spectacular.
It is an arresting simile. Another obvious comparison
is with the oceans. Sometimes, they are completely calm.
But if one is trying to cross them in safety, one needs a
sound boat. And even then, it might be overwhelmed if the
waves are high enough. 119 Several conditions can lead to
financial instability. First, when capital markets are
liberalized, they create the potential for vast
international movements of financial assets. Second, when
of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, October 31,
1997, IMF.
118 Stanley Fischer, The Asian Crisis: A View from the IMF.
119 Martin Wolf, Capital Punishment, Financial Times, March
17, 1998.
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countries keep their exchange rates pegged, they create the
perception that there is little risk involved in moving
funds from one market to the other. Third, problems can
occur when the monetary regime (including the system of
regulatory control) is not adapted to the new regime of
liberal capital market. Even though they do not always lead
to disaster, it is fair to conclude that these three factors
substantially increase the probability of the problem. 120
120 Paul De Grauwe, Economic and Monetary Turmoil, Financial
Times, February 20, 1998.
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Figure 4.1 Composition of Capital Flows, 1990-96
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Source: Data provided by the Indonesian authorities.














































Figure 4.3 Stock Prices in Emerging Markets and United
States Interest rates, 1990-96.
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E. INVESTORS AND PANIC-STRICKEN LENDERS
Prior to the crisis, high volumes of international
capital, together with a strong performance by major
borrower countries, produced a sharp rise in commitments
(including syndicated loans and bond issues) to developing
countries. According to the World Bank, commitments from
January to September exceeded the 1996 total by 10%, and
portfolio equity flows increased strongly, accompanied by
booming stock markets in Latin America and Eastern Europe.
Over the year as a whole, net long-term private flows rose
for the seventh straight year to reach a total of $ 256
billion, up from $247 billion in 1996. In 1997, developing
countries relied on sophisticated market instruments more
often than in the past, including greater use of derivative
instruments and emerging markets mutual funds, and
instruments to attract institutional investors and encourage
greater participation by private firms. 121
After viewing Asia for years as a promised land for
lending and investing, despite growing signs of trouble,
western financial institutions panicked last fall and shut
down the flow of new capital to troubled countries. A study
prepared for the world's major banks, documents how within
the span of a few months, foreign banks and investments
companies did a U-turn from greed to fear, slashing new
loans and investments to the five most troubled Asian
countries by $100 billion. That amount equals two- thirds of
the new money tunneled to Asia the prior year. 122 As the
121 The World Bank Group, East Asia Financial Crisis Leads To
Tumultuous Year In Emerging Markets, News Release No. 98/1683/S,
March 24, 1998.
122 Edmund L. Andrews, Report: Banks Shut Off Capital to Asia
Last Fall as Greed Turned To Fear, The New York Times, January
30, 1998.
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Washington-based Institute for International Finance notes,
net private flows to Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the
Philippines and Thailand jumped from $48 billion in 1994 to
$93 billion in 1996 then collapse to an estimated minus $12
billion last year (1997)
.
123 The eastern Asian crises were
triggered and exacerbated partly when investors found out
that reserves were smaller than they had thought, and that
short-term debt was higher. Perhaps more important than
misleading information was the general lack of information.
When the problems became apparent, information limitations
made it hard for lenders to distinguish bad companies from
good, leading them to shy away from all companies. 124
As capital flooded out, exchange rates collapsed and
bankruptcy engulfed the private sector. Countries found
themselves at the mercy of panic-stricken private lenders
and demanding official ones. Prof. Jeffrey Sachs from
Harvard said that the investors were not so stupid, the
trouble was that panic, albeit rational for each individual
institution, turned a necessary, ideally quiet modest,
adjustment into a catastrophe. 125 Moreover, the inflows had
exacerbated the economies' underlying weaknesses. Large-
scale inflows raised the real exchange rate, created current
account deficits, lowered domestic interest rates and
exacerbated overheating. Inflows were a response to past
triumphs and transmuted them to disaster. 126 Despite the
123 Financial Times, East Asian Shipwreck, February 16, 1998.
124 Joseph E. Stiglitz , Boats, Planes and capital flows,
Financial Times, March 25, 1998.
125 Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sach, The onset of the East Asian
Financial Crisis, Harvard Institute for International
Development, 1998, mimeo.
126 Martin Wolf, Capital Punishment, Financial Times, March
17,1998.
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current crisis in Indonesia, investors' interest concerning
investment in Indonesia was still high. According to the
Minister of investment/chief of the investment coordination
chamber, Sanyoto Sastrowardoyo, there were 815 projects with
the value of RP 100.7 trillion in 1996 undertaken by
Indonesian companies and 959 projects with the value of
$29.9 billion undertaken by foreign companies. In 1997,
there were 728 projects with the value of Rp 119.9 trillion
undertaken by Indonesian companies, and 790 projects with
the value of 33.8 billion undertaken by foreign companies.
In 1998, through February, there were 227 foreign projects,
80 from the mining sectors. Despite the crisis, foreign
investors were still willing to invest in Indonesia. 127
F. SPECULATIVE ATTACKS
The wild fluctuations in the world stock markets, since
July 1997 have highlighted the risks and potential dangers
of an increasingly globalized financial system and currency
speculation. The rapid and continuing integration of
emerging market countries into global financial markets
during the 1990' s was accompanied by several currency
crises. When the financial crisis occurred in Thailand in
July 1997, then spread to other countries in the region, Dr.
Mahathir Mohamad, the Malaysian Prime Minister, raised his
voice against currency speculators (singling out George
Soros and his "Quantum Fund' for speculative attacks to
punish ASEAN countries for their policies towards Myanmar)
and called for international actions to make such
speculation and "sabotage 1 a criminal offence. 128 On July
127 Kompas , Meninvest: Investasi Asing Meningkat, February 8,1998.
128 Chakravarthi Raghavan, Developing Countries Should Retain Some
Capital Controls, Third World Network No. 86, October 1997.
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27,1997, he told the media in Alor Star, a northern
Malaysian town,
,
that the international community should
make sabotaging of currencies by financial speculators a
crime. "Otherwise the currencies of developing countries
will continue to be sabotaged. This phenomenon will be
repeated, and it is for this reason that we must regard it
as a crime .
'
Earlier, leaders of ASEAN accused financial speculators
for causing the recent fall in the value of their currencies
and pledged to work together to combat the threat
.
129 In his
paper about "Currency Crises', Krugman agreed that what
forced Thailand to devalue its currency was massive
speculation against the bath, speculation that over a few
months had consumed most of what initially seemed an
awesomely large war chest of foreign exchange. And why were
speculators betting against Thailand? They expected the bath
to be devalued, of course. 130
In a press conference at the Hong Kong Convention and
Exhibition Center on September 25, 1997, Michel Camdessus,
Managing Director of IMF addressed the international
speculators' attack:
We have witnessed here a formidable, temporary,
but very strong pressure of speculation. What I
would say is that when you see speculation
somewhere, you must ask yourself why, as
speculators never like to lose money. If they
speculate, it is because they see somewhere a
weakness or rigidity, which would make them very
safe conditions for making money. So, if
speculation is part of market life, what this
crisis tells us is that you should not try to
outlaw speculators, because you will create only
parallel circuits for speculation. What you must
do, with a sense of urgency, is to compete for
excellence in the management of your economy in
129 Martin Khor, Currency Sabotage Should Be An International
Crime, Third World Network Features, August 1997.
130 Paul Krugman, Currency Crises.
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such a way that you will not attract the attention
of the speculators and that they would not dare to
speculate against you. 131
Speculative currency attacks are not a uniquely modern
phenomenon. Historically, they have occurred during periods
characterized by high capital mobility and fixed exchange
rates for example, the gold standard era and the 1920s.
Then as now, investors and lenders responded swiftly and
abruptly to bad news about political or economic crises in a
given country, launching speculative attacks on the
country's gold reserves. Recent empirical studies have
determined that attacks (both direct attacks and those that
represent the contagion effect of an attack on another
currency) were most likely to target the currencies of
countries with certain characteristics: a highly overvalued
real exchange rate, a weak financial system and fiscal
position, and an external debt position with a high
proportion of short-term maturities. 132
In Indonesia, the crisis was not only made by the
foreign speculators but also by domestic speculators. When
they saw certain indications that made them feel unhappy or
panicked, such as banking problems, social unrest, political
uncertainty, continuing depreciation of the rupiah against
the U.S. dollar, etc., they quickly withdrew their money
from banks and changed their rupiah to dollars. This created
a massive rush in exchange money that plunged the value of
rupiah against the U.S. dollar.
131 Michel Camdessus, Press Conference at Hong Kong Convention and
Exhibition Center, IMF, September 25, 1997) .
132 IMF Research Department Staff, Capital Flow Sustainability and




G. SOCIO POLITICAL, DROUGHT AND FOREST FIRES
In the 30 years of New Order, political stability was
always taken for granted, but the recent increase of
political uncertainty and a prolonged drought caused by El
Nino contributed to the financial crisis in Indonesia. The
increasing degree of uncertainty and anxiety had been
triggered by underlying socio political factors, such as
widening socio economic inequality, elections in the mid-
1997 general assembly in March 1998, and the issue of
political succession. In ECONIT: Economic Outlook 1997, the
ECONIT Advisory Group concluded that 1997 is a Year of
Uncertainty. It was so named because there were many
unpredictable factors in domestic politics, which would have
a strong and direct impact on the economy approaching the
year 2000. The increasing degree of uncertainty originated
from a number of factors, such as increasing frequency of
inconsistent policies, as well as increasing errors of
judgement in economic and political decision-making.
ECONIT also mentioned that a number of factors had
contributed directly to the rising degree of uncertainty.
First, there was an increasing tendency toward fragmentation
in the decision-making process and increasing weakness in
government policy responses. One clear example was the
fragmentation and clear differences in opinion within the
members of the cabinet on the Fiscal Team over the case of a
tax holiday. Second, there was a rising tendency toward
highly centralized and personalized decision-making in both
politics and economy. The excessive centralization and
personalization in decision-making increased errors of
judgement. Third, increasing political re-alliances and
jockeying, both before and after the election, pushed
economic issues to the back burner. At the same time,
increasing budgetary and non-budgetary spending was
mobilized to guarantee the political status quo. This
154
increased spending minimized the effectiveness of monetary-
contraction. 133
Several riots and social unrest in some regions, before
and after Election Day in May 1997, made investors and
markets worry about stability in Indonesia.
Demonstrations/riots in several Universities and burning and
looting at some shops owned by ethnic Chinese worsened the
situation and caused fluctuations in the rupiah. Rumors
about the health of President Soeharto in October 1997, and
when he decided not to attend the ASEAN summit in Malaysia,
caused the rupiah to nosedive to Rp5,800 per U.S. dollar on
December 15, 1997. This represented an 11% depreciation in a
single day. Concern about who would be the new vice
president also depreciated the rupiah. When the ruling
party, GOLKAR, announced the expected criterion of the
future candidate of the vice president, which clearly
indicated B.J. Habibie, markets reacted negatively and
caused the rupiah to decrease further against the dollar.
H. FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGIME
One of the key domestic factors that led to the present
difficulties appears to have been maintaining pegged
exchange rates for too long, which encouraged external
borrowing and led to excessive exposure to foreign exchange
risk in both financial and corporate sectors. 134 In recent
months, financial crises focused attention on the role of
the exchange rate regime. Since the 1970s, developing
countries have followed a gradual but significant shift from
133 ECONIT: Economic Outlook 1997, Indonesian Economy 1997: Year
of Uncertainty
.
134 Stanley Fischer, The Asian Crisis: A View from the IMF,
Washington, D. C, January 22, 1998.
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fixed exchange-rate systems (pegging to a single currency,
such as the dollar, or to a basket of currencies) toward
more flexible exchange rates arrangements. Countries have
tended to move away from the pegs they originally adopted
after the industrial countries switched to floating rates in
the early 1970s, and have instead introduced arrangements
that allow more frequent adjustments, such as exchange rate
bands, managed floats, or floating exchange rates. In the
mid-1970s, 86% of developing countries had some type of
pegged exchange rate. At the end of 1996, fewer than half
did. Almost one-third of countries now claim to have
independently floating rates.
The basic argument about the benefits of the flexible
exchange rates was to increase the flexibility in exchange
rate management for external shocks that require domestic
adjustment. Flexible exchange rates make it easier for an
economy to adjust to external shocks which widened a
country's trade deficit, such as a rise in the oil prices. A
flexible exchange rate also allows countries to target
monetary policy to domestic ends, such as price stability,
rather than having to use interest rates to maintain
inflexible exchange rates.
But flexibility has disadvantages as well. The most
important are that exchange rates can be volatile and, on
occasion, grossly misaligned. This can hinder trade and
upset the economy. 135 In World Economic Outlook December
1997, the IMF stated:
Indeed, while there are many examples of pegged
exchange rate regimes functioning reasonably well
for extended periods, there are also numerous
examples of pegged exchange rates being adjusted
too late in the face of capital inflows that
ultimately proved destabilizing. Greater
135 The economist Newspaper, Getting Out Of A Fix, The economic
Newspaper Limi ted, 1998
.
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willingness to let the exchange rate move in
response to changing circumstances may also help
convey a more realistic perception of risk to both
domestic and foreign investors. 136
Central banks in Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia
and Indonesia have succumbed to currency speculators in
recent months and have abandoned their policies of pegging
their currencies to a basket of currencies dominated by the
U.S. dollar. The currency pegging policies became
vulnerable because of ballooning trade deficits.
With the growing international mobility of capital
after the 1970s, however, it became increasingly clear that
there were substantial stocks of capital that were prepared
to move en masse from one currency to another. Countries
that tried to fix their exchange rates could find their
reserves (or, in the case of surplus countries, their
patience) quickly exhausted by massive speculative attacks;
countries with floating exchange rates found that those
rates fluctuated with the expectations of speculators. 137
13 6 IMF, World Economic Outlook, Interim Assessment, December
1997, International Monetary Fund.
137 Paul Krugman, Currencies and Crises, p.xiv-xv, 1992, the MIT





The Republic of Indonesia has achieved remarkable
economic development success over the past several decades
and is considered to be among the best performing East Asian
economies. With abundant natural resources and a population
of 200 million, prudent macroeconomic policies, high
investment and saving rates, and continuing structural
reforms to liberalize markets have kept Indonesia on a path
of rapid economic development. Since the 1970s, economic
growth has averaged 7 percent per annum, a growth
performance that ranks among the ten fastest in the world,
and attained real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of 7.8
percent in 1996. The economic structure has become
diversified, as dependency on the oil sector has declined
and an export oriented manufacturing base has emerged, led
by a dynamic private sector and fueled by high domestic
savings and large inflows of foreign direct investment.
The Indonesian economy continued to perform well in
1996 and in the beginning of 1997. Macroeconomic balance was
maintained: the budget was balanced; inflation was contained
at relatively low levels; current account deficits were
moderate; and international reserves remained at comfortable
levels. The rate of inflation in 1996/1997 fell to 5%, and
there was a budgetary surplus for 1996/1997 equalling 1% of
GDP. The overall balance of payments was estimated to have
registered a surplus of US$6.1 billion in 1996/1997,
compared with US$3.4 billion in 1995/1996. The external
current account deficit in 1996/1997 widened to 3.5% of GDP
and official reserves increased to the equivalent of six
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months of imports in 1996/1997. Foreign exchange reserves,
as of April 1997, had reached US$20.38 billion. As of early
1997, foreign debt has reached US$110 billion, US$56 billion
owed by the government and US$54 billion by the private
sector.
In the banking sector, the number of commercial banks
increased from 111 to 240 between 1988 to 1994. A liberal
capital account regime and regulatory changes over the past
decade have all contributed to fast changes in Indonesia's
banking sector. The seven state banks dominated the sector,
with their combined assets accounting for about 45% of the
entire system, although their share of total lending has
declined markedly in recent years. The private commercial
banks have grown faster than the state banks, which
accounted for about 30% of the total banking system assets
in the mid-1997. There were also 9,300 rural banks, which
are limited in both their geographical area of operations
and their banking activities. The nonbank financial sector,
including savings banks, mutual funds, pension funds,
insurance companies, and leasing companies, has continued to
develop
.
Large private sector banks were generally well managed
and competitive, but the soundness of the banking system,
especially for the state banks and smaller banks, had been
of concern. Foreign currency borrowings showed substantial
growth between 1988 and 1996, and foreign currency deposits
also grew rapidly. There had been a rapid expansion in
lending to the property sector, and most property projects
utilized short-term loans to finance development. Indonesian
companies were also borrowing heavily in international
capital markets. Bank Indonesia, the central bank, had taken
several steps to strengthen the banks, such as, including
increasing moral suasion to restrain overall credit growth,
including the stricter limits for individual banks, based on
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their level of capital and riskiness of their lending
portfolios
.
Before June of 1997, with the economic environment as
explained previously, it was difficult to predict that the
Indonesian economy would deteriorate rapidly. When the
economic crisis hit Thailand in July of 1997, Thailand had
to devalue their currency by changing their foreign exchange
regime from a dollar peg to floating. It triggered other
countries in Southeast Asia (including Indonesia) to devalue
and float their currencies. However, Indonesia was still
considered in good condition. Even when Indonesia felt the
pressure of the crisis in October of 1997, analysts said
that Indonesia's macroeconomic foundation remained sound,
despite recent pressures in the foreign exchange markets.
At the same time, Thailand's economic crisis deepened; the
spillover spread beyond the Southeast Asian countries to
regions such as Hong Kong and South Korea.
Unfortunately, Indonesian economics were not immune to
the crisis. The situation gradually worsened. Indonesian
currency continued to depreciate and the stock market was
volatile. The government introduced several reform packages
and asked for economic assistance and advice. The IMF agreed
to provide US$40 billion in financial assistance. The crisis
deepened in January of 1998 after the government announced
the fiscal 1998-1999 Central Government Budget that failed
to convince the market that Indonesia was committed to
reforming its economy. After the government revised its
budget and signed a new agreement with the IMF, Indonesian
currency, fell to a record low of Rpl7, 000 to the U.S.
dollar. Bank Indonesia intervened by selling the dollar;
soon the rupiah rose to Rpll,800.
The IMF package showed no signs of alleviating
Indonesia's debt and confidence about the market and
economic conditions became very weak. Stocks prices were
falling and the rupiah had plunged into an abyss. With each
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downward spiral of the currency, Indonesia's foreign-debt
burden grew bigger. It became difficult for many companies
to pay their debt. The financial and currency crisis forced
many companies in to bankruptcy, unemployment was on the
rise, the price of food and other products were increasing,
and some economists predicted that millions of Indonesians
would be dragged back below the poverty line, reversing
decades of progress.
The crisis also has heightened the likelihood of social
unrest. There were riots in several places, students in many
universities participated in peace demonstrations on their
campuses, and people called for President Suharto to step
down. This was the worst economic crisis in Indonesia since
1965.
The causes of the crisis can be explained by several
factors
:
1. Start from Thailand. The crisis began in
Thailand, where there were numerous signs of
impending crisis. Macroeconomic indicators pointed
to substantial imbalances: the real exchange rate
had appreciated substantially; export growth had
slowed markedly; the current account deficit was
consistently large and was increasingly financed
by short-term inflows; and external debt was
rising quickly. The bulk of the increase was in
the most volatile type of debt, short-term bank
loans. Thailand became the country with the
largest debt increase in 1994 and 1995. Thailand
economic weaknesses also included unhedged foreign
borrowing by the private sector, an inflated
property market, and a weak and over-exposed
banking system. On July 2, 1997, after increasing
exchange market pressure and a desperate defense
of the currency by the central bank, Thailand had
to devalue its currency by abandoning the dollar
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peg and adopting the floating rate regime. The
economic crisis broke and spread to other
countries
.
Contagion/Spillover Effects. Once the crisis hit
Thailand, the contagion to other economies in the
region appeared relentlessly. After their
experience in Thailand, markets began to take a
closer look at the problems in other neighboring
countries. The market signaled some of the
problems in Indonesia as found in Thailand,
particularly in the financial sector. Some
contagion reflected rational market behavior. The
depreciation of the Thailand currency, bath, could
be expected to erode the competitiveness of
Thailand's trade competitors, and put downward
pressure on their currencies. The
contagion/spillover effect spread quickly to other
countries in the region. The Philippines, after
seeking briefly to defend its currency peg through
interest rate hikes and intervention, finally
allowed the peso to float on July 11, 1997. In
Malaysia, the authorities opted to allow the
ringgit to depreciate rather than raise interest
rates. Indonesia adjusted its intervention bands
and raised its interest rates, however, measures
to tighten liquidity conditions in Indonesia
failed to stem the growing exchange market
pressures. Finally the government allowed the
rupiah to float on August 14, 1997. As the crisis
deepened, contagion/spillover effects spread to
other countries in Asia. The Singapore dollar and
New Taiwan dollar weakened moderately. The Hong
Kong dollar also came under attack. The most
sensational casualty was South Korea, the eleventh
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largest economy in the world. They began to have
economic problems and had to ask for a financial
bailout from the IMF.
Structural Weaknesses, Debt and Crisis of
Confidence. Despite Indonesia's strong economic
performance over the past several decades, which
has ranked among the best in the developing world,
Indonesia has a number of underlying structural
weaknesses. These made them vulnerable to adverse
external developments. Some of the weaknesses are
long-standing rigidities in the form of domestic
trade regulations, and import monopolies that
impeded economic efficiency and competitiveness.
At the same time it was unclear how decisions were
made that affected the business environment and
data deficiencies, increased uncertainty and
adversely affected investor confidence. Large
capital inflows, intermediated through a weak
banking system, exposed Indonesia to a shift in
financial market sentiment. Indonesia's banking
sector was not prepared to withstand the financial
turmoil
.
The financial sector lacked proper prudent
standards and supervision. The relative stability
of the rupiah during most of the 1990s, together
with high rates of return on domestic investment,
both encouraged and facilitated high levels of
overseas borrowing, a significant portion of which
was private short-term debt that was unhedged. By
the end of December 1997, Indonesia's external
debt stood at US $140 billion (about two-thirds of
GDP) , of which US $20 billion was short-term. With
the fall of the rupiah, companies were unable to
repay their foreign debts and became bankrupt
.
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Such structural problems take time to resolve, and
involve high social costs.
4 . Globalization and Integration in Financial/Capital
Markets. The globalization and integration in
financial/capital markets has progressed
significantly and has promoted a better
distribution of world savings during the last
decade. Improvements in communications and
technology significantly decreased transaction
costs and increased international capital
movement. Cross-border-transactions in bonds and
equities increased. The daily turnover in the
foreign exchange market expanded. The
liberalization of the economies, the high growth
performance and relative macroeconomic stability
in most developing countries, rapidly expanded
capital flows.
As globalization and changes in policy orientation
have tightened international trade and financial
linkages, the economic performance and growth
prospects of many developing countries have been
greatly enhanced. Some benefits from globalizing
and the integrating financial markets have given
countries new opportunities to accelerate
investment, job creation, and growth and give
investors a wider range of investment
opportunities and higher returns on savings, etc.
Despite these benefits, globalizing and
integrating financial markets also created very
serious risks. Countries were more vulnerable to
shifts in market sentiment regarding their
economic situation or policies. Changes in the
market triggered massive shifts in capital that
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could, in turn, precipitate banking sector crisis
and have serious spillover effects in other
economies. Countries that were not well equipped
to take advantage of expanding world trade and
capital flows risked becoming marginalized from
the world economy.
Investors and Panic-stricken Lenders. Prior to
the crisis in Southeast Asia, high volumes of
international capital, together with a strong
performance by major borrower countries, produced
a sharp rise in commitments (including syndicated
loans and bond issues) to developing countries.
The developing countries in Southeast Asia relied
on sophisticated market instruments more often
than in the past, including derivative
instruments, emerging market mutual funds, and
instruments to attract institutional investors and
encourage greater participation by private firms.
After viewing Asia for years as a Promised Land
for lending and investing, despite growing signs
of trouble, the world financial institutions
panicked last fall and shut down the flow of new
capital to troubled countries. A study documents
how within the span of a few months, foreign banks
and investment companies did a U-turn from greed
to fear. The crises were triggered and exacerbated
partly when investors found out that reserves were
smaller than they had thought and that short-term
debt was higher. When the problems became
apparent, it was difficult for lenders to
distinguish bad companies from good, leading them
to shy away from all.
166
As the capital flooded out, exchange rates
collapsed and bankruptcy engulfed the private
sector, countries found themselves at the mercy of
panic-stricken private lenders and demanding
official ones. The trouble was that panic, albeit
rational for each individual institution, turned a
necessary, ideally quiet modest, adjustment into a
catastrophe
.
Speculative Attacks. Speculative currency attacks
are not a uniquely modern phenomenon.
Historically, they have occurred during periods
characterized by high capital mobility and fixed
exchange rates -for example, the gold standard era
and the 1920s. Then as now, investors and lenders
responded swiftly and abruptly to bad news about
political or economic crisis in a given country,
launching speculative attacks on the country's
gold reserves . Recent empirical studies have
determined that attacks (both direct attacks and
those that represent the contagion effect of an
attack on another currency) , were most likely to
target the currencies of countries with certain
characteristics. These were a highly overvalued
real exchange rate, a weak financial system and
fiscal position, and an external debt position
with a high proportion of short-term maturities.
In Indonesia, the crisis was not only percipitated
by foreign speculators, but also by domestic
speculators. When they identified certain
indicators, including banking problems, social
unrest, political uncertainty, continuing
depreciation of the rupiah against U.S. dollar,
etc., they quickly withdrew their bank deposits
and changed their rupiah to dollars or other
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strong currencies. This created a massive rush in
exchange money significantly depreciating the
value of rupiah against the U.S. dollar.
Socio Political Drought and Forest Fires. The
socio political situation, during 1997 and in the
beginning of 1998, was full of uncertainty.
Increasing uncertainty and anxiety has been
triggered by some underlying factors, including
widening socio economic inequality, elections in
mid-1997, general assembly formation in March
1998, the issue of political succession and
uncertainty in identifying the vice president.
Several riots, demonstrations and social unrest in
some regions, before and after both Election Day
in May of 1997 and forming the general assembly in
March of 1998, concerned investors and markets
about circumstances in Indonesia. This also
depreciated the rupiah. Forest fires in parts of
Indonesia, especially on the Sumatera Island and
Kalimantan islands, and prolonged drought caused
by El Nino, destroyed many agricultural harvests
and worsened the situation.
Foreign Exchange Regime. In recent months, the
financial crisis has focused attention on the role
of the exchange rate regime. One of the key
domestic factors that led to the economic crisis
appears to have been the prolonged maintenance of
pegged exchange rate regimes. This encouraged
external borrowing and led to excessive exposure
to foreign exchange risk in both financial and
corporate sectors. With the growing international
mobility of capital during the last decades, it
became increasingly clear that substantial stocks
of capital are prepared to move en masse from one
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currency to another. Countries that fix their
exchange rates could find their reserves (or, in
the case of surplus countries, their patience)
quickly exhausted by massive speculative attacks.
The Indonesian central bank, Bank Indonesia,
together with central banks in Thailand, the
Philippines and Malaysia have succumbed to
currency speculators and have abandoned their
policies of pegging their currencies to a basket
of currencies dominated by the U.S. dollar. The
currency pegging policies became vulnerable
because of ballooning trade deficits.
B. CONCLUSION
After achieving remarkable economic success over the
past several decades and considered to be among the best
performing East Asian economies, Indonesia has faced
financial and currency difficulties. The financial and
currency crisis was sparked by the sharp depreciation of the
Thailand bath, which in turn triggered similar downturns in
the Philippine peso, Malaysian ringgit, Indonesian rupiah,
and even the Singapore dollar. The crisis then spread to
other regions, including Hong Kong and South Korea. The
crisis in Indonesia occurred because of several factors. It
started from the Thailand crisis, which triggered subsequent
crises in other Southeast Asian countries through
contagion/spillover effects. The crisis was worsened by
Indonesia's structural weaknesses, debt crisis and loss of
confidence within the markets; globalization and integration
of the financial/capital market; investors and panic-
stricken lenders; speculative attacks; socio political
issues; drought and forest fires; and the foreign exchange
regime, which prolonged the pegged exchange rate.
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
• Indonesia's economic situation after March 1998.
• The impact of the financial and currency crisis in
Indonesia and in other Asian countries on global
financial markets.
• Financial and banking system relationships under
alternative foreign exchange regimes.
• The flows of international capital funds and their
regulation.
• Speculative attacks, how they work, and how to




ADB = Asian Development Bank
AFTA = ASEAN Free Trade Area
APEC = The Asia-Pacific Economic Council
ASEAN = The Association of South-East Asian Nations
BAPPENAS = Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional, National Development
Planning Board
BI = Bank Indonesia, central bank
BIS = Bank for International Settlements
BKPM = Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal, Investment Coordinating Board
BPIS = Badan Pengelola Industri Strategis, Strategic Industries Board
BPS = Biro Pusat Statistic, Central Bureau of Statistics
BULOG = Badan Urusan Logistic, National Logistic Agency, government food price
Stabilization agency, particularly rice procurement
BUMN = Badan usaha milik negara, state-owned enterprises
CAD ^Capital Adequacy Directive
CAR = risk-adjusted capital adequacy requirement
CBA =Currency board arrangement
CGI = Consultative Group for Indonesia, replacing IGGI in 1992
CPI = Consumer Price Index. CPI is a measure of the average change over time in the
Prices paid by urban consumes for a fixed market basket of consumer goods and
Services from A to Z
ERM = exchange rete mechanism
FDI = Foreign direct investment
G-7 = Group of Seven
G-10 = Group ofTen
GDP = Gross Domestic Product. GDP is a measure of the total production and
Consumption of goods and services
GNP = Gross National Product
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GOLKAR = Golongan Karya, government political party
IMF = The International Monetary Fund
IGGI =Inter-Governmental Group for Indonesia, the international donor consortium, in
Existence until 1992
JSE = Jakarta Stock Exchange
LIBOR = London interbank offered rate
LOLR = The lender of last resort
MOU = Memorandum of Understanding
NAM = Non-aligned Movement
NASDAQ = National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation
NDA = Net domestic assets
New Order/Orde Baru = refers to the period since the commencement of President
Suharto's rule, generally taken from March 1966, although
Sometimes interpreted in a constitutional sense to be from 1967
NIES = The Newly Industrialized economies
OECD = Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPEC = Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OTC = over-the-counter market
PPI = Producer Price Index. PPI measures average changes in selling prices received by
Domestic producers for their output. The PPIs track the rate of price change in
the manufacturing, mining, agriculture, and electric utility industries. The PPIs
most often used for economic analysis are the three stage-of-processing indexes,
composed of: finished goods, intermediate goods, and crude goods
PPP = purchasing power parity
Rp = rupiah, Indonesian money
SBI = Sertificat Bank Indonesia, Bank Indonesia certificate, a security issued by Bank
Indonesia
SBPU = Surat berharga pasar uang, money market security that can be sold to Bank
Indonesia
S&P = Standard and Poor's
VAR = Value at risk
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VAT = value-added tax
VRR = Value Recovery Rights












: Thousands of students hold campus protests.
May 1 st : President Suharto said that political reform cannot come, constitutionally, before
2003.
May 4th: The government raised fuel prices 71%. Riots broke out in the North Sumatran
capital of Medan, six die.
May 9 : President Suharto left for a week-long visit to Egypt.
May 12 th : Six students were shot and killed at Trisakti University in Jakarta. Vice
president, B. J. Habibie, expressed the government's "deepest condolences." The armed
forces promised to investigate. The movement for political reform, carried along for three
months by daily student demonstrations throughout the country, reached a turning point.
May 1 3 : Southeast Asian currencies (including the rupiah) and bourses weakened
considerably because of the political fallout from Indonesia. Riots broke out in some part
of Jakarta.
May 14th : President Suharto said any changes must be through constitutional means.
Chaos reigns. Mob attacks and damaged buildings are linked to firms controlled by
President Suharto's family and friends, and owned by ethnic Chinese.
May 15 th : President Suharto returned and ordered ministers to act against rioters. The
government reduced some oil prices.
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May 16 : President Suharto pledged to shuffle cabinet soon. Hundreds of foreigners and
ethnic Chinese flew out of Jakarta. The death toll from a week of rioting, arson and




: The students occupied the national parliament building. They were planning to
stay there until President Suharto resigned. They had widespread support from the
people.
May 18 th : Parliamentary Speaker Harmoko, a close associate of the president, called on




: President Suharto promised to step down but did not specify when.
May 20 : Suharto's Golkar party called on the president to resign
May 21 st : President Suharto announced his resignation and vice-president B. J. Habibie
became the new president. World leaders welcomed the resignation of President Suharto,
and said the move could be a giant step toward democracy in the Asian nation, the
world's fourth most populous country with some 202 million people. The rupiah closed




Anne O. Krueger, Trade Policy and Economic Development: How We Learn, American
Economic Review, Vol. 87 March 1997.
Anne-Marie Guide, Banking Sector Challenges, Indonesia-Selected Issues, IMF Staff Country
Report No. 97/76, September 1997, p.54.
Bank Indonesia, Indonesia - Memorandum ofEconomic and Financial Policies, January 1998.
Business news. Economy in 1998, www. indonesiatoday.com
BNI Securities, Daily - Economics, December 22, 1997.
BNI Securities, Daily - Corporate News, February 4, 1998.
BNI Securities, Daily- Corporate News, February 9, 1998.
BNI Securities, Daily-Corporate News, March 3, 1998.
BNI Securities, Daily-Corporate News, March 9, 1998.
Bob Davis, IMF Signals Assent To Jakarta Currency Board, The Wall Street Journal, March 11,
1998.
Chakravarthi Raghavan, Developing Countries Should Retain Some Capital Controls, Third
World Network No. 86, October 1997.
Charles S. Lee, The Next Domino, Far Eastern Economic Review, November 20, 1997.
Cherrie Marriott, Battling the bulge, Asia money, July/August 1996.
Darren McDermott and Jay Solomon, Suharto Considers Pegging Rupiah to Dollar, The Wall
Street Journal, February 10, 1998.
Darren McDermott and Jay Solomon, Indonesian Debt Plan Leaves Bankers Skeptical, The Wall
Street Journal, January 28, 1998.
Edward C. Schultz, Dynamic Indonesia Economy leads Asia Pasific Region,
www.solusinet.com/econ02.htm
The Economist, The doctors at the door, March 7, 1998.
The Economist, Suharto's Family Value, March 14, 1998.
The economist Newspaper, Getting Out OfA Fix, The economic Newspaper Limited ,1998.
ECONIT: Economic Outlook 1997, Indonesian Economy 1997: Year of Uncertainty.
177
Edmund L. Andrews, Report: Banks Shut Off Capital to Asia Last Fall as Greed Turned To Fear,
The New York Times, January 30, 1998.
Financial Times, Timetable: Countdown to crisis, January 13, 1998.
The Financial Times, World Stock Markets, Currencypeg doubts drive down Jakarta 9%,,
February 13. 1998.
External Debt Statistics, 1996 edition, OECD.
Financial Times, East Asian Shipwreck, February 16, 1998.
Giancarlo Corsetti-Paulo Pesenti-Nouriel Roubini, What caused the Asian currency andfinancial
crisis?, p. 59, Nouriel Roubini homepage, March 1998.
Henny Sender, Thorny Hedge, Far Eastern Economic Review, August 28, 1997.
Henny Sender, Money Isn 7 Everything, Far Eastern Economic Review, February 12, 1998.
Imam B. Sarjito, Economic Brief, BNI Securities equity research, January 1998.
IMF Staff Country Report No.97/75, Indonesia-Recent Economic Developments, p.9-
10,Washington D. C. September 1997.
IMF Research Department Staff, Capital Flow Sustainability and Speculative Currency Attacks,
Finance & Development / December 1997.
IMF Staff Team, International Capital Markets, IMF, Washington, DC, 1997.
IMF, IMF Approves Stand-By Creditfor Indonesia, Press Release No. 97/50, November 5, 1997.
IMF, IMF Welcomes Indonesia 's Exchange Rate Action, IMF News Brief No. 97/1 8, August 14,
1997.
IMF, World Economic Outlook, May 1997.
IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 1997.
IMF, World Economic Outlook, Interim Assessment, December 1997, International Monetary
Fund.
Indonesian Business: The Year in Review 1997, Chapter 2, Macro Economic Indicators, The
Castle Group Business Information.
Indonesian Business: The Year in Review 1997, The Castle Group Business Information.
Indonesian Business: The Year In Review 1997, The Castle Group Business Information, Chapter
1, Capital Markets, Banking and Finance.
Indonesia's Economic Crisis -A chronology ofevents,
http:www.indonesiatoday.eom/a3/j6/yl.html#Top
178
Jay Solomon, IMF Digs In Heels on Indonesian Rupiah Plan, The Wall Street Journal, February
17, 1998.
Jay Solomon and Kate Linebaugh, IMF Offers Face-Saving Proposal to Suharto, The Wall Street
Journal February 19, 1998.
Jay Salomon and Richard Borsuk, IndonesiaJMF appear to move closer to accord, The Wall
Street Journal, March 18, 1998.
J.S. Djiwandono, The Banking Industry Facing the 21s' Century, Bank Indonesia.
John McBeth, Big is best, Far Eastern Economic Review, November 13, 1997.
John McBeth, Flame Out, Far Eastern Economic Review, December 18, 1997.
John McBeth, Ground Zero, Far Eastern Economic Review, January 22, 1998.
John McBeth. Double or Nothing, Far Eastern Economic Review, February 26, 1998.
John McBeth and Salil Tripathi, Playing With Ire, Far Eastern Economic Review, March 5, 1998.
John McBeth, Suharto 's Way, Far Eastern Economic Review, March 26, 1998.
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Boats, Planes and capitalflows, Financial Times, March 25, 1998.
KK. and Andi Zulfikar, Strategy to safe rupiah, Gatra Number 48/111, October 18, 1997.
Kompas, Sangatlah Benar, Laju Pertumbuhan Expor Sudah Mengkhawatirkan, April 16, 1996.
Kompas, Meninvest: Investasi Asing Meningkat, February 18, 1998.
Margot Cohen, Unlucky Country, Far Eastern Economic Review, December 25, 1997 and January
1. 1998.
Martin Khor, Currency Sabotage Should Be An International Crime, Third World Network
Features, August 1997.
Martin Wolf, Capital Punishment, Financial Times, March 17, 1998.
Michel Camdessus, Press Conference at Hong Kong Convention and Exhibition Center, IMF,
September 25, 1997).
Michel Camdessus, The Asian Financial Crisis and the Opportunities ofGlobalization, Address
at the Second Committee ofthe United Nations General Assembly, New York, October 31, 1997,
IMF.
Michel Camdessus, The Asian Crisis and The International Response, Address at The Institute of
Advanced Business Studies (IESE) ofthe University ofNavara, Spain, November 1997, IMF.
Michael Vatikiotis, Pacific Divide, Far Eastern Economic Review, November 6, 1997.
179
Murray Hiebert and John Mcbeth, Trial by Fire, Far Eastern Economic Review, October 16,
1997.
Nouriel Roubini, Chronology ofthe Asian Currency Crisis and its Global Contagion, 1997,
http://vvww.stern.nvu.edu/~nroubini/asia/AsiaChronologv 1 .html
Paul De Grauwe, Economic and Monetary Turmoil, Financial Times, February 20, 1998.
Paul Krugman, Currencies and Crises, p.xiv-xv, 1992, the MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, London, England.
Paul Krugman, Currency Crises.
Paul M. Dickie, For Asia, Confidence Means Structural Reform, International Herald Tribune,
February 17, 1998.
Peter Landers and Dan Biers, This Will Hurt, Far Eastern Economic Review, December 4, 1997.
Peter Montagnon and Sander Thoenes, On the Critical List, The Financial Times, January 16,
1998.
Peter Passell, In Indonesia, Showdown On Risky Bet, The New York Times, February 19, 1998.
Raphael Pura and Richard Borsuk, Suharto 's Likely No. 2 Man Could Stir Storm, The Wall Street
Journal, January 21, 1998.
Reuters, Chronology ofthe Asianfinancial crisis, February 01,1998.
Richard Borsuk and Jay Solomon, Indonesia Dismisses Central-Bank Governor, The Wall Street
Journal, February 18, 1998.
Salil Tripathi, Face the Music, Far Eastern Economic Review, December 25, 1997 and January 1,
1998.
Salil Tripathi, Hanke Panky?, Far Eastern Economic Review, February 19, 1998.
Sander Thoenes, Indonesia: The offshore borrowing trap, Financial Times, January 12, 1998.
Sander Thoenes, Indonesia stocksfall on Habibie decision, February 13, 1998.
Sander Thoenes, Suharto 's cabinet choices ignores pleasfor reform, The Financial Times, March
16, 1998.
Seth Mydans, Indonesia Agrees to Economic Reform Under Pressure From I.M.F, The New
York Times, January 15, 1998.
Seth Mydans, Indonesia Currency Falls Hard, Clouding Recovery, The New York Times,
January 23, 1998.
Seth Mydans, At Pivotal Time, Suharto Gets a 7th Term, The Wall Street Journal, March 1 1, 1998.
180
Shigemitsu Sugisaki, The Global Financial System: Status Report, IMF, November 18, 1997.
Shigemitsu Sugisaki, Economic Crises in Asia, Addressed at the 1998 Harvard Asia Business
Conference, Harvard Business School, January 30, 1998, IMF.
Stanley Fischer, The Asian Crisis: A Viewfrom the IMF, Addressee at the Midwinter Conference
of the Bankers' Associationfor Foreign Trade, Washington, D.C., January 22, 1998, IMF.
Stanley Fischer, The IMF and the Asian Crisis, March 20, 1998.
Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sach, The onset ofthe East Asian Financial Crisis, Harvard Institute
for International Development. 1998, mimeo.
The World Bank Group, Indonesia, country brief
The World Bank, Indonesia-Sustaining Development, p.2, Washington D.C., January 1994.
The World Bank, World Bank Strengthens Support For Indonesia, News Release No. 98/1503,
October 9, 1997.
The World Bank Group, East Asia Financial Crisis Leads To Tumultuous Year In Emerging





1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
8725 Kingman RgL STE 0944
Ft. Belvoir.VA 22060-6218














5. Desi Albert Mamahit 3
C o OMADP
United States Embassy








8. Perpustakaan Pusat 3
MABES TNI-AL, Cilangkap
Jakarta Timur. Indonesia
9. Ir. H. Malkan 1
Jin. Cilandak IX no. 4
Jakarta Selatan. Indonesia


9 483NPG
1H
10/99 22527-101
2%5
\

is-*


